



## *Ethics and International Affairs*

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I will discuss them as a political scientist, not as a philosopher, for a number of reasons. The first and best (Napoleon would have said to stop after that first) is that I am not a philosopher. My training is not in philosophy, or in moral philosophy; it is in history, and in political science and law. My interest is that of a student of those fields, and of a citizen. Also, my concern is less with what *should* be done, although I am, as we shall see, deeply interested in that, than with *how* one can get to what should be done. A comparison between what I will try to say and what has been written recently, and eloquently, by my friend and former colleague Michael Walzer in his book on *Just and Unjust Wars*<sup>1</sup> may be of help. His line goes from a scrutiny of existing or generally accepted

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norms, to his view of the "ought," to the "is." His business is, properly, applied ethics; he tries to define what ought to be the just causes of war, or the right way of fighting them, and he compares his standards with the (usually somber) realities of warfare. My way is the opposite, starting from what is and groping toward the "ought": it is an attempt at uplifting politics. To be sure, uplifted politics and applied ethics ought to converge; and I hope that we will meet halfway, although without having necessarily chosen our rendezvous for the same reasons.

Secondly, I am attempting not to reach exclusively specialists and scholars who have dealt professionally with these questions, but also people outside the scholarly world. This means that I shall examine these issues in as practical and common-sensical a way as possible. My last reason for not wanting to invade philosophy is that when philosophers deal with the ethics of politics the results are not always, in my opinion, very satisfying. Some of the purely theoretical discussions about ethics in world affairs leave me puzzled. At present, for instance, there is a debate about the application of John Rawls's theory of justice to international relations. It is very fascinating, but it has very little relevance to reality, for two reasons. In his learned and massive tome, Rawls asks what would happen if individuals met under what he calls a "veil of ignorance," in a hypothetical "original position" in which they do not know who they are—they know nothing about their respective situations, fortunes, or conceptions—in order to try to agree on principles of justice, on the assignment of rights and duties, on the distribution of benefits and costs, while furthering their own interests. When one asks what would happen if, instead of having individuals meeting under those conditions, each one representing only himself, we had representatives of nations meeting behind that "veil of ignorance" in order to choose the principles of international

justice, there are fundamental differences between various authors (one of whom is Rawls). Some of them even say that Rawls is perfectly wrong in describing what, in his opinion, they would decide if they were representatives of nations. Thus we have already a debate on the very nature of the principles of justice in world affairs: are they principles of *interstate* justice, or principles of *universal* justice? In domestic affairs, we agree that the problem is one of justice for individuals (if we don't, the whole Rawlsian construction collapses). In international politics we shall again and again come across the "state vs. human beings" or "nation vs. individuals" problem, an old bone of contention for students of international law.

But there is another reason for being suspicious of that exercise. It is not only intellectually but politically very exciting to ask oneself, as Rawls does, what should be the perfect fair society. For the whole enterprise is based on two conditions that give it practical relevance—that make of the principles derived by Rawls criteria for judging existing societies and guidelines for changing them—but that are missing in the international milieu. First, the original position, for all its hypothetical character, corresponds not only to the old notion of the state of nature, but above all to the fundamental postulate of democratic government, "equality between human beings as moral persons"<sup>2</sup>: the principles of justice are derived from a procedure of equalitarian democratic participation, which resembles the political framework of a number of (predominantly Western) nations. Rawls describes himself as the heir not of all social contract theory, but of that of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant—certainly not that of Hobbes, in which the individuals abdicate to the Leviathan they have set up. Now, whereas citizens in democratic states resemble the individuals in Rawls's state of nature, there is no resemblance at all between state representatives supposedly meeting in

Rawls's original position, and the reality of international affairs. To be sure, in real domestic life there are huge inequalities in status and wealth, even in democracies, and in international life, conversely, there is the legal principle of state equality. But the dynamics are quite different: constitutional democracy is based on the principle of equal participation, to which even the rich and the well-born pay lip service (and whose application makes the erosion of at least some of the inequalities of status and wealth possible). In world affairs, the principle of state equality is accepted as a formal norm, not as a substantive one. International politics severely restricts its operational consequences and remains dominated by the interplay of might and wealth—it is the big powers who tend to lay down the law.

The second difference lies in the realm of enforcement. The kinds of principles of justice which Rawls thinks people in his state of nature would arrive at make sense as long as all those individuals can establish a state which would have, as all states do, a legitimate monopoly of constraint; so that the individuals, having agreed on certain principles, would be obliged to stick to them: the state could enforce them. And in fact the state often tries to approximate the standards of justice at which these individuals are supposed to have arrived. This exercise is practically meaningless in the international milieu, because even if state representatives did agree, behind the "veil of ignorance," on standards of international justice, in a milieu where self-help is the rule and where force can always be used by each agent, there is no guarantee whatsoever that those principles would ever stick for very long.

In other words, when you are dealing with a domestic order, the gap between what Rawls calls the "original position" and reality is often no more than a normative gap—if you prefer, an inspiration. The prin-

ciples at which people would arrive in that original position indicate a direction in which the society and the state ought to go and are, in many instances, politically (if not economically) equipped to go. In international affairs, even if one could agree on what those norms should be, the goal remains utopian—a mirage: there is no way of obliging, say, those states that would find the application of the principles intolerable to respect them. Unless Rawls is right about the principles that representatives of nations would arrive at (he lists them in a couple of pages), they amount to an exercise in pure formalism, which is not very interesting. I shall therefore proceed not from that fragile original position, but from political realities.

The topics that will be discussed are the following. First, I shall examine what could be called the moral problem itself: Can there be moral behavior in international affairs? And if so, under what conditions? Then I will turn to three of the most burning contemporary issues. The first one is the case of moral restraints on the use of force. This used to be at the core of moral theories of foreign policy behavior, many centuries ago. It has become a most essential problem again in the twentieth century. We have had two savage world wars. In recent years the United States has gone through a fierce debate over Vietnam, which raised many questions. Did we have the right to intervene? This question provoked not one debate, but two—a debate on our ends, of course, but also a debate on the nature of the conflict. What kind of war was it? Was it a civil war, or was it an international struggle? There was a further question: Did we fight well? Hence a debate on the means. And, last but not least, what were the moral effects of the outcome—in other words, a debate on the consequences also.

The second case is the formidable and tormenting issue of human rights. Is this a proper concern for

foreign policy at all? If it is, with what rights should one be concerned? How important is the promotion of these rights in the overall hierarchy of objectives which a state must have? What are the tradeoffs, and also what means is it wise to use if one decides to promote such rights?

Third, I will examine the problems of distributive justice, about which there begins to be an enormous literature that raises very interesting questions. Are there obligations between rich and poor nations comparable to those which most domestic societies accept toward the poorer members of those societies? If there are such obligations, what is their destination? Are they owed to governments? Or to individuals in those poorer countries? For what purposes? At what costs to oneself?

Finally, I shall try to discuss what a morally livable world order would look like, given the world as it is—and it is cacaphonic in any dimension you want to look at—in the horizontal dimension (the relations between the major powers), in the vertical dimension (the relations between the weak and the strong), and in what could be called the functional dimension, since world politics these days is a number of different games played with very different means, not always by the same actors. In each instance my objective is to review, as unobtrusively and unpedantically as possible, the literature on the subject in order to describe the main (and frequently incompatible) positions; also, I shall try to navigate between the extremes (except in the rare cases where I might agree with one) and suggest my own position.

Another remark about these essays: the problems of international relations exist at different levels. For obvious reasons—this is not supposed to be an encyclopedia—I will concern myself mainly with one. At least three layers can be distinguished; first of all, there are the moral dilemmas of the statesmen, of the decision makers. Then we find the moral choices of those who

carry out those decisions, mainly, to use broad categories, the diplomats and the soldiers. Finally, there comes the rest of us (some may want to treat intellectuals as a separate category altogether). I will emphasize primarily the first level, the problems of the statesmen. Theirs is the burden of putting burdens on everyone else. But it will be useful to cast a glance at the other levels also. For when we think about those who carry out the decisions, whether it is the diplomats and the soldiers or the rest of us, we encounter in the domain of foreign policy a special case of the general problems of the obligations of citizenship. What are one's rights or one's duties toward the state? The average citizen would have no problem, dilemma, agony, or choice caused by the acts of his state in foreign affairs if we took one of two positions, neither of which I recommend. One would be that each citizen has an absolute duty to obey the government. This would eliminate the moral problem of citizenship altogether. There is a second way of eliminating the problem: by making the following distinction. One could argue that indeed we all have rights as well as duties toward our government in domestic affairs—there is no such thing as "Right or wrong, my government" in such matters. But there is such a thing as "Right or wrong, my country." In other words, one could take the position that whereas there is no obligation that covers the whole political field, there is a duty of obedience limited to foreign policy, either because one believes that foreign policy does not raise moral problems anyhow, or because one believes that the moral issues of foreign policy are properly the preserve of the government, which one should obey, given the nature of the competition among states (both its complexities, which require expertise, and its intensity, which demands untroubled steering). This is not my position, as will become clear below.

If, therefore, there are serious citizenship prob-

lems, two very interesting questions arise, with which I will not deal fully, but which we should remember. What should be the behavior of the citizens in general, and particularly of the soldiers and diplomats, and of the intellectuals, when their government engages in an immoral foreign policy? This was, of course, an extraordinarily vital and difficult problem for German citizens and for German officials in the Nazi period. The other question, which is quite different, is for the citizens or the civil servants or the soldiers of a domestically oppressive state, whether it acts badly abroad or not. How should these citizens behave toward the outside world? Should they call for help? Or should they essentially do their job by themselves, throw out the tyrants themselves, and keep the outside world at arms' length? These are not simple questions.

Finally, before reaching the subject itself, it is always good for the author to put his cards on the table. Since all attempts at discussing moral issues in domestic or international affairs are necessarily colored by the biases of the writer, let me describe my own as simply as possible. I consider myself to be one of those old-fashioned and increasingly dinosaur-like types, a liberal. There must be a few of us left. I don't apologize for it. Indeed, I feel sorry for those who aren't. (I realize that this constitutes the majority of mankind). Inevitably this will be reflected here. I am neither a Marxist nor a conservative, nor a neo-Marxist nor a neo-conservative. To be a liberal does not mean necessarily to believe in progress, it means only to believe in a (limited and reversible) perfectibility of man and society, and particularly in the possibility of devising institutions, based on consent, that will make society more humane and more just, and the citizens' lot better. This means—conservatives would agree—that the state should be servant of society, not the other way around, but also that this servant's role is vital

and can be salutary. And it means—Marxists would agree—that injustices that are the patterned products of economic systems, social stratification, or ethnic biases must be fought; but also that no philosophy of history provides us once and for all with a tool kit or a destination.

As a liberal I do believe that questions about morality—including the morality of foreign policy decisions—are questions about the rights and duties, as well as about the happiness and burdens, of individuals. This does not mean that I deny the importance of groups—kinship groups, ethnic groups, classes, nations; obviously, it is in and through them that individuals act and fulfill themselves (most of the time—sometimes they fulfill themselves by reacting against these groupings). But these are made of individuals, and, in my view, their own rights and duties derive from the role they play at the service of their members (a service that can indeed require sacrifices on the part of the individuals, insofar as the life, happiness, and opportunities of persons depend on the groups, and especially on the nations', own existence, freedom, and prosperity). Individuals receive their first moral notions from the groups in which they live and continue to receive moral dictates from them throughout their lives. But this does not mean that there can be *no* moral development outside the groups. We have in ourselves a moral faculty that is awakened and sharpened by our relations with others, but which, once it is aroused, can grow and evolve apart from group pressures or commands. The group, therefore, while always a trigger, and often a help, can become an oppressive obstacle. Moral education consists precisely in helping the individual both realize what he owes the group and emancipate himself from group bondage.

Also as a liberal, my position is reformist or meliorist, not revolutionary. This does not mean that I believe revolutions to be necessarily evil, or even avoid-

able. They are often inevitable, and sometimes beneficial, given the alternatives. But it means that I am addicted to the search for a better, less destructive, more tolerant alternative to an unbearable or nefarious status quo—an alternative more respectful of the rights or of the humanity of opponents.

Thus it is a liberal's view of morality in international affairs that will be found here, whenever I deal with *oughts*. Moreover, one is always shaped by one's own experiences; my formative experience was in the thirties and World War II, particularly the years when the Nazi stain spread over Europe, and when the Nazis occupied France. This has kept me with a lifelong, perverse preoccupation with world wars; and again, to make my biases very clear, I do not like them. So while I am not a pacifist, Christian or otherwise—the experience of the Thirties, so perfectly distilled in Ionesco's *Rhinoceros*, rules this out—I have a very strong belief that no war is very often better than war (indeed, a world war was avoidable as late as September 1938). It would be a mistake to make you believe that I have for actual, real-life military battles the enthusiasm that some of my friends and colleagues seem to feel.

#### THE MORAL PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Two central questions have been discussed for a long time. First, is there a possibility of moral choice for statesmen in international relations? And secondly, if one assumes that there is, what are the limits of moral choice?

On the first question, nobody has ever argued that there *should* be no choice, but many people have asserted that there *can* be none. What are their argu-

ments, and how valid are they? There are two kinds of arguments. The most radical remains that of Hobbes: Nations are in a state of nature (indeed it is that state which suggests what the individual's pre-Leviathan state of nature must look like). It is a state of anarchy, conflicting desires, and scarcity. There is a general struggle for power, fueled by what he calls "competition," "diffidence," and "glory." In this competition the only universal concern is survival. Gresham's law operates: even those who would like to pursue loftier goals cannot escape from the contest waged by the power greedy. This means that the right of nature is the liberty to use one's power of self-preservation, and that the laws of nature are simply laws of self-preservation, dictated by reason; and those laws involve both self-defense and war. In such a state there is no morality; in fact, morality is simply the name given to behavior in conformity with the law of an established domestic order—with the positive legislation of a Leviathan in which the enforcement of humane laws of self-preservation becomes possible. But in international affairs, which is a state of nature, and in which there is no such Leviathan, there can be no morality. It is a definitional problem.

This means that international affairs remain the domain so well described by probably the most famous text of history, Thucydides' Melian dialog between the Athenians and the Melians. The Athenians tell the Melians that in international affairs the strong do what they can and the weak do what they must, and that, anyhow, discussion of rights is valid only among equals. The Melians insist on talking about right and justice. The Athenians reply "that expediency goes with security, while justice and honor cannot be followed without danger,"<sup>3</sup> and they conquer and kill the Melians. This approach to the problem is what Robert W. Tucker calls, euphemistically, a "naturalistic" conception.<sup>4</sup> It means that interna-

tional relations is the domain of necessity, in which the only ends, which are dictated by the nature of the game, are security and survival. On behalf of those ends any means can be used. This is literally a structural explanation; it starts from the nature of international politics, and everything derives from it mechanistically and logically.

There is another, very similar, argument, not perhaps the most radical—the Hobbesian is the most radical—but the most tragic, and that is the view of Max Weber.<sup>5</sup> It is not mechanistic; it is philosophical. It is not, as in the case of Hobbes, naturalistic and sardonic. It is, as usual with Max Weber, depressed and tormented. It starts with his famous opposition between the ethics of conviction, the ethics of the saints or of the prophets, the ethics of ultimate ends, and the ethics of responsibility, which is the ethics of all politics, domestic or foreign. The point he makes, which is not exactly new with him, is that the ethics of responsibility, the ethics of political action always inevitably entails the use of evil means. But he goes beyond this, for he stresses that this need to resort to evil means is by far at its greatest, and inevitably so, in international affairs, because the world scene, by contrast with domestic politics, is the domain of inexpiable, irreconcilable, and violent conflicts of values, represented by the states. All politics entails conflict. But the states are the ultimate, supreme expression of the values locked in a struggle for existence and supremacy. There is nothing above them, and they are armed. It is an interesting blend of Hegel, whose agonistic philosophy Weber had of course absorbed, and of a kind of Darwinian-Nietzschean view of the international competition. And it is a very stark view, in two different ways: first of all, it assumes that for people who believe in an ethics of responsibility, which means, of course, the statesmen, the power of the nation-state must be their supreme value, by

*definition.* If anybody had a concern other than the power of the state as his supreme value, he would be out of the sphere of political action. The political sphere is by definition that in which there is nothing above the nation. That is stark enough. What makes it even starker is that he not only says this, but he also subordinates domestic politics and economic policy to it. Domestic politics must be tailored to and corseted by this supreme value. In other words, he does not only eliminate moral choice about ends outside; he does not only present international politics as the domain of uncompromising moral conflicts. Because of this, he also very sharply wants to limit moral choice within. Moral choice tends to be relegated to the realm of means—and even there it is limited since Weber calls violence the decisive means in politics.

I do not believe that these arguments are convincing. Let us begin with the structural view, the Hobbesian one. Very often, there is a tendency to try to refute it by resorting to a rosier view of international relations. This alternative view is that of the secularized natural law tradition, the tradition of Grotius, of Locke, of Pufendorf. Or else, it is the antinaturalist, utilitarian conception of Hume. Both the secularized natural law thinkers and Hume start with human sociability and derive from it the existence of common norms and common interests. They argue that of course in international affairs those common norms are weak, those common interests are fragile, because there is no central power, or because a state—stronger than a mere individual in society—has less of an interest in observing them. And yet these common norms exist, and the international state of affairs is not a state of war. This is not a very convincing refutation of Hobbes, because it can easily be shown to be false, first of all by experience. We all know by experience that in many periods in history there simply are no, or very few, common norms or common interests. And it has also



been very neatly demolished by Rousseau, who pointed out that in a competition, each state is above all concerned with its *own* advantage: when states calculate their interests, there is no common standard of utility.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, he reminds us, sociability is a force for considerable mischief, it is at the root of "amour-propre" and competition and is not necessarily a source of good behavior. In fact, sociability is to him the cause of all evils, since once we start being sociable we start comparing ourselves to one another, we start being envious, and greedy, and scheming, and violence and deception follow.

However, the stark description of international politics by Hobbes as a state of nature that is a state of (to him and in his days, bearable) war is not a perfect description of international reality either. Not at all times are states in a situation of war of all against all; it is not true throughout history, it is not true in space at any one moment. The statesman is not always knocked to the floor, having to survive or else. Also, the Hobbesian view predetermines the goal of political action by saying that it must be security and survival and nothing else, and by reducing all choices to techniques. This is patently false. Survival itself is not an unambiguous goal. Let us take three cases where survival was clearly at stake: France in 1940, Israel since its birth, Poland for the last two centuries. There were violent disagreements, not about the technique of survival but about the meaning of survival itself. Was it to be the physical survival of the French, as Pétain thought, or the "moral" survival of France, as deGaulle wanted? Is the survival of a country under foreign rule, like Poland, better served by preserving as much national spirit at home despite foreign domination, or by refusing any collaboration and keeping the flame burning abroad? Does the survival of Israel require reconciliation with the Arabs and insertion in the Middle East—Nahum Goldmann's vision—or a tough, an-

nexationist stance—Ben Gurion's vision as long as he was in power? There are disagreements both about *what* it is that must survive, and about the time perspective. Nor is survival the only goal of states—it may be a necessary one, but when it is reasonably assured, all the other goals become manifest and come up front. If one goes back to the Melian dialog, one realizes that both the Athenians and the Melians had choices; the Melians did not have to behave like heroic self-sacrificers, and the Athenians did not have to behave like barbarians. The situation was bad enough, but the outcome was the result of choices. To paraphrase my former colleague, Mr. Brzezinski, the Melians behaved like Poles, not Czechs, and the Athenians behaved, let us say, like Nazis. This was not a necessity rising out of the structure of the game.

As for the Weberian view, it is a fallacy to assume that all statecrafts that put the power of the nation-state as the supreme value are doomed thereby to permanent conflict. It is wrong to look at the conflict of nation-states as a kind of permanent, agonizing test of fitness, to view each nation-state as a sacred, separate essence that has to be tested in battle against the others, with the outcome of the battle telling which is the morally superior essence. It is a strange nineteenth-century view, both very gloomy and very optimistic; gloomy in that it assumes that one is doomed to that kind of contest, and optimistic in assuming that after the battle is over one will play the game again as if nobody had been eliminated from it once and for all. It is also a fallacy to believe that the alleged supreme value, the power of the nation-state, is a clear-cut end. Even if one believes that the statesman has the power of the nation as his goal, and indeed must have it as a goal if he is to be a statesman, the power of the nation can be sought in very different ways, depending on the statesman's conception of power, of his nation, of the international order, and so on. A Theodore Roosevelt

and a Wilson, a Bismarck and a Hitler, a Napoleon and a de Gaulle do not have the same idea of their roles. In other words, the Weberian view is both an abdication of moral judgment and a confusion of moral judgment.

The answer to the first question is therefore: Yes, there is a domain of choice. But the real question then becomes how much. We must turn to the limits of moral choice. The domain is obviously extremely narrow, for three reasons mainly. The first one is a structural reason, revised in a non-Hobbesian way, but it is still the same idea: the nature of the social framework itself. The international milieu simply does not leave one much room for moral action; as Wolfers put it: "moral convictions cannot tell what roads are open to a statesman."<sup>7</sup> The arguments here are double. First comes one for which I have a limited amount of sympathy, for it has sometimes been carried much too far. It is the argument made at length in the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, and briefly and much more sharply in E. H. Carr's *Twenty Years Crisis*, about the difference between individual behavior and all group behavior. Individuals can behave altruistically; for a person, "self-transcendence" is both possible and sometimes even expected, or rewarded; whereas groups in general are expected to behave selfishly; they are there literally to promote the interests of the members. If they did something else, they would betray the interests of the group. Not only is selfish behavior accepted, but one also expects of groups that they will sometimes behave in a way that would be immoral if it were indulged in by individuals. There is something in this argument, but it should not be carried too far. The notion of interest is a very tricky one; self-interest and selfishness are not identical. If all groups behaved selfishly all the time, all social life would come close to that model of enmity, of a conflict of all against all, which, as Wolfers pointed out, eliminates moral choice, but also

breeds intolerable insecurity. As many pressure groups have found out—for instance die-hard business associations or revolutionary unions—purely selfish behavior, by destroying the social fabric, is not in their self-interest. Moreover, not every group interest is morally respectable; domestic society has laws that aim at deterring or punishing reprehensible group behavior. International law tries to do the same insofar as national behavior is concerned.

There is a second argument which in a way reinforces the previous one, but it exists quite independently from it, and I put more stock in it. It stresses the difference not between individuals and groups, but between individuals and groups in a domestic order on the one hand, and the statesmen on the world scene on the other. It is a two-stage argument. In the first place, in a domestic system which functions well, individuals and groups can behave morally because there is a framework of social order—in which they have a stake. *A contrario*, when that framework disappears, and survival or basic needs become the obsession of all, individuals and groups start behaving in an immoral or in a cowardly way. This is one of the points made, effectively if not totally fairly, by Marcel Ophüls' well-known movie, *The Sorrow and the Pity*, about France under Nazi occupation. When we are in an economic depression or in a civil war, we are indeed much closer to the Hobbesian floor than to the Kantian ceiling, and we behave accordingly. But in the domestic system, the statesman, being the maintainer of the framework of social order, being a man whose moral obligation is to preserve that order, will sometimes have to behave in an immoral way. This is the old Machiavelian argument: for the individual *and* the group in a well-functioning society, altruistic or enlightened behavior is possible, but the statesman's duty is to protect the general interest of the nation; and sometimes doing

evil—lying, deceiving, striking out—on behalf of that interest is a necessity. De Gaulle defined the statesman, by contrast with the intellectual, as somebody who takes risks, including moral risks.

The second stage of the argument shows that this contrast between the behavior of individuals and groups in the domestic order and the statesman is particularly acute when one looks at the international milieu. Both Carr and Arnold Wolfers recognize that the statesman operating in the context of domestic politics can often behave reasonably well, even though his first duty is the maintenance of the domestic society—especially when the political system and the social order are recognized as legitimate, and of course also because of the state's monopoly of coercion. But a statesman in the international competition cannot afford moral behavior so easily; first, because of what might be called the state's duty of selfishness: as Hamilton put it, "the rule of morality... is not precisely the same between nations as between individuals. The duty of making its own welfare the guide of its own actions is much stronger upon the former than upon the latter. Existing millions and ... future generations are concerned with the present measures of a government while the consequences of the private action of an individual ordinarily terminate with himself."<sup>8</sup> To be sure, and as I will argue, this duty of selfishness is no license to pursue any end and to use any means, but it restricts the realm of choice. Secondly, in international relations, by contrast with domestic politics, the scope of moral conflict is infinite, whereas in a domestic order the scope is normally much more restricted. Thirdly, violence, the ever-present possibility of war, limits the range of moral opportunity. There is the state's security dilemma, there is the need to survive. And because a drastic separation between order and justice exists in international affairs, the state has to survive first;

as a statesman, you have to establish or preserve order first, and then you can worry about justice, if there is time left. International order has to be established or defended every minute, whereas domestic order is a given, and already reflects a conception of justice. In other words, the condition which drives out moral choice, or (again in Wolfers' phrase) dooms one to "out-group morality," or (in Raymond Aron's) to the morality of struggle: enmity, is much more likely to arise in international politics. And this is so because of the two fundamental differences between domestic politics and international politics: international relations is a competition of groups with no consensus among them, and with no power above them. This indeed makes for a non-Hobbesian structural argument, which explains why moral opportunities for the statesman in world affairs are quite limited.

The second reason is a philosophical argument, revised in a non-Weberian way. Even if one does not accept Weber's notion of inextinguishable conflicts of values, there is, in fact, no single, operational international code of behavior. There are competing codes, rival philosophical traditions, clashing conceptions of morality. This is far worse than what went on, let us say, in the days of the just war theory. The behavior of princes was often atrocious, but at least they acknowledged a single code of legitimacy. They violated it, but they recognized it in principle. At present there are incompatible notions of legitimacy; the only common code is not an ethical one, really. The only common code, which incites both struggle and prudence, is national egoism. We behave in a certain way in Vietnam or in the Dominican Republic; the Soviets behave in a certain way in Afghanistan, the Indians "liberate" Goa, Vietnam "liberates" Cambodia. Each party denies that its acts are comparable to those of the others, and so on. It is true, as some point out, that all statesmen use the same moral language—they all argue

about rights and wrongs, justice and law. And the United Nations Charter, plus a number of quasi-universal treaties, seem to provide a common grammar. Unfortunately, from the viewpoint of moral harmony, this is meaningless. A community of vocabulary is not the same thing as a community of values. When people with very different values use the same vocabulary, it debases both the vocabulary and the values hidden behind the vocabulary. This is what has been happening to notions like self-determination, non-intervention, etc. Behind the common grammar there are competing ideological logics.

Not only is there no single moral code, but there are no effective substitutes. International law and international organizations certainly are not. What limits the role of the latter is precisely the conflicts of values and interests among the members. As for international law, it is partly a fragile truce between the combatants, partly the victim of value (and of power) confrontations that have undermined many of the traditional branches of the law. World public opinion is about as fragile as the sum of conflicting domestic opinions can be—each domestic opinion being capable of oscillation, and at least as prone to chauvinism as to universalism. Moreover, some public opinions have no way of expressing themselves and therefore of joining in the chorus of world opinion. The latter remains far less potent than the separate governments, in the world as it is. None of this means that the battles of values and philosophies must be resolved by struggles among states, that international violence is a *Weltgericht* of values, that there can be no compromises or no “peaceful coexistence” of moral opposites—or that when states fight it is necessarily as carriers of value systems. But it means, once again, that we shall often be very close to the pole of enmity.

The third reason for the limits on moral choice is

political. The structural and the philosophical arguments say that it is difficult for statesmen to exert moral choice because of the certainty and the pressures of competition, the power contest and the value contest. The political argument states that fair moral choice by statesmen is also made more difficult by two kinds of political handicaps. The first one is political uncertainty—the difficulty of assessing the situation. Far more than domestic statecraft, international statecraft is statecraft in the dark. It is often blind statecraft. The statesman's ethics cannot ever be a perfect ethics of responsibility, because he does not control what goes on outside, and because he normally does not even understand clearly what goes on outside. What has been happening between us and the Russians after their invasion of Afghanistan is the clearest example of this, even though we have had thirty-five years of experience, of dialog with the other side. The difficulty of assessment is created by the fact that events are always ambiguous. When you must make your decision, you often do not know what the event to which you react means. A splendid example is provided by the debate in England in 1906–1907 as to whether imperial Germany was mounting a worldwide offensive—which Britain had to stop—or was merely a clumsy, prestige-conscious nation, which the mighty British should try to accommodate. There was a comparable debate in the thirties, on whether Hitler was Hitler, or merely an impolite version of Bismarck. One key question divided the French in 1940: Was the victory of the Germans final or not? A great deal of public behavior depended on what one thought the answer was. Was Vietnam a civil war, was it an outside aggression? Are the Soviets in Afghanistan because they are afraid, or because they are cocky? And so on. The difficulty of understanding what events mean is compounded by the difficulty of assessing the effects of one's own course. We choose a policy on the basis of our

(unscientific) interpretation of an event, a trend, another nation's behavior, but often ignore the fact that our own move, which we see as a mere reaction, may have unfortunate effects. We select a course, but do we know how far it will take us? When Carter seemed to drag his feet on SALT II and hasten his pace of rapprochement with China, did he calculate the effect on the Soviets? When Pétain decided for the armistice, did he know that it would lead to rather abject collaborationism a little later? Or when one rejects a course, does one know at the time whether one was wise to reject it or not? Think of the decision made by the United States to drop the atomic bomb on Japan rather than to "demonstrate" the bomb on some empty island.

The second kind of political handicap is not uncertainty, but foreclosure. The first necessity for a statesman is to preserve his political base, to maintain domestic support for his policies. But the constraints of internal moods and pressures often restrict severely his range of action abroad. Certain moral courses may be barred by domestic prohibitions; far less ethical ones may be dictated by internal imperatives. Moreover, moral choice is also hampered by the fact that different statesmen operate according to very different codes, even within the same country or the same political regime. A statesman's code is the product of his character, of his own experiences, of his upbringing, of the mood of the moment. He rarely performs according to a model of perfect rationality, weighing all options; his code tends to shut out certain alternatives, to make him blind to certain realities and deaf to certain demands, to overvalue the benefits of the preferred course and to exaggerate the costs of the discarded alternatives. Men like Chamberlain and Daladier put very high on their list of priorities the economy of lives, after the blood bath of the first World War; but, in Churchill's famous words, they got both

dishonor and war. Thus moral action is impaired both by the rails on which statesmen move, which traverse only a part of the landscape, and by the fog through which the train advances.

What are the consequences of these limits on moral choice? The most evident could be called the moral inferiority of international politics. This is a domain in which, much more than in domestic politics, one pays a penalty for behaving decently. One always risks being duped; for instance if you wait angelically until your neighbor attacks you first. If one behaves too well toward outsiders—refugees, trade competitors, needy states—one may also expose oneself to a domestic backlash. Also, there is always a greater opportunity to rely on immoral methods; this was the immortal statement of Cavour: If statesmen had behaved in their private life the way they did in order to bring about the unification of Italy—lying, spying, and killing—their mothers would not have approved.

We can look at the social order as a pyramid of moralities. There is, at the bottom, the morality of the individual—let us say traditional Christian morality or its "lay," post-Enlightenment, Kantian variety. Then, there are various group moralities within the state—less capable of altruism, and prone to distinguish sharply between what is due to those who are in and what is left for those who are out. Finally there is the statesman. Machiavelli's whole work is based on the contrast between ordinary Christian ethics and the ethics of statescraft, which entails doing whatever is necessary for the good of the country—not an "immoral" code of behavior, except by Christian standards, but a different code of morality, which wills the means to the noble end of civic survival. *Raison d'Etat* is not an abdication from morality, but the proper morality of statescraft.

Now, in well-ordered polities, group morality—

from the family to the big pressure group—is under a double control: that of individual morality, which presumably will prevent the in/out distinction from becoming murderous, and that of the state, eager to prevent group selfishness from destroying the social order (Mafia morality is a perfect example of what happens when the double check falters). And the whole effort of Western political philosophy and Western liberalism has consisted in replacing the ethics of Machiavelli's Prince with a quasi-Christian version of statecraft morality: the ethical politics of social contract theory *à la* Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. In other words, there has been a partly successful attempt at making statecraft, concerned with the good of the national group, compatible with common-morality definitions of the good. When a recent American president behaved as a dime-store version of the Prince, he was driven out of office for having violated both the law and the spirit of the system.

The drama of international politics is that there is, as of now, no generally accepted alternative to Machiavellian statecraft. The latter has not been made illegitimate. To be sure, we have, in theory, two such alternative morals: the old Christian notion of the prince who obeys the precepts of natural law, and the Kantian version of the statesmen who adopt the principles of eternal peace. But the three factors I have discussed make it impossible for statesmen to behave as if a world community, however decentralized, had already been achieved. Wilson is an exemplary figure—both because his high ideal of non-Machiavellian statecraft ended in tragedy, and because, as the defender of his nation's interests, he sometimes acted as a good Machiavellian, "for where the very safety of the country depends upon the resolution to be taken, no considerations of justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, nor of glory or shame, should be allowed to prevail."<sup>9</sup> Our problem is how to reach the stage, partially achieved in some domestic sys-

tems, of a possible non-Machiavellian ethical statecraft in international affairs—a statecraft that will not define what it is its duty to protect, the good of the nation, in ways incompatible with the good of mankind. And we must also remember that whenever enmity prevails, what J. N. Figgis rightly calls Machiavelli's philosophy of emergency, siege and self-defense will accurately describe the behavior of statesmen. The possibility of their behaving accordingly is always present, at the margin or tangentially, so to speak. As long as the structural, philosophical, and political conditions that would make an alternative ethics of statecraft practicable do not exist, recommendations or exhortations (for instance about the legitimacy of interventions for good causes) ought to be treated with considerable skepticism, on moral as well as on prudential grounds; remember Pascal: *qui veut faire l'ange fait la bête*.

The drama of moral reformers of international relations is not only that the dream of a world community with non-Machiavellian statecraft remains apolitical, but also that the Machiavellian ethics have a strong appeal. For it is not a call for the jungle, it is literally "outgroup morality." It does not advocate cynical and brutal behavior *per se*; it tends to divide mankind into those who are on our side, and our foes; it appeals to the idealism of commitment, of rewards to friends, as well as to the machismo of might, and to the competitive instinct that feeds the concern with credibility. Were it entirely the opposite of Christian, or democratic, statecraft, its appeals would be less broad. They derive both from what could be called a self-righteous perversion of such statecraft, and from the latent dissatisfaction with its meekness, with its all-too-reasonable, too uncombative character. In other words, it appeals both to the selfish instincts suppressed by Christian morality and to the fascist ones latent in many of us.

Another consequence of the limits of moral

choice consists of the dangers which exist in the field, and about which many Americans have written so eloquently that they sometimes threw out the moral baby with the murky bath. One of the dangers, already mentioned, is excessive moralizing in the abstract. This is the old critique of idealism, which wants the statesman to come straight out of the Ten Commandments, and forgets that he is bound to the here-and-now. He has to choose most of the time not between moral action and immoral action, but between competing half-moral, half-immoral, or amoral alternatives, or between a course that will strike him as moral, given his code (say, help to a "friendly" dictator in trouble) but will be denounced by people with different priorities, and a course such people would prefer but that would appear immoral to him (if it risks helping radicals hostile to the United States, in the example given). When one acts one does not choose between immorality and morality; first of all, many decisions are purely technical and have no clear moral implications; secondly, one normally has to choose between one's own brand of dubious morality and another actor's. Vietnam made all this very clear. Our trying to impose our will on the Vietcong and on Hanoi brought dreadful results; but the alternative (which we failed to prevent, and could not have prevented at a reasonable cost) was the imposition of Hanoi's will. Was it better for us to try keeping our commitment, would it have been better to spare the Vietnamese people the horrors of our war?

The other peril, which is sometimes much more serious, lies not in abstract moralizing but in self-righteousness. It is not the danger of inefficient idealism; it is the danger of effective hypocrisy. It takes two forms. One is ideological thinking, when one justifies one's discrete acts by the overall design, and looks at one's nation as the secular arm of a set of principles (whereas the abstract moralist wants to make of the statesman the

humble servant of the idea, here the idea is at the mercy of the secular arm). Of course, as the French Revolution demonstrated, it is the latter that advances behind the shield of the principles. (The Soviet Union call wars of national liberation which it supports "just wars"; and the Brezhnev doctrine promises "friendly" intervention for Communist regimes in trouble.) The other form moralizing self-righteousness takes is the notion, so prominent in American writings thirty years ago, that the national interest is ethical by itself, that the defense of the interests of the state is automatically moral—which provides one with the ritualistic justification of absolutely anything, but begs the question of the compatibility of the various national interests. Both forms risk exacerbating conflict, adding violence to hypocrisy. What started as an ethical parade ends as a glorification of power—for without power the principles, or the "moral" national interest, have no chance of prevailing. The result is, at best, the tyranny of benevolence—expansion justified by "world responsibility" or "world revolution"—at worst imperialism pure and simple.

Within these limits, however, what can we do?

#### THE ETHICS OF FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

I began by rejecting the position of the unpolitical moralist, who believes that ethical judgments can be made in the abstract. All ethical judgments in politics, but particularly in this field, are historical judgments. They are, as the jargon would put it these days, contextual or situational; they are not separable from the concrete circumstances, from the actual cases. And I also reject the position which Kant called that of the political moralist, the person who wants to concoct a system of morals for

the convenience of the statesman—in other words, the adviser of the prince who whispers in the prince's ear the principles which will justify the prince's acts. This is not what I am concerned with; I have enough colleagues who have professionally been doing this, with results which are the best evidence ever given for the merits of ivory towers. The question I want to raise is the good old Kantian question: Can one, in this field, be what he called a moral politician—whom he defined as “a man who employs the principles of political prudence in such a way that they can co-exist with morals.”<sup>10</sup> Now this is of course a normative problem, it is a problem of *oughts*, and I know that one cannot mechanically derive an *ought* from an *is*. But one of the key necessities in this field is to avoid too big a gap between what is and what ought to be. In any system of law, or in any system of morals, there is always a gap between the *is* and the *ought*, between the empirical pattern and the norm. The gap is necessary and inevitable. If there were no gap, people would not feel any sense of obligation, or any remorse when they violate a norm. But when the gap becomes too big, the system of law or the system of morals is really doomed—to have no impact whatsoever or to be destroyed.

A skeletal outline of what ethical action in foreign policy should be like within the limits previously stated will start with some *ises*, go to some *oughts*, and end by dealing with a few objections and difficulties. Let us start with the *is*. The ethics of a statesman is and must be what Weber called an “ethics of responsibility”; it cannot be just an ethic of conviction or intentions, for all kinds of reasons. Conviction is necessary, but costs must be assessed. Intentions are normally mixed; particularly when decisions are made by groups, as they are made in most modern states. An ethics of intentions risks being one of extraordinary self-righteousness, and of the kind of callousness Weber so strongly criticized. Any moral

statecraft has to be an ethics of consequences, in the sense of being concerned for the foreseeable effects. This does not mean that “whatever works is good” (whatever that means, for a key question is: For whom does it work? For the national community, at terrible costs for all others? For others, but at the expense of one's own nation's interests?). It means that the good, in politics, is not separable from its realization. The criteria of moral politics are double: sound principles, and effectiveness. A morally bad design—say, naked aggression—does not become good because it succeeds. But a morally fine one—say, a rescue operation for the freeing of hostages—does not meet the conditions of the moral politician if the details are such that success is most unlikely, or that the costs of success would be prohibitive. Politics is an art of performance; a politician with excellent intentions but incoherent or unsteady execution is not a moral politician—especially not if one effect of his clumsiness is to help far less well intentioned politicians, or politicians whose moral code is far more of the Machiavellian variety, prevail in his stead. Even a prophet-statesman, a revolutionary statesman, a Khomeini or a Lenin, and even a statesman-saint like Gandhi has to be concerned with consequences both because he is responsible to his own people and because of the bad results a neglect of consequences might have for his creed.

However, to say that he must have an ethics of responsibility does not tell you at all *how* the statesman will calculate the consequences. It depends entirely on the nature of his ends and on his view of his constituency. Concerning the latter: does he see himself as responsible above all to his people or to a more abstract conception of the nation (remember de Gaulle's distinction between France and the French) or to a larger community (the world proletariat, Islam, or, in Gandhi's case, the souls of his opponents as well as those of his supporters)? Does he



see himself as responsible above all to those currently living, or to future generations whose welfare or glory he is attempting to ensure? Concerning the ends, if he is a revolutionary statesman, he will define the consequences by comparing the future he wants to reach with the bad present he wants to leave behind; and since he is likely to want to leave it behind by destroying it, he will be much more willing to use force, to use evil means, or perhaps, as in the case of Khomeini, to court martyrdom for his people, than if he were just your ordinary *ad hoc* pragmatic statesman campaigning in New Hampshire. If he is a statesman saint, *à la* Gandhi, he will be calculating consequences in terms of the effects of the means on the purity of the ends, because his end will be radical moral change, even if the choice of means adapted to this goal slows down liberation or social transformation.

In other words, having said that the ethics of the statesman must be an ethics of consequences, we leave the normative problem pretty much intact. And here we must leap from what must be to what ought to be. The ethics of the statesman ought to be a blend of three different elements: ends, means, and self-restraint. First of all, it has to be a morality of ends because ends are of course susceptible to moral judgment; but moral judgments of ends are never simple. At first sight, doesn't it seem obvious that certain kinds of ends are purely evil—not only according to common morality but even in a Machiavellian ethics, since they go far beyond what public safety requires: what might be called Hitlerian goals such as racial domination, the extermination and subjugation of inferior peoples, the exploitation of conquered countries, etc.? And doesn't it seem equally obvious that a goal such as national survival is necessarily good? Soon, however, the simplicity dissolves. On the one hand, who judges the morality of the ends? What we now deem repugnant was deemed moral by a huge fraction of

the German people; what we see as rightful—the survival of Israel—is judged plain wrong by many Arabs. I will indicate below how to deal with that issue—the diversity of points of view, or the relativity of moral judgments; let us just remember that it is troublesome. On the other hand, in daily politics, ends are not easy to identify. Policies defined through a collective process do not always have clear ends. Also, a statesman with very evil ends can do a masterful job of disguising them for a long time. Hitler succeeded in fooling almost everybody (except people who had read *Mein Kampf*, not a best-seller) because he moved toward his horrid grandiose ends by installments—slice by slice, with means that at first seemed limited. And even ends which look rightful on the surface, like survival, dissolve once one analyzes them. For instance, do we talk about the survival of Uganda, or the survival of Idi Amin? Do we talk of the survival of an abstract entity, let us say a Pakistan which still included East Bengal, or the Federation of Nigeria, or the survival of a concrete people that may want to secede—Bangladesh, Biafra? Bad ends can be disguised, and ends which look good may be a little bit more complicated. All too often, we find ourselves in the typical Weberian situation—a conflict between equally moral ends, for instance in civil wars involving an attempted secession, or in wars that pit against each other equally legitimate but incompatible claims, as in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

In addition to a moral test, ends ought to be submitted to two others, first of all to a test of reality. A good end which has not the slightest chance of being realized—which is exactly what characterized American policy in China in the 40's, when we sought a democratic, united China under Chiang, and in Vietnam for many years, when we sought an independent, self-sustaining South Vietnam—is not good policy. And there ought to

be a test of priority. If an end is good, it does not mean necessarily that it should be put on top. There are, inevitably, competing objectives that may be more pressing, and morally more important.

I will attempt a more precise definition of moral ends in the next chapters, dealing with major issues in foreign policy. But precisely because the simple examination of ends is not enough, we must move from the ends to the means. A valid end does not meet the demands of moral politics if it requires a price that is excessive for oneself or for others: Pétain tried to obtain France's survival by concessions that mortgaged both French honor and French independence, just as at Munich Chamberlain and Daladier tried to save peace (and to give themselves more time for rearmament) by sacrificing Czechoslovakia. Nor is a valid end morally acceptable if it requires means more evil than the evil to be avoided or redressed. For instance, the Palestinians' original end was to redress the injustice committed against them by throwing the Israelis into the sea. A valid end can be undermined by the wrong choice of means. The goal of Israeli security is certainly a good one, but not if it has to be achieved by creating massive insecurity for the Arabs, and particularly for the Palestinians. Justice for the Palestinians is a rightful end, but not if it entails indiscriminate terror against innocent Israelis (or a presumption of collective guilt that eliminates all distinctions). In other words, international relations is an endless chain of ends and means. Today's means shape tomorrow's ends. The choice of means is particularly important either when the range of choice of ends is narrow—when the ends are almost dictated by the international situation, that is, in periods of extreme enmity, or on the contrary, when the range of choice of ends is quite broad, when the statesman can choose among ends which are all morally fairly plausible or all morally mixed (as

had been the case for us in Vietnam). It is morally necessary to choose means which are not destructive of one's end through coercion or corruption; secondly, the means must be proportional both to the end, and to the importance of the end in the hierarchy of one's goals; and finally, one ought to choose means which do not entail costs of values greater than the cost of not using these means.

One must nevertheless recognize that the calculation of effects, in international affairs, is always hazardous. Because of the huge political handicap of uncertainty, a statesman can never be sure that his means will deliver the results he expects. Therefore, even an ethics of consequences needs to be saved from the perils of unpredictability and from the temptations of Machiavellianism by a corset of firm principles guiding the choice of ends and of means—by a dose of ethics of conviction covering both goals and instruments. What this entails is indicated by the final ingredient: a morality of self-restraint. The purpose of moral action in international affairs ought to be to diminish the strain of the antinomies that weigh on the statesmen and on the citizens. We are all torn between our duties as citizens and our vaguer duties as members of mankind. A morality of self-restraint entails simply taking into account the existence of the moral claims of others.

This in turn has a number of consequences. The first is the need to observe the principle of self-determination. It can be abused. There is no "objective" way of defining a nation—since the borders of many states are purely artificial, the principle of self-determination may be deeply subversive of the existing order; and when it is claimed by tribes, minorities, ethnic groups within existing nations, it seems like a recipe for chaos, in full contradiction of the trends of economic interdependence. (Every unhappy group does not have a

right to establish its own nation. Many nations are successful blends of different ethnic or cultural entities; a state that is not yet a nation deserves a chance to create one.) However, the possible excesses—some of which result from claims provoked or exacerbated by the mismanagement and brutalities of domestic systems—are no reason for refusing to acknowledge the validity of the principle itself, or for subordinating its application to a higher but ill-defined ideal of justice. Justice itself requires that the right be granted; for there is no more certain injustice than alien rule imposed against the will of a people.<sup>11</sup> Self-determination is a precondition for peaceful coexistence. And if one ever wants to go beyond the nation-state, recognizing the right of people to their own nation is the first step; you cannot go beyond by avoiding it.

A second consequence is the immorality of any policy of universal domination, because it can only be imposed by force. And the last one is the immorality of any national policy of universal or very large-scale intervention (which does not mean, we shall see it later, that some interventions are not allowable). To be sure, foreign policy, especially that of great powers, cannot refrain from intervening abroad—refusing to intervene (against a tyrannical government, or by giving aid to a needy people) is itself a form of intervention. But I am referring to the more extreme forms, military or not, aimed not merely at influence but at control. They are incompatible with the right of a nation to determine its own destiny. A fuller discussion will be provided in the next chapter.

One might object that a morality of self-restraint simply perpetuates the traditional game of international politics with all its antinomies. But one must remember that the first duty of the statesman is to his own community; he is not at the helm in order to abolish the race,

although it is proper to ask him to make it more moderate and sportslike. A policy that aims at protecting the nation's interest while minimizing the risks for all others is morally preferable to a more ambitious attempt at transcending the game, which weakens the international order and leaves all nations less secure. One may also object that by equating existing regimes with the underlying (and often oppressed) nations, self-restraint actually allows the former to commit a host of injustices and to make the people a victim of their state. However, self-restraint does not mean endorsing the status quo. A diplomacy of self-restraint may be used to make the world a better place, and while it rules out attempts at extreme manipulation or imperialism, it does not rule out, as the next chapters will show, attempts at fighting a variety of injustices abroad. To show regard for the rights of others means both refraining from trampling them and helping others to rescue these rights when they are trampled or ignored.

Indeed, the ethics of the statesman ought to be guided by the imperative of moving the international arena from the state of a jungle to that of a society, because the moral opportunities available to all of us—not only to the statesman—depend on the state of the international system. Moral opportunities, in every milieu, depend on the social framework. If (as in primitive societies) integration is total, there is no moral choice at all. This is not a danger that threatens international relations. If the social framework disintegrates, there are no longer sufficient opportunities for moral choice. In international affairs they are, as we have seen, limited and pervertible—but not always to the same extent. The closer the international system is to a jungle, the closer we are to the floor of survival, the less opportunity for choice we have, the more values we have to sacrifice, the more plausible the statesman's claim of necessity becomes, the

more we will be tempted to accept the "morality of struggle"—and either resign ourselves to endless competition, or put a moral dressing on it, in either case restricting our duties to our own community and, at most, to its supporters or clients. On the contrary, the more moderate the system is, the greater the range of moral choice for all of us, the greater the possibility for the statesman to look at the world in terms other than us vs. them—to try to move from what I called a Machiavellian morality of public safety to a more universal morality that accepts the rightful claims of others; so that the question: right or good for whom? is no longer answered: exclusively for the statesman's community.

In a sense we have gone back to Kant in two ways. First of all, he was not wrong to believe that if one wants to move in that direction, one prerequisite is domestic: what he called constitutional government. Not necessarily because the people are always for peace, whereas autocrats are for war. We have seen imperialistic and bellicose democracies. But domestically repressive governments often promote immoderate statecraft outside and need outside successes to maintain their grip inside. It is much more likely that moral judgments on ends and means will be observed if there is a certain amount of popular control over what the government does. All of the precepts I advocated suppose a great deal of public discussion, a very limited amount of secrecy, a very limited possibility of cooking up Machiavellian schemes in the dark. A morality of self-restraint is compatible with liberal nationalism. It is incompatible with the kind of nationalism that developed in many nations by the end of the nineteenth century, but was at its most acute in countries which had no constitutional or representative governments.

Secondly, the guidelines I have listed can exploit the two "oughts" which I think emerge from the present

international situation. All states want to survive in a nuclear world, and all states, or almost all, need each other for their own economic and social development. It was Kant who predicted that nations would move toward peace not because of the moral will and virtue of human beings, but because of the terror of modern weapons, and because of greed—people being dragged to the good by the horror of modern war and by material need. Those two concerns—survival and interdependence—are the only tenuous, uneven, contentious common threads.

This sketchy discussion raises two categories of questions or objections. I have been talking about rules of behavior. The first question is: Rules for whom? There is a horizontal aspect to the question, and there is a vertical one. The horizontal one is the old dilemma of relativism; the values and directions I have suggested are not accepted by everybody. I have pointed out that conflicts of ethical codes characterize international affairs. The solution to this is certainly not to accept relativism and give in. For giving in simply means refusing to judge, and that means not merely accepting the validity of all codes, but in effect yielding to the strongest, neither of which is acceptable. One has to recognize the diversity of values, and the close connection between them and a society's social structure and culture—another reason for self-restraint and prudence in acting abroad. But then one must go on and make one's own decision—a step both necessary and arbitrary. It is necessary to protect and promote one's own values if one believes in them, especially when one deems some other codes to be destructive of all values; and it is arbitrary, because no system of values can claim to be the only good and true one; but so be it. One must not confuse tolerance for diversity, and for those values of other people that are merely different from ours, with the acceptance of practices and policies

that violate our notion of humanity. To do the latter would mean abandoning "the element of universalization which is present in any morality."<sup>12</sup> If the values we try to promote are values which make the coexistence of peoples and value systems possible, there is no need to be ashamed of it. In two cases I mentioned earlier, the Germans in the 30's and the Arab-Israeli dispute, the answer certainly is not relativism—"all claims are equally valid." The solution, quite simply, is that one had to resist the Nazis, whose code required the destruction of "inferior" races and value systems, but without exterminating the German people; and that should have had some consequences on how one ought to have waged the war. And one ought to recognize Israel's existence and security needs, but not at the expense of justice for the claims of the other side.

The vertical dimension of the question of "rules for whom" is the problem of cosmopolitanism. Are the rules of moral conduct I have been trying to suggest rules of behavior among governments, which define rights and duties of states such as the respect of treaties, or the equality of states, or the principle of collective security? Or are they also rules of behavior for the benefit of the citizens of other states? If you want to rephrase the question, do states have rights because they are states, independently of what happens inside them? Or if you prefer to rephrase it in a different way, already mentioned above, Justice for whom? Are we trying simply to define rules of justice for the states, or for the people? This is a very controversial question; it opposes, as one author puts it, the traditional international law conception of the morality of states, "states, not persons, (as) the subjects of international morality,"<sup>13</sup> versus what could be called "cosmopolitan morality," in which the only real beneficiaries of rights and holders of duties are persons. My answer would be that it has to be a mix of both. There is

justification for the morality of states. States have rights and duties as the main actors in world affairs. The relation between the rights of a state and the degree to which the state or the regime is based on the implicit consent of the persons that live under its jurisdiction will be explored later. But insofar as each national group is deemed to have the right to organize its own state and to exert autonomy through it, the state benefits from the presumption that it is the expression of the national wish to independence. We have a right to be French and not Germans, to be Americans and not Soviets, to be Afghans and not a mere republic incorporated in big brother's domain. This is the foundation of the state's rights and duties. The Pol Pot regime was quite illegitimate at home—it is the least one could say—but still Cambodians are entitled to form the state of Cambodia, and not a province of Vietnam.

On the other hand, it is clear that there is a relation between the rights of individuals and the rights of states. The latter are not unlimited and unconditional. States are artificial constructs. Also, statesmen affect by their behavior the lives of people abroad; and even though there is not yet any community of mankind, we in many nations that are not closed off begin to be affected by germs of cosmopolitan consciousness. Many of us are becoming a little more than pure nationals to whom other men, being foreigners, are nothing. In other words, we are in a period of transition, in which there are twin dangers. One is to neglect the cosmopolitan germs—and therefore to treat states as if they were indeed totally sovereign or absolutes. But the other danger is to destroy those germs of cosmopolitanism either by advocating sweeping cosmopolitan measures while forgetting that their enforcement depends on the existing states—a sure way to insure their evaporation or distortion; or by removing too soon the protection which

statehood provides to citizens against domination by foreigners. For the real choice for most of us is not between being, say, Americans and being citizens of the world; it is a choice between being Americans and being somebody else's satellites or victims.

The second set of questions is not rules for whom, but what kinds of rules. This has a general and a specific focus. The general question could be phrased, "interest versus morality." If the statesman is bound to the interests of his state, if he must be selfish for the state's survival, security, and interests, can one really talk about morality at all? Is not the best one can hope for a kind of relaxed Hobbesianism? One should not exaggerate. Selfishness and total disregard of moral restraints are not synonymous. Even Weber wrote that he admired the statesman who, having reached a certain point, says: here I stand, I can do no other. It is true that state altruism is not very frequent, nor can it always be commended because, after all, the statesman's duty is to look after the interests of his people. However, all statesmen have a tendency to justify their acts in moral terms and not in those of Machiavelian morality, but according to standards other than *Raison d'Etat*; even in Thucydides, when statesmen, in their speeches, argue about their respective positions and ambitions, they reason in moral terms of rights and wrongs. This is more than a tribute of vice to virtue. It is an acknowledgment of the fact that statesmen find a need to go beyond mere Hobbesian behavior. Moreover, the ways in which statesmen defend their nations' interests vary a great deal. They very often include moral considerations in defining the national interest, by adding milieu to possession goals, by making long-range considerations prevail over short-term gains. Also, it is quite possible to show the bad impact of either recurrent immoral behavior or of shockingly evil conduct on one's interest. It was not good for the interests of France and

Britain to have behaved at Munich the way they did. Nor did Hitler's methods found a thousand-year Reich. Only if one took the position that the sole genuine morality is that which requires selfless behavior, would the gap between interest and ethical action be unbridgeable. But "it is quite unrealistic to force onto... anyone... an exclusive disjunction between the prudential and the moral," precisely because these two categories "leave out, in fact, almost everything" about human motivations.<sup>14</sup> The conflict between interest and morality should not be dramatized, and the task of moral politics is to bring the two together.

The more specific question is: what criteria of moral judgment are appropriate for international politics? There is a debate between utilitarians and champions of Kantian morality or, if you prefer, an ethics of rights and duties, "Thou shalt do this" or "Thou shalt not do that"—categorical imperatives. Utilitarians have a *prima facie* strong case. They can argue as follows: If the sad necessity of international relations is that one must make morality and interest coincide, and also that one must always weigh the consequences of what one does, would not then the ethics of international relations be necessarily utilitarian? Should not the statesman aim at the greatest good for the greatest number, at the greatest happiness, or the long-term utility as decided by rational people? Is it not more fitting than the morality of absolutes, of the categorical imperative, or the Decalog?

This is not necessarily true, even though happiness and utility are obviously worthy goals. To say that the statesman must calculate consequences, that is, worry about how his precepts will be realized, does not mean that the precept must be the calculus of happiness. Why should it not be a calculus of the best way of promoting a fundamental right or of ensuring a categorical prohibi-

tion? Only if it could be shown that such rights or prohibitions cannot be enforced except at disastrous cost would the utilitarian preference make sense. Utilitarianism is an ethics of consequences; that does not make it *the* ethics of international affairs.

Moreover, the criteria on which it relies are quite problematic. In a sense, they beg the key question of foreign policy behavior: whose (greatest) good is the statesman enhancing? In a pure "state of war," there is no general standard of utility—see Rousseau again: it is only the happiness of his own "pseudo-species" that the statesman can worry about; for in situations of total enmity, what is useful to me cannot be useful to my enemy. If the competition relaxes, there is still a danger of *my* trying to impose my notions of happiness and utility on *you*—and as Kant has shown they are far more subjective than considerations of basic rights and wrongs. Statecraft, quite properly, often gives priority to other concerns: one can argue that only when basic issues of legitimacy, authority, and freedom are settled is the road to a politics of happiness or welfare open. Moreover, different kinds of utility or disutility are nonfungible, and policy decisions must take into account many nonquantifiable, noncomparable elements; the effects of different kinds of decisions on happiness and utility are equally hard to assess and to compare. In other words, there is no substitute for a weighing of alternatives, and utilitarianism, far from providing easy guidelines or shortcuts, tends to become excessively rubbery, to split into infinite varieties, and to breed an exuberant casuistry in its attempt to encompass an unmanageable reality. It ends up often as a vast exercise in *ex post* rationalization, and it is open to the criticism that in its emphasis on "simple-seeming . . . calculation," "it often appears to imply that" dubious acts, "apart from their resultant harm and benefits, are in themselves neutral."<sup>15</sup>

In international affairs concerns of order and status, honor and trust, safety and ideology are either prior to considerations of pleasure and pain, or impossible to translate into calculations of happiness and utility. Here such calculations are especially uncertain; we are in the domain of uncertainty. Utilitarianism is better at giving one a good conscience than at providing a compass. The answer to the question must therefore be one which is very unsatisfactory for philosophers (but as I said earlier I am not one of them). The morality of international relations will simply have to be a mix of commands and of utilitarian calculations. The commands cannot be followed at any cost; "Thou shalt not kill" or "Thou shalt not lie" can never be pushed so far that the cost clearly becomes a massive disutility to the national interest (how much of a disutility is bearable depends on alternatives, on the statesman's conception of the national interest, and on the nature of the system). On the other hand, purely utilitarian ethics simply cannot cope with the complexity and the shortcomings of the calculations statesmen must make; the advantage of imperatives is that they provide at least a sense of direction.