Abou El Fadl Replies
ohn Esposito aptly raises perhaps the most important question confronting Muslims
today: What Islam? Which of the many manifestations of Islam throughout history
is to help shape the moral import and meaning of this grand religious tradition?
Extrapolating upon Esposito's theme, the question is: what will Muslims do with
their past, and how will they impact upon the present? I am in complete agreement
with Amina Wadud that extremists are equally as destructive within Muslim societies
as they are toward non-Muslim communities. The trauma that extremists inflict upon
half the population of Islam, namely women, is unconscionable. But the plight of
extremism is that it defines Islam in such a way that the very construct associated
with this religion becomes thoroughly ugly.
Islam is not simply a national or social identity; it is one of the primary monotheistic
world religions. The very raison d'être of the Islamic religion is that it
is a universal message that not only speaks to humanity, but that must also construct
a way of including humanity in a moral conversation. However, what Amina Wadud describes
as "extremist interpretive modalities" frustrate the universalistic and humanistic
message of Islam. When the average person in the world today associates the very
word "Islam" with images of harshness, suffering, oppression, and violence, Islam
becomes an idiosyncrasy—a moral and social oddity that is incapable of finding
common ground with modern societies. As such, the real danger is that extremist
interpretive modalities transform Islam into an outcast or an 'other' that perhaps
may be explained or interpreted, but not seriously engaged.
I do agree with Wadud's insight that the text, especially that of the Qur'an,
can enrich the reader far more than the reader can enrich the text. In many ways,
the moral compass and final line of defense against extremism is the text of the
Qur'an itself. However, as Sohail Hashmi appropriately points out, interpretive
communities do form around texts, and at times, they may hold the moral insights
of the text hostage. Interpretive communities could stultify and imprison the text
in an extremist paradigm that becomes very difficult to disentangle or dismantle,
and as a result, it becomes very difficult to restore to the text its integrity.
However, to the extent that Hashmi suggests that the juristic interpretive communities
of the past were necessarily conservative, intolerant, or extremist, I disagree
with him. The one truly remarkable thing about classical Islamic scholarship is
that, for its age and time, it was dynamic, diverse, complex, and constantly evolving.
For every dogmatic and intolerant voice found in the classical tradition, one will
be able to locate a contemporaneous voice that challenged and refuted it. The reality
is that compared to the puritans of modern Islam, classical Muslim scholars look
like raving liberals. Nevertheless, Hashmi makes a very important point. I think
that as Muslim intellectuals we must admit that the morality of the Qur'an exceeded
the morality of its interpreters. In many ways, the Qur'anic text set moral trajectories
that could not be adequately realized or even understood by the interpretive communities
of the past. At times, the interpreters of the past completely missed the moral
point of the Qur'anic message, and generated determinations that locked the Qur'an
in short-sighted and inadequate modalities. But I think Wadud makes an important
point here. As Muslims, we must emphasize the religious conviction that the morality
of the Qur'an will always exceed the morality of its interpreters. In other words,
I do not believe that human beings can claim to have understood the message of the
Qur'an perfectly and completely. Falling short of the moral message of the Qur'an
is inevitable, but it is also an impetus to engage in a never-ending dynamic of
moral exploration and interpretation. As far as the interpretations of the past
are concerned, the difficult challenge confronting Muslim intellectuals is how to
critically engage the interpretive traditions of the past without falling in the
intellectually arrogant and historically myopic view that anything produced in modernity
is necessarily morally superior to anything produced in the past. In addition, part
of the difficult challenge is to articulate coherent and systematic moral theories
that could be utilized in sifting through the accumulations of past interpretations,
and in constructing new interpretations of the text.
One of the core related issues that Muslim intellectuals must confront is: Do
the bin Ladens of the Muslim world actually find justification for the ugliness
that they perpetuate in any interpretive tradition in Islam? Does this level of
intolerance and criminality find support, however flimsy or absurd, in some of the
interpretations of the past? I think that, unfortunately, the answer must be yes—it
would be dishonest to say otherwise. But fortunately, Muslims have the power to
deconstruct and reject those interpretations. Put differently, God relegated to
Muslims a moral trust. At no point in history can Muslims ignore their unending
obligations to appropriately discharge this moral trust. The basic and invariable
point is that Muslims and non-Muslims must understand that it is within the power,
and is in fact the duty, of Muslims of every generation to answer the question:
What Islam? The response must not be left in the hands of the bin Ladens of the
world.<
Khaled Abou El Fadl is Omar and Azmeralda Alfi Distinguished Fellow in
Islamic Law at UCLA and author of Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law.
Originally Published in February/March 2002 issue of
the Boston Review
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