Cisneros was 19 at time of jailbreak

Not a hoax:
New evidence in the New York Journal’s rescue of Evangelina Cisneros

For brazen lawlessness and breathtaking audacity, few episodes in American media history rival the case of “jail-breaking journalism” — the New York Journal’s rescue in October 1897 of Evangelina Cossío y Cisneros, an eighteen-year-old imprisoned at Havana’s Casa de Recogidas during the Cuban rebellion against Spanish rule. For the Journal, and for many other U.S. newspapers, the rescue of Cisneros represented a triumph over Spain’s ruthless attempts to quell the insurrection, which in 1898 gave rise to the Spanish-American War. It was also an unprecedented exploit of participatory journalism — an episode that has since been disparaged as “a magnificent farce” and “a masterpiece of manufactured news,” characterizations which this article challenges as mistaken.

Cisneros was arrested in July 1896 in what authorities said was her failed attempt to lure a senior Spanish military officer, Colonel José Bérriz, into a deadly trap on Cuba’s Isle of Pines. She was there to be with her father, a Cuban rebel figure confined to the island for his role in the insurgency. In an account published after the jailbreak, Cisneros said she resisted Bérriz’s unwelcome overtures but the officer was undeterred and visited her quarters uninvited to press his sexual entreaties. Her cries of protest alerted her friends, who seized Bérriz and tied him to a chair. Bérriz, in turn, was rescued by a passing patrol of Spanish troops, and Cisneros and her accomplices were arrested. She was subsequently sent to the Casa de Recogidas, Havana’s squalid jail for destitute women, and kept there without trial.

The Journal — flagship of William Randolph Hearst’s emergent newspaper chain and archetype of the genre of yellow journalism then flaring in urban America — rejected the ambiguities of the case and sided unreservedly with Cisneros. To the Journal, she was “guilty of no crime save that of having in her veins the best blood in Cuba” and her imprisonment and “bestial persecution” were telling illustrations of Spain’s harsh treatment of Cuban women — a not-infrequent theme in American newspapers in 1897. The Journal, moreover, reported that Cisneros faced a twenty-year sentence in a Spanish penal colony off the north African coast, and invoked prospect in mounting a petition drive in the late summer 1897, to pressure Spain to release “the Cuban girl martyr.” The Journal enlisted in its effort such
Notable American women as Julia Ward Howe; the mother of President William McKinley, and the widow of Jefferson Davis.  

But the campaign to free Cisneros failed. In late August 1897, Hearst sent Karl Decker, a reporter at the Journal’s Washington bureau, to Cuba to plot Cisneros’ rescue. Decker—with the help of accomplices later identified as Carlos F. Carbonell, Francisco (Paco) De Besche, and William B. MacDonald—succeeded in breaking Cisneros out of the Casa de Recogidas in the early hours of 7 October 1897. After two days in hiding, she was smuggled aboard the Seneca, a Ward Line passenger steamer that arrived in New York on 13 October 1897.

The Journal lauded the escape as “epochal,” and as “the greatest journalistic coup of this age.” It praised Decker’s “superb audacity and dashing intrepidity.” Scores of U.S. newspapers likewise commended the rescue and many of their editorial tributes were reprinted in the Journal. The weekly trade publication Fourth Estate hailed the jailbreak as an “international triumph” and The Journalist said the case was evocative more “of medieval romance than of nineteenth century journalism.”

But at the same time, suspicions arose about the circumstances of Cisneros’ escape. The Journal’s critics speculated that the rescue was a hoax, that “the whole matter was a ‘put-up job’” to which Spanish authorities had given at least their tacit approval. Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee, the senior U.S. diplomat in Havana, at first encouraged such impressions, saying that Spanish authorities “must have winked at” Cisneros’ flight from Cuba because she never could have fled the island “without their permit.” Lee, who was in the United States on home leave at the time of the jailbreak, soon contradicted that characterization, dismissing the notion of Spanish collusion in the escape as “absurd” and saying it “took brave, resolute and fearless men to plan and carry out the scheme.”

Lee’s contrary statements escaped wide notice, however, and the suggestion the jailbreak was a hoax took hold. The New York Times referred to Lee’s “must-have-winked-at” comment in describing the jailbreak as a “remarkable case of unobstructed rescue.” Years later, Willis J. Abbot, a former editor of the Journal who had joined the Christian Science Monitor, pointedly dismissed the Cisneros case as “a false bit of cheap sensationalism.” Abbot claimed in a book of reminiscences that he was “at the office during the progress of this comedy and in daily contact with Hearst” and asserted that the escape was facilitated by bribes paid to Cisneros’ jailers. The Journal’s account of a dramatic rescue, Abbot wrote, was meant not only to present readers with a riveting tale but “to exonerate” complicit jailers in Havana as well.
Abbot’s challenge to the *Journal’s* jailbreak narrative was, however, thin on documentation and short on logic: It notably failed to explain why the *Journal* would have gone to such lengths to protect jailers in Havana—and neglected to mention that they had been arrested soon after the escape.\(^{30}\) Abbot also overlooked the official notice, published in Havana and widely reported\(^{31}\) in the United States, in which the Spanish prosecutor ordered civil and military authorities to search for and arrest Cisneros and return her to Havana.\(^{32}\) In addition, authorities searched the offices of Hidalgo & Co., the agents for Ward Line, and maintained a watch on the *Journal’s* bureau.\(^{33}\) Such response suggests that authorities in Havana regarded the Cisneros escape as a serious breach.

Moreover, Abbot’s claim that he was in close contact with Hearst at the time of the jailbreak—an assertion key to his version of the case—almost certainly is exaggerated and probably inaccurate. By early October 1897, Abbot had begun a leave of absence from the *Journal* to lead the campaign committee of Henry George, one of four candidates running that fall to become New York City mayor.\(^{34}\) The George campaign began in earnest 5 October 1897—two days before the Cisneros jailbreak—with a rally at Cooper Union, at which Abbot participated as chairman of the resolutions committee.\(^{35}\) News accounts in early October describe Abbot as working earnestly to reconcile the fractious elements of George’s ill-fated candidacy.\(^{36}\) Given his commitments to the George campaign, Abbot’s dismissive claims about the Cisneros escape must be treated with caution.\(^{37}\)

In any event, Abbot’s critique has informed many subsequent accounts of the Cisneros escape—including those appearing in John Stevens’ *Sensationalism and the New York Press*, Joyce Milton’s *The Yellow Kids*, W. A. Swanberg’s *Citizen Hearst*, and Ben Procter’s *William Randolph Hearst: The Early Years*. A popular account published in 1968, “The Perils of Evangelina,” also cited Abbot’s version and despaired, “It seems unlikely that the world will ever know the full story.” Even the historian of the City of Havana, Eusebio Leal Spengler, said in an interview in March 2002 that he suspects the Cisneros episode is more legend than fact.\(^{43}\)

This article argues otherwise in presenting detailed evidence that the *Journal’s* rescue of Evangelina Cisneros was neither fraud nor “magnificent farce.” It concludes that the escape was not a “put-up job” but was, rather, the result of an intricate plan in which Cuba-based U.S. diplomatic personnel and associates took direct and indirect roles—roles that have remained obscure, or have been ignored, for more than 100 years. No research until now has attempted to examine the identities and contributions of Decker’s accomplices, men to whom he referred only by pseudonyms in published reports about the jailbreak. Scholarly
and popular accounts of the Cisneros escape have considered the case narrowly, typically as an example of Hearst’s “sense of entitlement” or of his purported capacity to manufacture news and celebrity during the era of yellow journalism. This article reaches beyond such a constricted focus.

In thus presenting the first detailed account of the participation of U.S. diplomatic personnel and associates in the Cisneros escape, the article concludes it is implausible that they would have taken such risks had the rescue been a farce or sham. This article’s conclusions also make clear that the Cisneros case was far more complex, and far more important to U.S. diplomatic officials in Cuba, than previously understood. Illuminating the heretofore obscure details of the jailbreak also underscores the importance of recalibrating scholarly and popular understanding of the yellow press period in the United States. The genre of yellow journalism, as practiced in New York City and elsewhere in urban America at the end of the nineteenth century, has long been susceptible to the distorting effects of myth and misinterpretation. Notable among the enduring myths of yellow journalism is Hearst’s purported vow to “furnish the war” with Spain—an anecdote often cited to support the broader yet dubious notion that the yellow press fomented the Spanish-American War.

The conclusions of this article are based on a detailed review of the correspondence of American diplomatic personnel assigned to Cuba in 1897. Their letters and reports are kept at the U.S. National Archives. Also central to this article was the collection of correspondence, reports, and manuscripts of Fitzhugh Lee at the University of Virginia. Until recently, researchers’ access to Lee’s papers was restricted, under terms of an agreement with the donor. Further, this article draws on several manuscript collections at the Library of Congress and on accounts of the Cisneros case published by Hearst’s Journal and by rival newspapers in New York City. Articles and editorials appearing in newspapers in Washington, D.C., and Richmond, Virginia, also yielded important insights.

Together, these accounts reveal that:

- a junior member of the U.S. consulate staff in Havana, Donnell Rockwell, provided a file or similarly small instrument with which Cisneros sawed surreptitiously, if futilely, at the bars of her cell. Rockwell was detained and closely questioned by Spanish authorities investigating the jailbreak, but soon released. Immediately after his release, Rockwell requested, and was granted by his superior, a thirty-day leave to travel to the United States, purportedly because of ill health.
- the U.S. consular officer in Sagua la Grande in central Cuba, Walter B. Barker, was aboard the Seneca, the New York-bound Ward Line steamer onto which Cisneros was smuggled in completing her escape from Havana. The New York World quoted the Seneca’s captain as saying that Cisneros spent much of the passage in the company of Barker and the vessel’s purser. Barker went to New York on a leave of absence that he requested in an unusually
hurried manner. Even so, Barker did not secure passage to New York on the first available passenger steamer.

- one of the principal conspirators, Carlos Carbonell, was a Cuban-American banker with close ties to Lee. Carbonell married Cisneros in June 1898, less than a month after proposing to her at Lee’s home in Virginia. Moreover, Carbonell was appointed a lieutenant on Lee’s military staff soon after the United States went to war with Spain. While on Lee’s staff, Carbonell was ordered by Lee “to quietly make investigation” into a prospective real estate deal in Cuba that Lee thought would be worth a fortune. It is unclear whether Lee pursued or invested in the venture, but Carbonell’s investigation represents additional evidence of the extent of his ties to Lee.

Although Lee was associated with Rockwell, Barker, and Carbonell, the available record does not tie him unequivocally to the Journal’s plot to free Cisneros. Nor is there evidence suggesting that State Department officials in Washington—including John Sherman, the secretary of state, or William R. Day, the first assistant secretary of state—encouraged, countenanced, or even knew about the conspiracy.

Even so, it is inconceivable that Lee was unaware of the plot, given his keen interest in Cisneros. He was, moreover, the common link among Rockwell, Barker, and Carbonell. And Lee’s own account of the Cisneros case—an unpublished draft manuscript written in 1898 and intended to be a book chapter—offers considerable detail about the escape. Notably, Lee clarifies Carbonell’s role, describing it as essential to Cisneros’ flight from Havana.

In addition, Lee’s correspondence with State Department officials clearly shows that the affable consul-general—a former Confederate cavalry commander and a favorite source for U.S. correspondents covering the Cuban insurrection—relished scheming, intrigue, and intelligence-gathering. “I am,” Lee wrote during his assignment in Havana, “charged with delicate important secret functions [in] addition to my regular consular duties.” With the State Department’s assent, Lee in 1896 set up a $1,200 fund to pay for what he called a “secret service” or “a secret detective system,” a covert network that allowed him to be “accurately informed of all that goes on in the city [of Havana] and some other parts of the Island.” The “secret service” was intended, Lee said, to provide early warning about emergent crises and deteriorating conditions in Cuba. His correspondence with the State Department indicates that Lee sought no guidance from Washington in conducting his intelligence-gathering operation in Havana. Although his official correspondence did not identify the informants he recruited, Lee often informed the State Department about the reports from sources he called his “scouts” in Cuba.

Significantly, Lee took keen interest in the incarceration of Cisneros and once reportedly vowed: “If that young girl is liberated I will do anything in the world to protect
her from the sharks that will await her even at the prison door.”61 His wife and daughter visited Cisneros in prison in early 1897, and by doing so sought to “relieve the tedium and distress of her imprisonment.”62

Lee’s unpublished manuscript also makes clear that he went beyond the duties of an American diplomat and urged Spanish authorities to ease the harsh conditions of Cisneros’ detention at Casa de Recogidas.63 “Words fail me,” he wrote, “in describing the horrors of this place, and the appearance of the dissolute gang of women confined therein.”64 Lee said he had noticed Cisneros while visiting several American women who were briefly jailed there. “I succeeded in having the Americans finally released,” he wrote in the manuscript, “but the picture of this pretty young girl being left behind continued to haunt me.” He took up her case with senior Spanish authorities and soon less-punishing accommodations were built for what Lee called “the better class of prisoners”—Cisneros among them.65

In mid-August 1897, Lee went to the extraordinary length of writing a personal letter to the Spanish governor-general in Cuba, invoking his wife and daughter in asking for Cisneros’ release.66 The governor-general, Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, rejected Lee’s overture, referring indirectly to the Journal’s campaign to press Spain for Cisneros’ release. “I cannot conceal that the propaganda which is going on in the United States [would make] my action rather difficult,” Weyler wrote, “but I trust that this will disappear and that when the time comes I may be able to see if I can find a way of acceding to Mrs. and Miss Lee’s request.”67 Weyler’s letter—which ruled out a timely release—was written 28 August 1897, the day, coincidentally, when Decker arrived in Havana to begin plotting the jailbreak.68 A week later,69 Lee left Cuba on home leave.70 While in Havana, Decker acted as the Journal’s Cuba correspondent and worked from the newspaper’s bureau in Casa Nueva—a building in the heart of Havana that also housed the U.S. consulate71 and offices of Hidalgo & Co., Havana agents of the Ward steamship line, which operated the Seneca.72

A few hints and passing references about the roles of U.S. diplomatic personnel in the Cisneros escape have appeared elsewhere, in works by James L. Nichols, George Clarke Musgrave, and Cora Older. Nichols’ biography of Lee drew on the papers at the University of Virginia and includes a passing reference to the Cisneros case. Nichols noted that Lee was in the United States at the time of the jailbreak and mentioned in an endnote73 that Carbonell and Rockwell had helped “in rigging the hair-raising ‘rescue.’”74

Musgrave, who was a correspondent for the Journal in Cuba, mentioned in his book, Under Three Flags in Cuba, that Rockwell, the consular clerk, had obtained a pass that allowed Musgrave and Decker to visit Cisneros in jail.75 Older’s hagiographic treatment of Hearst
mentions that Decker, in recruiting co-conspirators in Havana, had "obtained the assistance of Lee" who made available the services of Rockwell. Older’s account must be treated with caution, however, as it is riddled with error. Among other lapses is Older’s mistaken reference to the jailbreak as having occurred in November 1897. And neither Nichols’ nor Musgrave’s nor Older’s account explores the extent to which Rockwell, Barker, and Carbonell figured in the rescue or considers the implications of their contributions.

There was, to be sure, obvious reason for U.S. diplomatic personnel and their associates to have concealed or deflected attention from their roles, given the lawlessness inherent in the jailbreak. Likewise, there was ample reason for Hearst and Decker to have minimized or ignored the contributions of others. The Journal—ever inclined to self-promotion—said the jailbreak as due almost entirely to the shrewdness and skill of its correspondent, Decker. That he had accomplices was, for the Journal, a minor, subordinate detail.

Moreover, the rescue of Cisneros was emblematic of the Journal’s emergent activist ethos—a manifestation of what it termed the “journalism that acts” or the “journalism that does things.” A newspaper’s duty must not be “confined to exhortation,” the Journal declared after Cisneros arrived in New York City. When “things are going wrong it should set them right, if possible.” The Cisneros case, it declared, represented a “brilliant exemplification of this theory.”

The “journalism that acts” was a brash even reckless, media-centric conception that maintained that newspapers had a duty to seek to correct wrongs when other agencies would not or could not. Flouting international law could even be rationalized by the “journalism that acts.” The Journal said it was “quite aware of the rank illegality” of the Cisneros jailbreak. But it declared itself “boundlessly glad” to have freed the prisoner and acknowledged “a savage satisfaction in striking a smashing blow at a legal system that has become an organized crime. Spanish martial law in Cuba is not, thank God, the law of the United States.”

The Journal, moreover, characterized the “journalism that acts” as “the final stage in the evolution of the modern newspaper,” a paradigm impatient with merely gathering and publishing the news: “It does not wait for things to turn up,” the Journal said of the policy. “It turns them up.” But as the Cisneros case made clear, the media-centricism of the “journalism that acts” was misleading: It required the support of sympathetic officials to be effective.
The *Journal* made certain that attention remained trained on Cisneros and Decker during the days and weeks following their separate arrivals in New York. They were, notably, celebrated at a thunderous reception at Madison Square in New York City. Decker was feted in late October 1897 by fellow correspondents at a lavish banquet in Washington, D.C. Lee “was specially invited” to the banquet, but declined, citing unspecified “other important engagements.” And the respective, first-person accounts that Decker and Cisneros wrote for the *Journal* were published as a book.

In his jailbreak narrative, Decker assigns pseudonyms to two of his accomplices, calling them Hernandon and Mallory. But the account does not describe how Decker recruited them beyond stating, vaguely, that “everything depended upon finding the right men, and in this I was most fortunate. I needed men who spoke Spanish as a native tongue and were familiar with Havana.”

Lee in his manuscript draft wrote that the “idea of releasing from prison Evangelina seems first to have entered the brain of Mr. Donald Rockwell, who was then consular clerk in my office. He had met her on several occasions on visitors days at the Casa de Recogidas, and becoming interested in her case[,] first mentioned the matter to Mr. Decker who brought it to the attention of Mr Hurst[,] the proprietor of the New York Journal, who authorized him to make the attempt. … It was not long before Mr. Decker took into his confidence Mr. W. B. McDonald of Havana, Mr. C. F. Carbonell and a few others, who heartily endorsed a plan for her release.”

What follows is a discussion about how Rockwell, Barker, and Carbonell figured in the jailbreak of Evangelina Cisneros. Each in his way was sympathetic to the Cuban insurgency. Each had a record of acting furtively or of defying convention. To participate in the rescue of Cisneros, therefore, would have been out of character for none of the three men.

**Rockwell: The troubled consular clerk**

Lee’s manuscript identifies Rockwell as having taken an active role in the plot to free Cisneros. Specifically, Lee said that Rockwell had smuggled “an instrument” to Cisneros who used it to saw at the bars of her cell before her rescue. Her efforts were unavailing, however, because she “did not understand the management of the instrument Mr. Rockwell gave her,” Lee’s manuscript says. Lee also wrote that Rockwell gave Cisneros “some sweet meats that had opium mixed with them,” which were to induce the deep sleep of her cellmates before the jailbreak.

While Lee’s manuscript contains no clear indication that he knew in advance about Rockwell’s smuggling the cutting instrument and narcotic-laced sweet meats to Cisneros, it
is exceedingly unlikely that Rockwell would have acted unilaterally. Lee in any event was aware of Rockwell’s interest in the Cisneros case: Lee’s papers show that Rockwell had reported to the consul-general in July 1897 about the account Cisneros had given him about the events that had culminated in her arrest and jailing.94

A further reason that Rockwell was unlikely to have acted alone was his subordinated status. Lee not only was Rockwell’s superior but in effect was also his probation officer: In early 1897, Lee suspended Rockwell for being “unfit for duty from drink” and reinstated the clerk with an unequivocal warning.

Rockwell began his duties at the Havana consulate in May 1896, shortly before Lee arrived to take up the consul-general’s position.95 In response to an inquiry from the State Department, which was checking on a report that Rockwell had been “drinking as hard as ever,”96 Lee confirmed that the clerk had “on several occasions been unfit for duty from drink. He has also been temporarily indisposed from slight illnesses and been in hospital for several days.”97 Lee told the Department that he had suspended Rockwell in March 1897, “when again he was somewhat under the influence of liquor.” Lee further wrote: “After two or three days of suspension and repentance and the most solemn promises that I should not have occasion to find fault with him again, I reinstated him in his duties with the warning and with the understanding that any further offense would be reported to the Department.”98

Correspondence from the Havana consulate indicate that Rockwell later sought a transfer “to some other post”99—but that he also earnestly completed an unofficial, information-gathering assignment for Lee in late July 1897, on a visit to friends in Artemisa in Pinar del Rio, Cuba’s westernmost province. Lee had asked Rockwell to report about the effects in Artemisa of Spain’s harsh and much-criticized policy of “reconcentration,” in which Cuban non-combatants were ordered into garrison towns. The policy was intended to deprive the Cuban insurgents of popular support in the countryside but in practice, “reconcentration” led to much suffering and the deaths of tens of thousands of Cubans. The plight of Cuban reconcentrados outraged the American public and may have done “more to bring on the Spanish-American War than anything else the Spanish could have done.”100

Rockwell wrote a vivid and detailed report that described dreadful conditions in what he called the “doomed settlement.” The death toll in Artemisa from starvation, Rockwell wrote, was twenty-five to thirty-five a day. “The death cart makes its rounds several times daily, and into it the corpses are thrown without ceremony, and taken to the cemetary[sic] where they are interred in a long ditch,” he stated. “A thin layer of earth is then
cast on the remains, and the next day the operation is repeated till the ditch is full.”¹⁰¹ Rockwell also wrote: “This state of affairs now to be seen in Artemisa is but a repetition of what is taking place in all the towns of reconcentration on the Island.”¹⁰²

Lee sent Rockwell’s report to the State Department with an accompanying cover letter in which he wrote: “I can assure the Department that there is no exaggeration in the reports of the overwhelming misery, sufferings, and death of the Cuban reconcentrados.” Lee in the letter vouched for Rockwell, describing him as “a very conscientious and truthful man.”¹⁰³ Margin notes on Lee’s cover letter indicate that Rockwell’s report was shown to President McKinley. The report is revealing of not only of the plight of the reconcentrados but of Lee’s willingness to call upon consular staff to collect information unofficially. It also suggests Rockwell’s sympathies for the Cubans and his earnestness in courting Lee’s favor.

In the days after the jailbreak, Spanish authorities in Havana came to suspect Rockwell and on 12 October 1897 questioned him “closely as to his knowledge of Miss Cisneros’s rescue,” the Journal reported, adding: “Finally he was able to refute all the accusations of his connivance in the affair. As a friend of the prisoner he frequently visited the Casa [de] Recogidas and was thus suspected by the authorities of assisting in her flight.”¹⁰⁴ Within hours of his interrogation, Rockwell asked Joseph Springer, the consulate’s senior officer during Lee’s absence, for a thirty-day leave to travel to the United States. Springer promptly approved Rockwell’s request and sent it to the State Department, citing “ill health” as justification.¹⁰⁵ The request was quickly approved in Washington.

It is not precisely clear when Rockwell left Cuba, whether he returned, or even whether he remained in the U.S. diplomatic service.¹⁰⁶ Lee’s correspondence indicates that Rockwell over Stayed his thirty-day leave but that he was still expected back in Havana in late November 1897.¹⁰⁷ In any event, Rockwell’s contributing role in the jailbreak represents a direct and unequivocal link between the U.S. consulate in Havana and the plot to free Cisneros.

Barker: The ‘fighting consul’

While Rockwell was being questioned by authorities in Havana, Cisneros was aboard the Ward Line steamer Seneca, bound for New York City. Also on board was Walter Barker, the U.S. consul in Sagua la Grande in central Cuba. Barker was a veteran of the Confederate army whom Lee in 1896 had described as “worthy of the highest credence.”¹⁰⁸ Barker also was a rough-edged bachelor, prone to hyperbole and known to flout protocol. Once, in response to rumors that his consulate was about to be overrun by a pro-Spanish mob, Barker
reportedly said that he placed “great faith in God and [my] repeating rifle.”109 Decker told a pro-Cuba rally in Washington, D.C., in May 1897 that Barker five months earlier had deterred demonstrators from moving on the consulate by making clear he would confront them “with his Winchester.”110 The Journal in 1898 called Barker “a fighting consul.”111 Barker’s presence aboard the Seneca in October 1897 was the culmination of an urgent—and highly unusual—request for leave of absence. At the end of September, Barker asked for leave, stating in a telegram to the State Department: “Unless my presence here next thirty days essential my health requires asking visit New York. Kindly wire answer.”112 Requesting leave in such a manner was a sharp departure from routine. The next day, Barker submitted a letter to the State Department, through the Havana consulate, properly requesting leave. In the letter, Barker said he hoped “the Department will pardon me for the liberty of conveying my request through a telegram.”113 Barker’s letter does not explain the urgency of his request, beyond stating: “During the entire summer I have suffered from impaired health; my physician states, that, if nothing more, a round trip would benefit me. … Should leave be given me, I will visit New York and Washington only.”114 Barker’s application for leave was approved 2 October 1897 by Springer, the acting consul-general in Havana,115 and by the State Department on 4 October 1897.116 Given his expedited request for leave, it is indeed quite curious that Barker failed to travel to New York as speedily as was possible. Swifter passage to New York was available to him, on the Concho, a Ward line steamer that left Havana on 7 October 1897, two days before the Seneca. The Concho and twenty-five passengers arrived in New York on 11 October 1897.117

On 8 October 1897—the day after the jailbreak—Barker left Sagua for Havana. The Seneca departed Havana for New York on 9 October 1897, after Cisneros had been smuggled aboard the vessel, dressed as a boy.118 Upon arriving in New York, Barker told a reporter for the Journal that he had not seen Cisneros until the second day out and did not know how she had boarded the Seneca. He was further quoted by the Journal as saying: “Of course my position forbids my discussing her case.”119

The New York World—the Journal’s keenest rival and, as such, the newspaper most likely to probe for gaps and inconsistencies in the Journal’s account of the jailbreak or of any exclusive report—offered a different and more detailed account about the passage to New York. The World said that Cisneros spent much of her time aboard in the company of Barker and the ship’s purser. The World’s source was the ship’s captain, Frank Stevens, who was quoted as saying:
“After supper the first night out, [Cisneros] took a promenade on the deck and met some of the passengers. Among them was Walter B. Barker, United States Consul at Sagua. She addressed him in Spanish *with an air which seemed to me as if she had met him before*. The purser, too, seemed to recall her as an old acquaintance. All the way she spent much of her time in his office.

“I didn’t see her again till Sunday [10 October 1897]. Monday and Tuesday she *spent most of her time with Mr. Barker* and the purser. She was seasick some of the time, but kept on deck.”

Barker’s presence on the *Seneca*, acting in effect as Cisneros’ chaperone, may have been coincidental. Lee did report in August 1897 that U.S. consuls in Cuba were “all more or less sick,” telling the State Department that they would benefit from leaves of absence. But the urgency with which Barker sought his leave, the timing of his request, and his choice of steamer to the United States all combine to make such a coincidence quite extraordinary.

An entirely plausible alternate explanation is that Barker’s presence aboard the *Seneca* represented a precautionary component of the conspiracy to free Cisneros: Had Spanish authorities challenged the departure of a vessel owned by an American company, who better to have aboard than a tough-minded, Spanish-speaking U.S. diplomat not reluctant to bend the rules? To be sure, challenging the vessel’s departure was not a far-fetched prospect. Spanish authorities in September 1896 had forcibly removed Samuel S. Tolon, a naturalized American citizen, from the decks of the *Seneca* as the steamer was about to leave Havana. Tolon was jailed three weeks on suspicion of aiding the Cuban rebellion.

But beyond his hurried and unorthodox request for a leave of absence, Barker’s official correspondence contains no tangible clues about whether he was a participant in the conspiracy. Nor does a private letter he sent to Lee in late November 1897, after both men had returned to Cuba from their respective leaves. In her account of the rescue, Cisneros wrote that she remained hidden in a state room of the *Seneca* until the vessel had left Havana and she was summoned by “a friend,” whom she declined to identify. “He called out his name, which for his own sake must still be a secret,” her account said. In an earlier, lengthy version of her escape, published in the *Journal* ten days after the jailbreak, Cisneros said the *Seneca’s* purser was the man who came looking for her.

While the precise reasons for Barker’s presence aboard the *Seneca* remain uncertain, State Department records make clear that he was known to defy protocol and to clash with Spanish authorities about his conduct and duties in Sagua. Lee’s predecessor had reprimanded Barker in 1896 for ignoring diplomatic practice in attempting to forward three
Not a hoax

private letters through the consulate in Havana. The letters—written by Cubans and addressed to Tómas Estrada Palma, leader of the pro-independence Cuban junta in New York—were intercepted by Ramon Williams, the then-U.S. consul-general in Havana. Williams rebuked Barker and pointedly reminded him of the regulations describing the proper conduct of diplomatic personnel.\textsuperscript{128} Williams also reported Barker’s indiscretion to the State Department, noting that Barker had violated consular regulations.\textsuperscript{129}

Barker’s conduct in Sagua irritated Spanish authorities who, in 1896 and 1897, complained that he exceeded his authority in “assuming the character of Consul of the United States at Sagua, as he calls himself.”\textsuperscript{130} The Spanish insisted that he was authorized only to act as a U.S. commercial agent, the position for which he had been accredited in 1894. Barker had been designated U.S. consul in Sagua in August 1896, but Spanish authorities were slow or reluctant to confirm the appointment.\textsuperscript{131} In the meantime, they complained that he was meddlesome. Weyler, the Spanish governor-general in Cuba, protested in a letter to Lee that Barker “frequently addresses communications, sometimes in not very correct form, inquiring with respect to the standing of military proceedings” to which American citizens were parties.\textsuperscript{132} In addition, the Spanish minister to the United States, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, suspected Barker was an agent of the Cuban insurgents.\textsuperscript{133}

Barker’s reports to the State Department show that he was appalled by the ruin caused by both sides in the rebellion, saying the Spanish forces and Cuban insurgents were “vying with each other in the devastation of the country.”\textsuperscript{134} His correspondence was replete with hyperbole. “Anarchy not only reigns,” he reported in spring 1896, “but is daily on the increase.”\textsuperscript{135} By mid-summer 1897, Barker said the insurrection was “no longer a semblance of war, but extermination of the inhabitants, with destruction of all property.”\textsuperscript{136}

His reports were nonetheless perceptive in asserting that Spain had little hope of quelling the insurrection which had begun in February 1895. Barker, moreover, evinced little respect for Spanish military forces, describing their conduct as amounting to “general inactivity” while “continuing to occupy altogether a defensive position.” He also wrote that “the Cuban is rare, of whatever station in life, who is not in arms or in sympathy with the revolt.”\textsuperscript{137} His correspondence makes clear that Barker’s sympathies likewise ran to the Cubans.

**Carbonell: The essential conspirator**

Lee’s unpublished manuscript is strikingly detailed about the role of Carlos Carbonell, a Cuban-American who had turned forty-seven just three days before the
Not a hoax

Carbonell, a banker who had earned a degree at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1875, concealed Cisneros in his house for two days after the escape and then smuggled her aboard the Seneca, Lee’s account says. The Journal in May 1898 disclosed that Carbonell had been an accomplice—or what it termed “not the least important of Karl Decker’s aid[es]”—in the Cisneros escape. The Journal’s report was prompted by what in the spring of 1898 had become an open secret in Richmond—that Carbonell was engaged to be married to Cisneros. The Journal reported that he had proposed marriage at Lee’s house in Richmond, while Cisneros was visiting. Carbonell had left Cuba in April 1898 as the U.S. entry into the war became certain. Lee, Barker, and other U.S. diplomatic personnel departed for the United States that month as well.

Lee’s manuscript describes Carbonell as central to Cisneros’ successful flight from Cuba and offers new details about Cisneros’ refuge at Carbonell’s house. Her time there was harrowing from the moment she arrived in a horse-drawn carriage that had sped her from the jail. As she left the carriage, two policemen were passing on foot and one of them “had to stop to let the young lady go into Mr. Carbonell’s house,” Lee wrote. “The servant who was opening the door upon hearing the carriage approach, told Mr. Carbonell just as the girl did when she entered[,] ‘What a pity the police have seen us.’” But the suspicions of the policemen were not stirred, Lee wrote, as they did not search the premises.

Once inside, Cisneros was troubled to find that Carbonell had no family and presumed he was a widower, Lee wrote. Carbonell replied that he was a bachelor. With that, Cisneros “became a little nervous,” Lee wrote, “not knowing where she was to be taken. Mr. Carbonell then replied that … she would be respected in his house as much as his own mother.”

Cisneros was terrified of being found and arrested, and grew “more and more nervous every time she read a paper saying they were looking for her,” Lee’s manuscript says. She told Carbonell “that she would not surrender herself … by which she meant she would kill herself first.” Carbonell, Lee wrote, told her:

that if the police came to search the house, there would be three of them as that was the usual custom, one would stop at the door and the other two would come up stairs. Mr. Carbonell said in that case he would tell the police that she was his friend, and not the lady for whom they were looking; in case they would not believe him, he would try to bribe them. He then asked her what she would do in that case and [she] answered, ‘All that we can do is to fight. I know where your revolver is,’ upon which Mr. Carbonell sent for another revolver, and there they remained both of them having pistols.
Carbonell took other precautions to prevent Cisneros’ recapture, renting a house next to his. “The windows between the two houses were broken so that she could escape [next door] if necessary,” Lee wrote. 150

Carbonell had intended to smuggle Cisneros aboard the Seneca during the night of 8 October, after its arrival from Mexico. But “the steamer was behind time and did not arrive into port until the next day, the ninth, so he had to take her aboard in the day time,” Lee wrote. 151 “He then sent for his friend, Captain Stevens of the Seneca, and took him over and introduced him … to the young lady. Captain Stevens found her dressed as a boy, and agreed to take her to New York if she was put on board.” 152

Late in the afternoon that day, Carbonell told Decker and MacDonald that he “was going to put her aboard the Seneca that evening.” MacDonald wanted to take a photograph of Cisneros dressed as a boy, “but as he had never taken a photograph before, they made a mistake and took all five pictures on one plate,” Lee wrote. 153

Carbonell walked with Cisneros, who had an unlighted cigar in her mouth, the two blocks from his house to the wharf where they boarded a launch to the Seneca. While Cisneros waited in the launch, Lee wrote, Carbonell and the ship’s purser “induced” the policemen onboard “to go into the dining room with him and take a dirnk,[sic] while in the meantime Captain Stevens sent his Quartermaster down the gangway to bring the girl up.” 154 She was hidden in a stateroom. The cigar and the heat in her hideaway “made her quite sick,” Lee wrote. “Fortunately the steamer left soon afterwards and Mr. Carbonell went back to his house to inform Mr. Decker that everything was all right.” 155

Lee’s papers make clear that he and Carbonell were well-acquainted before the jailbreak 156 and, if anything, their association deepened afterward. The consul-general came to regard Carbonell as “an excellent man,” who was as “conscientious and honest as he can be.” 157 Carbonell also was a source of information for Lee. Several weeks after the Cisneros escape, he took Lee to visit a hospital in Havana where Cuban doctors treated Cuban women and children. Many patients were reconcentrados. In late November 1897, Lee wrote to his wife about visiting the hospital, telling her of seeing a malnourished “baby child of a reconcentrado — 6 months old and only a foot long.” 158

At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in April 1898, Lee was given command of the U.S. Seventh Army Corps. He appointed Carbonell to his staff, with the rank of lieutenant. The Seventh Corps remained in the United States during the war but afterward was ordered to Cuba. 160 Shortly before the Corps was deployed there, Carbonell went to
Havana with Lee’s instructions “to quietly make investigation in reference to certain properties that I know must largely increase in value the very instant the Corps reaches Havana, and proves by its presence that the United States proposes to see that law and order is maintained, and human life and property protected.” Lee envisioned buying land for a trolley line and solicited the backing of Daniel Lamont, a former U.S. secretary of war. “If a few of us can pick these properties up now, and build the trolley line, there are real millions in it,” Lee wrote to Lamont.

Carbonell reported from Havana that he had completed his investigation and suggested to Lee “that the sooner we buy the land and houses will be the better. You might write to your friends and try to have them come when you do it, as it will be a matter that should be decided right off as the longer it is delayed, the more it will cost.” Carbonell also told Lee: “Everybody is anxious to see you arrive to welcome you. ... All Cubans look at you as the salvation of the country.”

Carbonell’s name also surfaced during the U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry into the destruction in February 1898 of the U.S.S. Maine. In testimony before the Court of Inquiry, a U.S. consular clerk named Henry Drain said Carbonell had passed along an anonymous letter describing a purported plot to blow up the warship. Drain testified that Lee had instructed him “to consult with Mr. Carbonell, who would probably know more about it than anybody else.” Drain further testified that he regarded Carbonell as reliable, “from having known him several years.” The letter, which was included as an appendix to the Court of Inquiry’s record, was never substantiated. But it holds significance for the Cisneros case because it underscores that Carbonell was well-known to, and well-regarded by, Lee’s consular staff. And it demonstrates that Carbonell continued to engage in intrigue in Havana months after the Cisneros jailbreak.

**Discussion and conclusion**

The respective contributions of Rockwell, Barker, and Carbonell in the escape of Evangelina Cisneros effectively combine to dispute the notion that the jailbreak was a hoax or “magnificent farce.” It is inconceivable that U.S. diplomatic personnel and a prominent Cuban-American would have figured in the case were it a sham, deception, or a “put-up job.” They simply would have had neither reason nor motive to run the risks they did. Instead, their involvement represents powerful and telling corroboration of the *Journal’s* jailbreak narrative.
Moreover, the details contained in Lee’s unpublished manuscript make clear that the escape was the result of considerable planning and close attention to detail—and no small amount of good fortune. The plot was intricate and the conspirators, notably Carbonell, were forced to adapt to unanticipated complications, such as the Seneca’s belated arrival in Havana. Lee’s account, moreover, adds considerable detail to the two days Cisneros spent in hiding: It describes how Cisneros feared recapture and how she vowed to kill herself if arrest seemed imminent—certainly not the reaction characteristic of a hoax.

Lee’s manuscript, heretofore little-known, also represents persuasive testimony that the escape was not a hoax. His account is detailed and rings true. Given his interest in the case, Lee assuredly would not have described her escape as genuine had he known it to be spurious. Given the “secret service” network he established in Havana, Lee was in an exceptional position to know whether the escape was a hoax.

As this article has made clear, the Cisneros case was considerably more important to U.S. diplomatic officials in Cuba than previously understood. Lee, in particular, took a keen and abiding interest in the young woman’s plight and went beyond the scope of his duties in Havana to urge Spanish authorities in Havana to alleviate the conditions of her imprisonment. Still, the precise nature of Lee’s role in the journal’s conspiracy to free Cisneros remains uncertain. He was on leave in the United States when the jailbreak took place, and his absence from Havana grants him a measure of plausible deniability. But it is important to recognize that when Lee left Cuba in early September 1897, he was not certain whether he would return to the post—his first and only diplomatic assignment. After all, Lee was a Democrat and a holdover from the administration of President Grover Cleveland. In June 1897, the McKinley administration had promised the Havana consul-generalship to James Franklin Aldrich, a Republican former congressman. Although Aldrich was preparing to take up the post, the press of events kept Lee in Havana throughout the summer. It was only after Lee, while on home leave, had conferred with McKinley and State Department officials in Washington that his return to Havana was assured—much to Aldrich’s surprise and consternation.

Given the uncertainty of his posting in Havana, it is not inconceivable that Lee, before taking home leave, endorsed and encouraged the conspiracy to free Cisneros. He was in Havana a week after Decker arrived to plot the jailbreak. The journal’s bureau and the U.S. consulate were in the same building, affording Lee and Decker ready opportunity to confer. In any event, it is now clear that Decker received invaluable support from U.S. diplomatic personnel and their associates in planning and executing the jailbreak. Lee’s manuscript,
moreover, explains away an important enduring question—that of how Cisneros boarded the Seneca undetected by police. Carbonell distracted them by inviting them to have a drink below deck.

Determining that the Cisneros jailbreak was not a fraud is significant for a number of reasons. It demonstrates that the escape was more than merely an example of Hearst’s madcap antics but was, instead, a remarkable episode in participatory journalism. The Journal’s notion that it could take an activist role in public affairs—that it was obliged to seize the initiative when no other agency was willing—found its most prominent, and most extreme, expression in the Cisneros jailbreak. The Journal called its exploit “epochal” and many U.S. newspapers commended the newspaper for its enterprise.\(^{171}\) Ironically, this brazen example of the power of the press also became a demonstration of the limits to that power. The Journal’s agency undeniably brought about Cisneros’ escape. The newspaper organized a stirring welcome for her in New York. But the prominence of the case quickly faded. Its significance was short-lived. By the end of 1897, Cisneros had disappeared from the news and the case of “jail-breaking journalism” was scarcely recalled, even by the Journal, as the United States and Spain went to war in the spring of 1898.

Even so, it can be said that the Journal’s rescue of Evangelina Cisneros effectively marked an ethical outer limit that has been respected for more than 100 years. Never since has the calculated, international lawlessness of the Cisneros jailbreak been approached, let alone exceeded, by American journalists.

NOTES

4. The Journal and other newspapers referred to her, incorrectly, as “Cisneros.” The proper second reference is “Cossío y Cisneros.” However, “Cisneros” will be used here, given that the case is widely known by that name.


22. The *Chicago Times-Herald*, for example, said “there are indications that the escape was effected through collusion on the part of Spanish authorities.” Cited in “Jail-breaking Journalism,” *Public Opinion*, 520.


24. “Lee for Senate,” *Richmond Dispatch* (16 October 1897): 1. The report further quoted Lee as saying: “I have good authority for the statement that [Spanish officials] in Cuba are greatly incensed over the young woman’s escape, but I am confident that the affair will lead to no complications, so far as this country is concerned.”


32. “Administracion de justicia: Juzgados militares: Habana,” *Gaceta de la Habana* [Cuba] (13 October 1897): 721. The official notice indicates that Spanish authorities in Havana regarded the jailbreak as a serious matter. A contrary interpretation is that the official notice “was simply playing for the galleries.” See Gonzalo de Quesada and Henry Davenport Northrop, *Cuba’s Great Struggle for Freedom* (n.p., 1898), 608. The contrary argument is implausible, however. Accepting that version means accepting that numerous Spanish authorities participated in a broad-based conspiracy of silence—and that they maintained their silence during a time of instability and upheaval in the military leadership in Cuba. The Spanish captain-general in Cuba, Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, was recalled around the time of the jailbreak and was formally replaced in Cuba at the end of October 1897. It is inconceivable that Weyler and his officers would have engaged in a ploy which effectively handed the *Journal* a publicity bonanza—and at their expense. Officers loyal to Weyler’s successor, Captain-General Ramón
Blanco, certainly would have had no reason to maintain a conspiracy of silence about the circumstances of the Cisneros escape.


34. Abbot, Watching the World Go By, 195–196. Abbot wrote: “It is perhaps illustrative of Hearst’s methods with his employees, and his invariable willingness to concede personal liberty of political action to them, that he gave me a leave of absence, with full salary, to conduct this campaign, although the paper was supporting the regular Democratic ticket.”


37. Abbot’s account was marred by other inaccuracies. Among them is his mistakenly reference to Hearst’s Journal as the American. The name change took place in 1902, five years after the jailbreak. In addition, Abbot identifies Carlos Carbonell, one of the participants in the plot to rescue Cisneros, as a dentist. Carbonell was a banker. Abbot also repeats without attribution Hearst’s famous vow to “furnish the war” with Spain. See Watching the World Go By, 213, 216–217. The evidence is overwhelming that Hearst never made such a statement. See W. Joseph Campbell, Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myths, Defining the Legacies (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001): 71–95.


40. W. A. Swanberg, Citizen Hearst: A Biography of William Randolph Hearst (New York: Charles Scribner’s Son, 1961), 125. Swanberg wrote that the “thrilling artifices” in the Journal’s account of the Cisneros escape “were necessary only for the purpose of making a good story and protecting the guards at the prison. The guards had been bribed in advance with Hearst’s money and were conscientiously looking the other way.”


44. Nasaw, The Chief, 129.

45. See, for example, Milton, The Yellow Kids, 201. Milton described the Cisneros case “a shameful early example of the manufactured celebrity.”

46. The purported vow was first reported in James Creelman’s On the Great Highway: The Wanderings and Adventures of a Special Correspondent (Boston: Lothrop Publishing, 1901), 177–178.


48. For a discussion of those and other prominent myths of the yellow press period, see Campbell, Yellow Journalism, 51–147.

49. The collection at the University of Virginia is comprised of photocopies of Lee’s correspondence, manuscripts, and other materials. The photocopies were made from originals owned by Fitzhugh Lee’s great-grandson, Fitzhugh Lee Opie.


51. Lee to Daniel Lamont (29 November 1898), Daniel Lamont Papers, Container 83, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC.
It is unlikely Sherman or Day knew about the plot to free Cisneros. Sherman’s papers at the Library of Congress contain no reference to the Cisneros jailbreak. Day’s papers at the Library of Congress contain nothing more than passing reference to the case. Moreover, the State Department was an unsettled place during the summer and autumn of 1897, given Sherman’s increasingly noticeable mental and physical infirmities. How long Sherman would remain secretary of state had become a topic of considerable newspaper commentary and speculation. See, for example, H. Gibson Gardner, “Too Old to do His Work Well,” *Chicago Journal* (22 October 1897), scrapbook clipping, volume 614, John Sherman papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC. See also, “John Sherman as Secretary of State,” *Literary Digest*, 15, 17 (21 August 1897): 486–487.

It is unclear why Lee did not publish the manuscript. Perhaps it was because the manuscript contained a measure of anonymity. One of the conspirators, for example, is described only by his initials, F.D.B.—which almost certainly is a reference to Francisco De Besche. Another reason is that the account of the escape would not have fit well with the contents of the book’s final version, which included accounts of the Spanish-American War and the subsequent Paris peace treaty negotiations. The book also had a co-author, Joseph Wheeler. See Lee and Wheeler, *Cuba's Struggle Against Spain With the Causes of American Intervention and a full account of the Spanish-American War, including Final Peace Negotiations* (New York, American Historical Press, 1899).

Richard Harding Davis, for example, wrote in early 1897 that there was “no better informed American on Cuban matters than [Lee], nor one who sees the course our government should pursue more clearly. Through the Consuls all over the island, he is in touch with every part of it, and in daily touch.” See Richard Harding Davis, “Cuba’s Problem an Urgent One,” *New York Journal* (28 February 1897): 41.

Lee to William Rockhill (4 July 1896), Havana Consular Dispatches, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. Lee also stated, “The information I am going to get is worth much more than [$$1200 to the Government.”

Lee to Rockhill (4 July 1896), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.

Lee to William B. Day (5 June 1897), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.

Lee to Day (5 June 1897), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park. Lee’s spy network was mentioned by Gerald G. Eggert in a journal article about Lee’s assignment to Cuba. See Eggert, “Our Man in Havana: Fitzhugh Lee,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 47, 4 (1967): 478. The article does not explore Lee’s connection to the Cisneros case, however.

Lee to Day (15 November 1897), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park. In the letter, Lee formally notified Day that he had resumed his post in Havana on 15 November 1897.
Further evidence of Lee’s attachment to the Cisneros case came during his home leave, when he lost his billfold to a pickpocket in Richmond, while on his way to attend Buffalo Bill’s “Wild West Show.” The billfold was soon recovered. But missing were $20 cash and a letter from Cisneros that Lee had tucked inside his wallet. See “General Lee Robbed on a Car,” Richmond Dispatch (17 October 1897): 13, and “General Lee Gets His Purse,” Richmond Dispatch (19 October 1897): 7. The letter’s contents are not known. See also, “Consul-General Lee Robbed,” New York World (18 October 1897): 1.

See Cisneros and Decker, The Story of Evangelina Cisneros, 68.

An article in the Journal in November 1897 described the occupants of Casa Nueva, stating: “On the ground floor of the house is the Journal bureau and the inspecting rooms of the Marine Hospital Service of the United States, Lloyd’s Shipping Agency and some brokers’ offices. The second floor is occupied by Hidalgo & Co., agents of the Ward Steamship Line, and the top floor is the United States consulate.” See George Clarke Musgrave, “Tried To Wreck Our Consulate in Havana,” New York Journal (25 November 1897): 5. The article said an explosive device had been found by a watchman at the doorway of Casa Nueva.


Nichols, General Fitzhugh Lee, 154.

Musgrave, Under Three Flags in Cuba, 103. Musgrave wrote: “Luckily, Mr. Rockwell of the United States consular service, a friend of the Marquis de Palmerola, had obtained a permit to visit the Recogidas. That permit proved the only means of communicating with the prisoner.” The Marquis de Palmerola was a ranking Spanish official in Havana.

See Cora Older, William Randolph Hearst, American (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, reprint 1972), 172. Older’s account identifies Rockwell as “one of the consular clerks.” It also says another conspirator, William B. MacDonald, was one of Lee’s aides. MacDonald in fact was an official of a shipping company and was based in Cuba.

Older, William Randolph Hearst, 175. Older also wrote, 180, that Cisneros lived in the United States “a little more than a year when she married” Carbonell at Lee’s home in Virginia. She married Carbonell in Baltimore, MD, less than eight months after her arrival in the United States. See among other accounts, “Miss Cisneros Weds,” Washington Post (10 June 1898): 7; “Cuba’s Heroine Now a Bride,” Richmond Times (10 June 1898): 6, and “Miss Cisneros Now A Bride,” New York World (10 June 1898): 12.

Self-promotion was one of the defining characteristics of yellow journalism of the late nineteenth century. See Campbell, Yellow Journalism, 8.


See “Banquet to Decker,” Richmond Dispatch (26 October 1897): 6. The Dispatch report read in part: “General Fitzhugh Lee, to whom Mr. Decker is personally and favorably known, was specially invited by wire. In reply to the telegram, which was pressingly worded, General Lee said: ‘Impossible. Am forced to decline on account of other important engagements.’ The [organizing] committee regret very much that General Lee could not attend the banquet, as his presence would greatly enhance the compliment to their guest of honor.” Lee and Decker were Virginians.

Cisneros and Decker, The Story of Evangelina Cisneros.
90. Lee, “Rescue of Miss Cisneros,” Fitzhugh Lee papers, University of Virginia. Lee’s account is at odds with the more common version that Hearst sent Decker to Cuba with orders to free Cisneros. See Cisneros and Decker, *The Story of Evangelina Cisneros*, 61–62, 64. Lee’s manuscript contains several spelling lapses and mistakenly says Decker arrived in Havana in September 1897. The errors are perhaps explained by the manuscript’s being a draft.
91. Lee, “Rescue of Miss Cisneros,” Fitzhugh Lee papers, University of Virginia.
92. Lee, “Rescue of Miss Cisneros,” Fitzhugh Lee papers, University of Virginia.
93. Lee, “Rescue of Miss Cisneros,” Fitzhugh Lee papers, University of Virginia.
94. An undated notation in Lee’s handwriting says, “Evangelina Cossio’s brief statement about the rising in the Isle of Pines—as taken down by Consular Clerk Rockwell.” Fitzhugh Lee papers, University of Virginia.
95. Lee to Rockhill (20 March 1897), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park, MD.
96. Rockhill to Lee (17 March 1897), Fitzhugh Lee papers, University of Virginia. In a handwritten postscript to his letter, Rockhill wrote: “Please let me know about Rockwell at your very earliest convenience. I am reliably informed he is drinking as hard as ever.”
97. Lee to Rockhill (20 March 1897), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
98. Lee to Rockhill (20 March 1897), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park. Lee also wrote: “I must add[,] in justice to Mr. Rockwell, that he is gentlemanly, of good manners and generally conscientious in the discharge of his duties. I regret that his unfortunate propensity should stand in the way of his efficiency as a consular officer but hope that my action suspending him from his desk and your letter requesting his record here, will have effect and serve as a warning that hereafter any further transgression will not be overlooked.” Rockwell did not keep his pledge of sobriety. Lee, in a letter home in the summer of 1897, noted: “Rockwell drunk again—poor fellow.”
99. Lee to his wife (7 August 1897), Fitzhugh Lee papers, University of Virginia.
102. Rockwell to Lee (29 July 1897).
103. Lee to Day (30 July 1897), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
105. Joseph Springer, telegram to U.S. State Department (12 October 1897), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
106. The National Archives contains no personnel records for Rockwell.
107. Lee to his wife (23 November 1897), Fitzhugh Lee papers, University of Virginia.
108. Lee to U.S. Secretary of State Richard Olney (22 July 1896), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
111. See “A Fighting Consul was Barker, of Sagua,” *New York Journal* (11 April 1898): 5.
112. Walter B. Barker to Day (30 September 1897), Record Group 59, Sagua la Grande Consular Dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
113. Barker to Day (1 October 1897), Sagua la Grande consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
114. Barker to Day (1 October 1897), Sagua la Grande consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park. Barker’s consular correspondence shows that he had cited ill health as a reason for a two-week delay in reply to a letter from Lee, the consul-general in Havana. See Barker to Lee (4 August 1896), Sagua la Grande consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
115. Springer appended a note of approval to Barker’s letter to Day of 1 October 1897.
116. Cited in Barker to Day (8 October 1897), Sagua la Grande consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
121. Lee to Day (12 August 1897), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
122. Barker’s sudden departure meant that no fewer than three U.S. consuls assigned to Cuba were in the United States on leave in October 1897. In addition to Lee and Barker, the U.S. consul at Santiago de Cuba, Pulaski F. Hyatt, was on home leave. See Hyatt to Day (20 September 1897), Santiago de Cuba consular dispatches, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park.
123. See Lee to Rockhill (12 September 1896), Reel 22, Olney papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.
125. Barker to Lee (30 November 1897), Fitzhugh Lee papers, University of Virginia. Barker wrote in reply to a letter from Lee, who, according to Barker’s letter, had asked about “the family and social antecedents of Evangelina Cos[s]io y Cisneros.” It is not clear why Lee, more than six weeks after the jailbreak, was making such inquiries. In any case, Barker wrote that “she comes from a highly respectable Cuban family.”
128. Ramon Williams to Barker (24 May 1896), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
129. Williams to Rockhill (27 May 1896), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
130. Weyler to Lee (7 July 1896), translation to English, Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
131. Cited in Lee to Rockhill (26 March 1897), Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
132. Weyler to Lee (7 July 1896), translation to English, Havana consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
133 Cited in John Offner, An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895—1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 255 (n. 37). Offner, citing a report Dupuy de Lôme sent to Madrid in October 1897, stated that the Spanish minister “considered the American consuls in Matanzas, Sagua la Grande, and Santiago de Cuba to be active agents of the insurgents.”
134. Barker to Rockhill (26 July 1897), Sagua la Grande consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
135. Barker to Rockhill (4 May 1896), Sagua la Grande consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
136. Barker to Rockhill (26 July 1897), Sagua la Grande consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
137. Barker to Rockhill (19 September 1896), Sagua la Grande consular dispatches, National Archives, College Park.
140. “Miss Cisneros Will Wed,” New York Journal (21 May 1898). The Journal reported that Carbonell had “desired no public mention” of the engagement until after the Spanish-American War. “The news, however, spread in that mysterious manner in which such fascinating morsels invariably will, and so the public is talking the matter over and rejoicing with the lovers over their happiness,” the Journal reported.
143. Lee received a hero’s welcome upon his return to the United States. See “Lee the Hero of the Hour,” New York Times (13 April 1898): 1. The Times said in a dispatch from Washington: “The ovation that has followed Consul General Fitzhugh Lee since he set foot on American soil on his return from Havana culminated … in what was in many ways the most remarkable demonstration the city has ever seen.” See also, “A Nation’s Hero,” Washington Evening Times (6 April 1898): 4.
144. Curiously, Cisneros’s account contains almost no details about her stay at Carbonell’s house. See Cisneros and Decker, The Story of Evangelina Cisneros, 206–207.
146. Lee, “Rescue of Miss Cisneros,” Fitzhugh Lee Papers, University of Virginia.
147. Lee, “Rescue of Miss Cisneros,” Fitzhugh Lee Papers, University of Virginia.
149. Lee, “Rescue of Miss Cisneros,” Fitzhugh Lee Papers, University of Virginia.
150. Lee, “Rescue of Miss Cisneros,” Fitzhugh Lee Papers, University of Virginia.
151. Lee, “Rescue of Miss Cisneros,” Fitzhugh Lee Papers, University of Virginia. Timetables published in a leading Havana newspaper of the time show that the Seneca was two days behind schedule. The steamer was to arrive 7 October 1897. See “Puerto de la Habana, Saldrain,” La Union Constitucional (8 October 1897): 1.
152. Lee, “Rescue of Miss Cisneros,” Fitzhugh Lee Papers, University of Virginia.
156. Lee’s correspondence shows, for example, that he was invited to a dinner party that Carbonell gave in early July 1897. “I backed out,” Lee wrote in a letter to his wife, adding that their son, Fitzhugh Lee Jr., attended. See Lee to his wife (3 July 1897), Fitzhugh Lee Papers, University of Virginia.
157. Lee to Lamont (3 December 1898), Lamont Papers, Container 83, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC.
158. Lee to his wife (23 November 1897), Fitzhugh Lee papers, University of Virginia.
159. Lee to his wife (23 November 1897), Fitzhugh Lee papers, University of Virginia. Lee wrote that the manservant had been “recommended by Carbonell and others as thoroughly honest.”
161. Lee to Lamont (29 November 1898), Lamont Papers, Library of Congress.
163. Carlos F. Carbonell to Lee (30 November 1898), Lamont Papers, Container 83, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC.
164. Carbonell to Lee (30 November 1898), Lamont Papers, Library of Congress.
168. “Hitt for Minister to Spain,” New York Times (5 June 1897): 1. The Times report said: “It is understood that ex-Representative Aldrich is to be appointed Consul General at Havana, and that his appointment will be made in the near future.”
169. See “Gen. Lee in Washington,” *New York Times* (11 October 1897): 1. See also, “Consul-General Lee,” *Richmond Dispatch* (6 November 1897): 5. The *Dispatch* reported: “It is understood that [Lee] is to remain in Cuba until the island is ‘pacified,’ or, in other words, until the ‘cruel war is over,’ whenever that may be, and General Lee’s return to this country will thus depend entirely upon circumstances.” Lee at the time was contemplating a run for a U.S. Senate seat from Virginia in 1899. See “Lee to be a Candidate,” *Washington Post* (16 October 1897): 3.

170. James Franklin Aldrich to Charles G. Dawes (11 October 1897), Day papers, Container 5, Library of Congress. Aldrich wrote in the letter: “I was wholly unprepared … for the recent report that General Lee had been asked to return to Havana in an official capacity, and am quite sure that he had no expectation of it himself.” Privately, Lee was irritated that the McKinley administration contemplated replacing him in Havana, writing in a letter to his wife: “Don’t know why [they] should send a green man here in a crisis!!!” Lee to his wife (17 July 1897), Fitzhugh Lee papers, University of Virginia.

171. Not all U.S. newspapers commended the *Journal’s* agency. The *New York Times* deplored the jailbreak as “perfectly indefensible” and said the *Journal’s* conduct was “without the shadow of legal excuse.” See “Personal,” *New York Times* (12 October 1897): 6.