Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory

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I. INTRODUCTION

There has been an explosion of interest in the concept of citizenship among political theorists. In 1978, it could be confidently stated that "the concept of citizenship has gone out of fashion among political thinkers" (van Gunsteren 1978, p. 9). Fifteen years later, citizenship has become the "buzz word" among thinkers on all points of the political spectrum (Heater 1990, p. 293; Vogel and Moran 1991, p. x).

There are a number of reasons for this renewed interest in citizenship in the 1990s. At the level of theory, it is a natural evolution in political discourse because the concept of citizenship seems to integrate the demands of justice and community membership—the central concepts of political philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively. Citizenship is intimately linked to ideas of individual entitlement on the one hand and of attachment to a particular community on the other. Thus it may help clarify what is really at stake in the debate between liberals and communitarians.

Interest in citizenship has also been sparked by a number of recent political events and trends throughout the world—increasing voter apathy and long-term welfare dependency in the United States, the resurgence of nationalist movements in Eastern Europe, the stresses created by an increasingly multicultural and multiracial population in Western Europe, the backlash against the welfare state in Thatcher's England, the failure of environmental policies that rely on voluntary citizen cooperation, and so forth.

These events have made clear that the health and stability of a modern democracy depends, not only on the justice of its 'basic structure' but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens: 1 for example,

1. Rawls says that the "basic structure" of society is the primary subject of a theory of justice (Rawls 1971, p. 7; Rawls 1993, pp. 257–89).

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their sense of identity and how they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate in the political process in order to promote the public good and hold political authorities accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and exercise personal responsibility in their economic demands and in personal choices which affect their health and the environment. Without citizens who possess these qualities, democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable. As Habermas notes, "the institutions of constitutional freedom are only worth as much as a population makes of them" (Habermas 1992, p. 7).

It is not surprising, then, that there should be increasing calls for 'a theory of citizenship' that focuses on the identity and conduct of individual citizens, including their responsibilities, loyalties, and roles. There are, however, at least two general hazards in this quest. First, the scope of a 'theory of citizenship' is potentially limitless—almost every problem in political philosophy involves relations among citizens or between citizens and the state. In this survey we try to avoid this danger by concentrating on two general issues that citizenship theorists claim have been neglected due to the overemphasis in recent political philosophy on structures and institutions—namely, civic virtues and citizenship identity.

The second danger for a theory of citizenship arises because there are two different concepts which are sometimes conflated in these discussions: citizenship-as-legal-status, that is, as full membership in a particular political community; and citizenship-as-desirable-activity, where the extent and quality of one's citizenship is a function of one's participation in that community.

As we shall see in the next section, most writers believe that an adequate theory of citizenship requires greater emphasis on responsibilities and virtues. Few of them, however, are proposing that we should revise our account of citizenship-as-legal-status in a way that would, say, strip apathetic people of their citizenship. Instead, these authors are generally concerned with the requirements of being a 'good citizen'. But we should expect a theory of the good citizen to be relatively independent of the legal question of what it is to be a citizen, just as a theory of the good person is distinct from the metaphysical (or legal) question of what it is to be a person. While most

2. This may account for the recent interest in citizenship promotion among governments (e.g., Britain's Commission on Citizenship, Encouraging Citizenship [1990]; Senate of Australia, Active Citizenship Revisited [1991], Senate of Canada, Canadian Citizenship: Sharing the Responsibility [1993]).

3. One issue we will not discuss is immigration and naturalization policy (e.g., Brubaker 1989; van Gunsteren 1988).
theorists respect this distinction in developing their own theories, we shall discuss in Section IV a fairly widespread tendency to ignore it when criticizing others' theories of citizenship—for example, by contrasting their own 'thick' conception of citizenship-as-activity with an opponent's 'thin' conception of citizenship-as-status.

II. THE POSTWAR ORTHODOXY

Before describing the new work on citizenship, it is necessary to outline quickly the view of citizenship that is implicit in much postwar political theory and that is defined almost entirely in terms of the possession of rights.

The most influential exposition of this postwar conception of citizenship-as-rights is T. H. Marshall's "Citizenship and Social Class," written in 1949. According to Marshall, citizenship is essentially a matter of ensuring that everyone is treated as a full and equal member of society. And the way to ensure this sense of membership is through according people an increasing number of citizenship rights.

Marshall divides citizenship rights into three categories which he sees as having taken hold in England in three successive centuries: civil rights, which arose in the eighteenth century; political rights, which arose in the nineteenth century; and social rights—for example, to public education, health care, unemployment insurance, and old-age pension—which have become established in this century (Marshall 1965, pp. 78 ff.). And with the expansion of the rights of citizenship, he notes, there was also an expansion of the class of citizens. Civil and political rights that had been restricted to white property-owning Protestant men were gradually extended to women, the working class, Jews and Catholics, blacks, and other previously excluded groups.

For Marshall, the fullest expression of citizenship requires a liberal-democratic welfare state. By guaranteeing civil, political, and social rights to all, the welfare state ensures that every member of society feels like a full member of society, able to participate in and enjoy the common life of society. Where any of these rights are withheld or violated, people will be marginalized and unable to participate.

This is often called "passive" or "private" citizenship, because of its emphasis on passive entitlements and the absence of any obligation.


5. It is often noted how idiosyncratically English this history is. In many European countries most of this progress occurred only in the past fifty years, and often in reverse order. Even in England, the historical evidence supports an "ebb and flow model" of citizenship rights, rather than a "unilinear" model (Heater 1990, p. 271; Parry 1991, p. 167; Held 1989, p. 193; Turner 1989).
to participate in public life. It is still widely supported, and with good reason: “the benefits of private citizenship are not to be sneezed at: they place certain basic human goods (security, prosperity, and freedom) within the grasp of nearly all, and that is nothing less than a fantastic human achievement” (Macedo 1990, p. 39).

Nevertheless, this orthodox postwar conception of citizenship has come increasingly under attack in the past decade. For the purposes of this article, we can identify two sets of criticisms. The first set focuses on the need to supplement (or replace) the passive acceptance of citizenship rights with the active exercise of citizenship responsibilities and virtues, including economic self-reliance, political participation, and even civility. These issues are discussed in Section III.

The second set focuses on the need to revise the current definition of citizenship to accommodate the increasing social and cultural pluralism of modern societies. Can citizenship provide a common experience, identity, and allegiance for the members of society? Is it enough simply to include historically excluded groups on an equal basis, or are special measures sometimes required? This issue is discussed in Section IV.

III. THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND VIRTUES OF CITIZENSHIP

A. The New Right Critique of Social Citizenship and the Welfare State

The first, and most politically powerful, critique of the postwar orthodoxy came from the New Right’s attack on the idea of “social rights.” These rights had always been resisted by the right, on the grounds that they were (a) inconsistent with the demands of (negative) freedom or (desert-based) justice, (b) economically inefficient, and (c) steps down ‘the road to servitude’. But in the public’s eye, these arguments were seen as either implausible or, at any rate, as justifiably outweighed by considerations of social justice or by a citizenship-based defense of the welfare state such as Marshall’s.

One of the revolutions in conservative thinking during the Thatcher/Reagan years was the willingness to engage the left in battle over the domain of social citizenship itself. Whereas Marshall had argued that social rights enable the disadvantaged to enter the mainstream of society and effectively exercise their civil and political rights, the New Right argues that the welfare state has promoted passivity among the poor, without actually improving their life chances, and

6. When asked what citizenship means to them, people are much more likely to talk about rights than responsibilities. This is true in Britain as well as the United States, although the British tend to emphasize social rights (e.g., to public education and health care), whereas Americans usually mention civil rights (e.g., freedom of speech and religion) (King and Waldron 1988; Conover et al. 1991, p. 804). For most people, citizenship is, as the U.S. Supreme Court once put it, “the right to have rights” (Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86, 102 [1958]).
created a culture of dependency. Far from being the solution, the welfare state has itself perpetuated the problem by reducing citizens to passive dependents who are under bureaucratic tutelage. According to Norman Barry, there is no evidence that welfare programs have in fact promoted more active citizenship (Barry 1990, pp. 43–53).

The New Right believes that the model of passive citizenship underestimated the extent to which fulfilling certain obligations is a precondition for being accepted as a full member of society. In particular, by failing to meet the obligation to support themselves, the long-term unemployed are a source of shame for society as well as themselves (Mead 1986, p. 240). Failure to fulfill common obligations is as much of an obstacle to full membership as the lack of equal rights. In these circumstances, "to obligate the dependent as others are obligated is essential to equality, not opposed to it. An effective welfare [policy] must include recipients in the common obligations of citizens rather than exclude them" (Mead 1986, pp. 12–13).

According to the New Right, to ensure the social and cultural integration of the poor, we must go "beyond entitlement," and focus instead on their responsibility to earn a living. Since the welfare state discourages people from becoming self-reliant, the safety net should be cut back and any remaining welfare benefits should have obligations tied to them. This is the idea behind one of the principal reforms of the welfare system in the 1980s: "workfare" programs, which require welfare recipients to work for their benefits, to reinforce the idea that citizens should be self-supporting.

This New Right vision of citizenship has not gone unchallenged. For example, the claim that the rise of an unemployed welfare-underclass is due to the availability of welfare ignores the impact of global economic restructuring, and sits uncomfortably with the fact that many of the most extensive welfare states (in Scandinavia, e.g.) have traditionally enjoyed among the lowest unemployment rates.

Moreover, critics charge, it is difficult to find any evidence that the New Right reforms of the 1980s have promoted responsible citizenship. These reforms aimed to extend the scope of markets in people's lives—through freer trade, deregulation, tax cuts, the weakening of trade unions, and the tightening of unemployment benefits—in part in order to teach people the virtues of initiative, self-reliance, and self-sufficiency (Mulgan 1991, p. 43).

Instead, however, many market deregulations arguably made possible an era of unprecedented greed and economic irresponsibility, as

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7. For evidence that there is a set of social expectations that Americans have of each other, and of themselves, that must be fulfilled if people are to be perceived as full members of society, see Mead (1986, p. 243); Shklar (1991, p. 413); Moon (1988, pp. 34–35); Dworkin (1992, p. 131).
evidenced by the savings and loan and junk bond scandals in America (Mulgan 1991, p. 39). Also, cutting welfare benefits, far from getting the disadvantaged back on their feet, has expanded the underclass. Class inequalities have been exacerbated, and the working poor and unemployed have been effectively “disenfranchised,” unable to participate in the new economy of the New Right (Fieribbeck 1991, p. 579; Hoover and Plant 1988, chap. 12).  

For many, therefore, the New Right program is most plausibly seen not as an alternative account of citizenship but as an assault on the very principle of citizenship. As Plant puts it, “Instead of accepting citizenship as a political and social status, modern Conservatives have sought to reassert the role of the market and have rejected the idea that citizenship confers a status independent of economic standing” (Plant 1991, p. 52; cf. Heater 1990, p. 303; King 1987, pp. 196–98).

B. Rethinking Social Citizenship

Given these difficulties with the New Right critique of welfare entitlements, most people on the left continue to defend the principle that full citizenship requires social rights. For the left, Marshall’s argument that people can be full members and participants in the common life of society only if their basic needs are met “is as strong now . . . as it ever was” (Ignatieff 1989, p. 72). However, many on the left accept that the existing institutions of the welfare state are unpopular, in part because they seem to promote passivity and dependence, and to “facilitate a privatist retreat from citizenship and a particular ‘culturalization’ of the citizen’s role” (Habermas 1992, pp. 10–11; cf. King 1987, pp. 45–46).

How then should the state foster self-reliance and personal responsibility? The left has responded ambivalently to issues such as ‘workfare’. On the one hand, the principle of personal responsibility and social obligation has always been at the heart of socialism (Mulgan 1991, p. 39). A duty to work is, after all, implicit in Marx’s famous slogan, “From each according to his talents, to each according to his needs.” Some people on the left, therefore, express qualified acceptance of workfare, if it “gives both responsibility and the power to use it” (Mulgan 1991, p. 46).

On the other hand, most people on the left remain uncomfortable with imposing obligations as a matter of public policy. They believe that the dependent are kept out of the mainstream of society because

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8. Some people on the right have recognized this danger with a purely market-based conception of citizenship and have sought to supplement it with an emphasis on voluntarism and charity. See the discussion of the British Conservative party’s citizenship rhetoric in Fieribbeck (1991, p. 589), Andrews (1991, p. 13), and Heater (1990, p. 303).
of a lack of opportunities, such as jobs, education, and training, not because of any desire to avoid work. Imposing obligations, therefore, is futile if genuine opportunities are absent, and unnecessary if those opportunities are present, since the vast majority of people on welfare would prefer not to be (King 1987, pp. 186-91; Fullinwider 1988, pp. 270-78). Rather than impose an obligation to work, the left would try to achieve full employment through, for example, worker-training programs. So while the left accepts the general principle that citizenship involves both rights and responsibilities, it feels that rights to participate must, in a sense, precede the responsibilities—that is, it is only appropriate to demand fulfillment of the responsibilities after the rights to participate are secured.

A similar rejection of the New Right’s view of citizenship can be found in recent feminist discussions of citizenship. Many feminists accept the importance of balancing rights and responsibilities—indeed, Carol Gilligan’s findings suggest that women, in their everyday moral reasoning, prefer the language of responsibility to the language of rights (Gilligan 1982, p. 19). But feminists have grave doubts about the New Right rhetoric of economic self-sufficiency. Gender-neutral talk about “self-reliance” is often a code for the view that men should financially support the family, while women should look after the household and care for the elderly, the sick, and the young. This reinforces, rather than eliminates, the barriers to women’s full participation in society.9

When the New Right talks about self-reliance, the boundaries of the “self” include the family—it is families that should be self-reliant. Hence, greater “self-reliance” is consistent with, and may even require, greater dependency within the family. Yet women’s dependence on men within the family can be every bit as harmful as welfare dependency, since it allows men to exercise unequal power over decisions regarding sex, reproduction, consumption, leisure, and so on (King 1987, p. 47; Okin 1989, pp. 128-29).

Since perceptions of responsibility tend to fall unequally on women, many feminists share the left’s view that rights to participate must, in a sense, precede responsibilities. Indeed, feminists wish to expand the list of social rights, in order to tackle structural barriers to women’s full participation as citizens that the welfare state currently ignores, or even exacerbates, such as the unequal distribution of domestic responsibilities (Phillips 1991a, 1991b; Okin 1992). Given the

9. The New Right’s emphasis on self-reliance puts women in a double bind. If they stay home and care for their children, they are accused of failing to live up to their duty to be self-supporting. (Hence the stereotype of irresponsible welfare mothers.) If they seek to earn a living, however, they are accused of failing to live up to their family responsibilities.
difficulty of combining family and public responsibilities, equal citizen-
ship for women is impossible until workplaces and career expectations are rearranged to allow more room for family responsibilities and until men accept their share of domestic responsibilities (Okin 1989, pp. 175–77).

However, if rights must precede responsibilities, it seems we are back to the old view of passive citizenship. Yet the left, as much as the right, accepts the need for change. The most popular proposal is to decentralize and democratize the welfare state—for example, by giving local welfare agencies more power and making them accountable to their clients (Pierson 1991, pp. 200–207). Hence the now-familiar talk of “empowering” welfare recipients by supplementing welfare rights with democratic participatory rights in the administration of welfare programs.

This is the central theme of the contemporary left view of social citizenship. Whether it will work to overcome welfare dependency is difficult to say. Service providers have often resisted attempts to increase their accountability (Rustin 1991, p. 231; Pierson 1991, pp. 206–7). Moreover, there may be some tension between the goal of increasing democratic accountability to the local community and increasing accountability to clients (Plant 1990, p. 30). As we discuss in the next section, the left may have excessive faith in the ability of democratic participation to solve the problems of citizenship.

C. The Need for Civic Virtues

Many classical liberals believed that a liberal democracy could be made secure, even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry, by creating checks and balances. Institutional and procedural devices such as the separation of powers, a bicameral legislature, and federalism would all serve to block would-be oppressors. Even if each person pursued her own self-interest, without regard for the common good, one set of private interests would check another set of private interests. However, it has become clear that procedural-institutional

10. Another theme in recent left writing on citizenship is the importance of constitutional rights. Indeed, the left’s reconciliation with liberal rights “is one of the major theoretical phenomena of our times” (Phillips 1991b, p. 13; Andrews 1991, pp. 207–11; Sedley 1991, p. 226).

11. Kant thought that the problem of good government “can be solved even for a race of devils” (quoted in Galston 1991, p. 215). Of course, other liberals recognized the need for civic virtue, including Locke, Mill, and the British Idealists (see Vincent and Plant 1984, chap. 1). See also Carens (1986) and Deigh (1988), who argue that basic liberal rights and principles ground a fairly extensive range of positive social duties and responsibilities, including the obligation to make good use of one’s talents, to vote, to fulfill the responsibilities of one’s office, and to aid in the defense of one’s country, as well as the duty to protect and educate one’s children.
mechanisms to balance self-interest are not enough, and that some level of civic virtue and public-spiritedness is required (Galston 1991, pp. 217, 244; Macedo 1990, pp. 138–39).

Consider the many ways that public policy relies on responsible personal lifestyle decisions: the state will be unable to provide adequate health care if citizens do not act responsibly with respect to their own health, in terms of a healthy diet, exercise, and the consumption of liquor and tobacco; the state will be unable to meet the needs of children, the elderly, or the disabled if citizens do not agree to share this responsibility by providing some care for their relatives; the state cannot protect the environment if citizens are unwilling to reduce, reuse, and recycle in their own homes; the ability of the government to regulate the economy can be undermined if citizens borrow immoderate amounts or demand excessive wage increases; attempts to create a fairer society will flounder if citizens are chronically intolerant of difference and generally lacking in what Rawls calls a sense of justice (Rawls 1971, pp. 114–16, 335). Without cooperation and self-restraint in these areas, "the ability of liberal societies to function successfully progressively diminishes" (Galston 1991, p. 220; Macedo 1990, p. 39).

In short, we need "a fuller, richer and yet more subtle understanding and practice of citizenship," because "what the state needs from the citizenry cannot be secured by coercion, but only cooperation and self-restraint in the exercise of private power" (Cairns and Williams 1985, p. 43). Yet there is growing fear that the civility and public-spiritedness of citizens of liberal democracies may be in serious decline (Walzer 1992, p. 90). 12

An adequate conception of citizenship, therefore, seems to require a balance of rights and responsibilities. Where do we learn these virtues? The New Right relies heavily on the market as a school of virtue. But there are other answers to this question.

1. The left and participatory democracy.—As we just noted, one of the left's responses to the problem of citizen passivity is to "empower" citizens by democratizing the welfare state and, more generally, by dispersing state power through local democratic institutions, regional assemblies, and judicable rights. However, emphasizing participation does not yet explain how to ensure that citizens participate responsibly—that is, in a public-spirited, rather than self-interested or prejudiced, way.

12. According to a recent survey, only 12 percent of American teenagers said voting was important to being a good citizen. Moreover, this apathy is not just a function of youth—comparisons with similar surveys from the previous fifty years suggest that "the current cohort knows less, cares less, votes less, and is less critical of its leaders and institutions than young people have been at any time over the past five decades" (Gendron 1991, p. 129). The evidence from Great Britain is similar (Heater 1990, p. 215).
Indeed, as Mulgan notes, “by concentrating too narrowly on the need to devolve power and on the virtues of freedom, issues of responsibility have been pushed to the margins” (Mulgan 1991, pp. 40–41). Empowered citizens may use their power irresponsibly by pushing for benefits and entitlements they cannot ultimately afford, or by voting themselves tax breaks and slashing assistance to the needy, or by “seeking scapegoats in the indolence of the poor, the strangeness of ethnic minorities, or the insolence and irresponsibility of modern women” (Fierlebeck 1991, p. 592).

Following Rousseau and J. S. Mill, many modern participatory democrats assume that political participation itself will teach people responsibility and toleration. As Oldfield notes, they place their faith in the activity of participation “as the means whereby individuals may become accustomed to perform the duties of citizenship. Political participation enlarges the minds of individuals, familiarizes them with interests which lie beyond the immediacy of personal circumstance and environment, and encourages them to acknowledge that public concerns are the proper ones to which they should pay attention” (Oldfield 1990b, p. 184).

Many people on the left have tried in this way to bypass the issue of responsible citizenship “by dissolving [it] into that of democracy itself,” which in turn has led to the “advocacy of collective decision-making as a resolution to all the problems of citizenship” (Held 1991, p. 28; cf. Pierson 1991, p. 202). Unfortunately, this faith in the educative function of participation seems overly optimistic (Oldfield 1990b, p. 184; Mead 1986, p. 247; Andrews 1991, p. 216).

Hence there is increasing recognition that citizenship responsibilities should be incorporated more explicitly into left-wing theory (Hoover and Plant 1988, pp. 289–91; Vogel and Moran 1991, p. xv; Mouffe 1992a). But it seems clear that the left has not yet found a language of responsibility that it is comfortable with, or a set of concrete policies to promote these responsibilities.14

2. Civic republicanism.—The modern civic republican tradition is an extreme form of participatory democracy largely inspired by Machiavelli and Rousseau (who were in turn enamored with the Greeks and Romans). It is not surprising that the recent upsurge of interest in citizenship has given civic republicans a wider audience.

13. See Arneson (1992, pp. 488–92) for a range of potential conflicts between democratic procedures and socialist goals. As Dworkin notes, there is a danger of making democracy “a black hole into which all other political virtues collapse” (1992, p. 192).

14. The left neglected many of these issues for decades, on the ground that a concern with “citizenship” was bourgeois ideology. The very language of citizenship was “alien” (Selbourne 1991, p. 94; van Gunsteren 1978, p. 9; Dietz 1992, p. 70; Wolin 1992, p. 241; Andrews 1991, p. 13).
The feature that distinguishes civic republicans from other participationists, such as the left-wing theorists discussed above, is their emphasis on the intrinsic value of political participation for the participants themselves. Such participation is, in Oldfield’s words, “the highest form of human living-together that most individuals can aspire to” (Oldfield 1990a, p. 6). On this view, political life is superior to the merely private pleasures of family, neighborhood, and profession and so should occupy the center of people’s lives. Failure to participate in politics makes one a “radically incomplete and stunted being” (Oldfield 1990b, p. 187; cf. Pocock 1992, pp. 45, 53; Skinner 1992; Beiner 1992).

As its proponents admit, this conception is markedly at odds with the way most people in the modern world understand both citizenship and the good life. Most people find the greatest happiness in their family life, work, religion, or leisure, not in politics. Political participation is seen as an occasional, and often burdensome, activity needed to ensure that government respects and supports their freedom to pursue these personal occupations and attachments. This assumption that politics is a means to private life is shared by most people on the left (Ignatieff 1989, pp. 72–73) and right (Mead 1986, p. 254), as well as by liberals (Rawls 1971, pp. 229–30), civil society theorists (Walzer 1989, p. 215), and feminists (Elshlaim 1981, p. 327), and defines the modern view of citizenship.

In order to explain the modern indifference to political participation, civic republicans often argue that political life today has become impoverished compared to the active citizenship of, say, ancient Greece. Political debate is no longer meaningful and people lack access to effective participation.

But it is more plausible to view our attachment to private life as a result not of the impoverishment of public life but of the enrichment of private life. We no longer seek gratification in politics because our personal and social life is so much richer than the Greeks’. There are many reasons for this historical change, including the rise of romantic love and the nuclear family (and its emphasis on intimacy and privacy), increased prosperity (and hence richer forms of leisure and consumption), the Christian commitment to the dignity of labor (which the Greeks despised), and the growing dislike for war (which the Greeks esteemed).

Those passive citizens who prefer the joys of family and career to the duties of politics are not necessarily misguided. As Galston has put it, republicans who denigrate private life as tedious and self-absorbed show no delight in real communities of people, and indeed are “contemptuous” of “everyday life” (Galston 1991, pp. 58–63).15

15. Civic republicans rarely defend their conception of value at length. For example, after asserting that political life is “the highest form of human living-together that
3. Civil society theorists. — We shall use the label ‘civil society theorists’ to identify a recent development from communitarian thought in the 1980s. These theorists emphasize the necessity of civility and self-restraint to a healthy democracy but deny that either the market or political participation is sufficient to teach these virtues. Instead, it is in the voluntary organizations of civil society — churches, families, unions, ethnic associations, cooperatives, environmental groups, neighborhood associations, women’s support groups, charities — that we learn the virtues of mutual obligation. As Walzer puts it, “the civility that makes democratic politics possible can only be learned in the associational networks” of civil society (Walzer 1992, p. 104).

Because these groups are voluntary, failure to live up to the responsibilities that come with them is usually met simply with disapproval rather than legal punishment. Yet because the disapproval comes from family, friends, colleagues, or comrades, it is in many ways a more powerful incentive to act responsibly than punishment by an impersonal state. It is here that “human character, competence, and capacity for citizenship are formed,” for it is here that we internalize the idea of personal responsibility and mutual obligation and learn the voluntary self-restraint which is essential to truly responsible citizenship (Glendon 1991, p. 109).

It follows, therefore, that one of the first obligations of citizenship is to participate in civil society. As Walzer notes, “Join the association of your choice” is “not a slogan to rally political militants, and yet that is what civil society requires” (Walzer 1992, p. 106).

The claim that civil society is the “seedbed of civic virtue” (Glendon 1991, p. 109) is essentially an empirical claim, for which there is little hard evidence one way or the other. It is an old and venerable view, but it is not obviously true. It may be in the neighborhood that we learn to be good neighbors, but neighborhood associations also teach people to operate on the “NIMBY” (not in my backyard) principle when it comes to the location of group homes or public works. Similarly, the family is often “a school of despotism” that teaches male dominance over women (Okin 1992, p. 65); churches often teach

most individuals can aspire to,” Oldfield goes on to say, “I shall not argue for this moral point. It has in any case been argued many times within the corpus of civic republican writing” (1990a, p. 6). But many critics have argued that these earlier defenses rest on sexism and denigration of the private sphere (e.g., Vogel 1991, p. 68; Young 1989, p. 233; Phillips 1991b, p. 49) or on ethnic exclusiveness (Habermas 1999, p. 8). Skinner’s argument seems to be that while political participation may only have instrumental value for most people, we must get people to view it as if it has intrinsic value, or else they will not withstand internal or external threats to democracy (Skinner 1992, pp. 219–21). For discussions of the relationship between republican conceptions of the good and liberalism, see Dworkin (1989, pp. 499–504), Taylor (1989, pp. 177–81), Hill (1993, pp. 67–84), and Sinopoli (1992, pp. 163–71).
deference to authority and intolerance of other faiths; ethnic groups often teach prejudice against other races; and so on.

Walzer recognizes that most people are "trapped in one or another subordinate relationship, where the 'civility' they learned was deferential rather than independent and active." In these circumstances, he says, we have to "reconstruct" the associational network "under new conditions of freedom and equality." Similarly, when the activities of some associations "are narrowly conceived, partial and particularist," then "they need political correction." Walzer calls his view "critical associationalism" to signify that the associations of civil society may need to be reformed in the light of principles of citizenship (Walzer 1992, pp. 106–7).

But this may go too far in the other direction. Rather than supporting voluntary associations, this approach may unintentionally license wholesale intervention in them. Governments must of course intervene to protect the rights of people inside and outside the group if these rights are threatened. But do we want governments to reconstruct churches, for example, to make them more internally democratic, or to make sure that their members learn to be independent rather than deferential? And, in any event, wouldn't reconstructing churches, families, or unions to make them more internally democratic start to undermine their essentially uncoerced and voluntary character, which is what supposedly made them the seedbeds of civic virtue?

Civil society theorists demand too much of these voluntary associations in expecting them to be the main school for, or small-scale replica of, democratic citizenship. While these associations may teach civic virtue, that is not their raison d'etre. The reason why people join churches, families, or ethnic organizations is not to learn civic virtue. It is, rather, to honor certain values and enjoy certain human goods, and these motives may have little to do with the promotion of citizenship.

Joining a religious or ethnic association may be more a matter of withdrawing from the mainstream of society than of learning how to participate in it. To expect parents, priests, or union members to organize the internal life of their groups to promote citizenship maximally is to ignore why these groups exist in the first place. (Some associations, like the Boy Scouts, are designed to promote citizenship, but they are the exception, not the rule.)

A similar issue arises with theorists of "maternal citizenship," who focus on the family, and mothering in particular, as the school of

16. Also, it is difficult to see how even reconstructed groups could teach what some regard as an essential aspect of citizenship—namely, a common identity and sense of purpose (Phillips 1991b, pp. 117–18). We discuss this in Sec. IV below.
responsibility and virtue. According to Jean Elshtain and Sara Ruddick, mothering teaches women about the responsibility to conserve life and protect the vulnerable, and these lessons should become the guiding principles of political life as well. For example, mothering involves a "metaphysical attitude" of "holding," which gives priority to the protection of existing relationships over the acquisition of new benefits (Elshtain 1981, pp. 326–27, 349–53; Ruddick 1987, p. 242). This has obvious implications for decisions about war or the environment.

However, some critics argue that mothering does not involve the same attributes or virtues as citizenship and that there is no evidence that maternal attitudes such as "holding" promote democratic values such as "active citizenship, self-government, egalitarianism, and the exercise of freedom" (Dietz 1985, p. 30; Nauta 1992, p. 31). As Dietz puts it, "An enlightened despotism, a welfare-state, a single-party bureaucracy and a democratic republic may all respect mothers, protect children's lives and show compassion for the vulnerable" (Dietz 1992, p. 76).

This criticism parallels that of civil society theories. Both maternal feminists and civil society theorists define citizenship in terms of the virtues of the private sphere. But while these virtues may sometimes be necessary for good citizenship, they are not sufficient, and may sometimes be counterproductive.

4. Liberal virtue theory. — Liberals are often blamed for the current imbalance between rights and responsibilities, and not without reason. Liberal theorists in the 1970s and 1980s focused almost exclusively on the justification of rights and of the institutions to secure these rights, without attending to the responsibilities of citizens. Many critics believe that liberals are incapable of righting this imbalance, since the liberal commitment to liberty or neutrality or individualism renders the concept of civic virtue unintelligible (Mouffe 1992a).

However, some of the most interesting work on the importance of civic virtue is in fact being done by liberals such as Amy Gutmann, Stephen Macedo, and William Galston. According to Galston, the virtues required for responsible citizenship can be divided into four groups: (i) general virtues: courage, law-abidingness, loyalty; (ii) social virtues: independence, open-mindedness; (iii) economic virtues: work ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change; and (iv) political virtues: capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, willingness to demand only what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public discourse (Galston 1991, pp. 221–24).

It is the last two virtues—the ability to question authority and the willingness to engage in public discourse—which are the most distinctive components of liberal virtue theory. The need to question authority arises in part from the fact that citizens in a representative
democracy elect representatives who govern in their name. Hence, an important responsibility of citizens is to monitor those officials and judge their conduct.

The need to engage in public discourse arises from the fact that the decisions of government in a democracy should be made publicly, through free and open discussion. But as Galston notes, the virtue of public discourse is not just the willingness to participate in politics or to make one's views known. Rather, it "includes the willingness to listen seriously to a range of views which, given the diversity of liberal societies, will include ideas the listener is bound to find strange and even obnoxious. The virtue of political discourse also includes the willingness to set forth one's own views intelligibly and candidly as the basis for a politics of persuasion rather than manipulation or coercion" (Galston 1991, p. 227).

Macedo calls this the virtue of "public reasonableness." Liberal citizens must give reasons for their political demands, not just state preferences or make threats. Moreover, these reasons must be "public" reasons, in the sense that they are capable of persuading people of different faiths and nationalities. Hence it is not enough to invoke Scripture or tradition. Liberal citizens must justify their political demands in terms that fellow citizens can understand and accept as consistent with their status as free and equal citizens. It requires a conscientious effort to distinguish those beliefs which are matters of private faith from those which are capable of public defense and to see how issues look from the point of view of those with differing religious commitments and cultural backgrounds (cf. Phillips 1991b, pp. 57–59).

Where do we learn these virtues? Other theorists we have examined relied on the market, the family, or the associations of civil society to teach civic virtue. But it is clear that people will not automatically learn to engage in public discourse or to question authority in any of these spheres, since these spheres are often held together by private discourse and respect for authority.

The answer, according to many liberal virtue theorists, is the system of education. Schools must teach children how to engage in the kind of critical reasoning and moral perspective that defines public reasonableness. As Amy Gutmann puts it, children at school "must

17. See the discussion of the "principle of secular motivation" in Audi (1989, p. 284).
18. This shows why civil society theorists are mistaken to think that good citizenship can be based on essentially private virtues. The requirement of public reasonableness in political debate is unnecessary and undesirable in the private sphere. It would be absurd to ask churchgoers to abstain from appealing to Scripture in deciding how to run their church.
learn not just to behave in accordance with authority but to think critically about authority if they are to live up to the democratic ideal of sharing political sovereignty as citizens.” People who “are ruled only by habit and authority . . . are incapable of constituting a society of sovereign citizens” (Gutmann 1987, p. 51).  

However, this idea that schools should teach children to be skeptical of political authority and to distance themselves from their own cultural traditions when engaging in public discourse is controversial. Traditionalists object to it on the grounds that it inevitably leads children to question tradition and parental or religious authority in private life. And that is surely correct. As Gutmann admits, education for democratic citizenship will necessarily involve “equipping children with the intellectual skills necessary to evaluate ways of life different from that of their parents,” because “many if not all of the capacities necessary for choice among good lives are also necessary for choice among good societies” (Gutmann 1987, pp. 30, 40).

Hence, those groups which rely heavily on an uncritical acceptance of tradition and authority, while not strictly ruled out, “are bound to be discouraged by the free, open, pluralistic, progressive” attitudes which liberal education encourages (Macedo 1990, pp. 53–54). This is why groups such as the Amish have sought to remove their children from the school system.

This creates a dilemma for liberals, many of whom wish to accommodate law-abiding groups like the Amish. Some liberals view the demise of such groups as regrettable but sometimes inevitable in a democratic society (Rawls 1975, p. 551; but see Rawls 1988, pp. 267–68). Other liberals, however, want to adjust citizenship education to minimize the impact on parental and religious authority. Galston, for example, argues that the need to teach children how to engage in public discourse and to evaluate political leaders “does not warrant the conclusion that the state must (or may) structure public education to foster in children skeptical reflection on ways of life inherited from parents or local communities” (Galston 1991, p. 253). However, he admits that it is not easy for schools to promote a child’s willingness to question political authority without undermining her “unswerving belief in the correctness” of her parents’ way of life.

This parallels the dilemma facing civil society theorists. They face the question of when to intervene in private groups in order to make them more effective schools of civic virtue; liberal virtue theorists, on the other hand, face the question of when to modify civic education

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19. Public schools teach these virtues not only through their curriculum but also “by insisting that students sit in their seats (next to students of different races and religions), raise their hands before speaking, hand in their homework on time . . . be good sports on its playing field” (Gutmann 1987, p. 53).
in the schools in order to limit its impact on private associations. Neither group has, to date, fully come to grips with these questions.

D. Conclusion: Responsible Citizenship and Public Policy

In most postwar political theory, the fundamental normative concepts were democracy (for evaluating procedures) and justice (for evaluating outcomes). Citizenship, if it was discussed at all, was usually seen as derivative of democracy and justice—that is, a citizen is someone who has democratic rights and claims of justice. There is increasing support, however, from all points of the political spectrum, for the view that citizenship must play an independent normative role in any plausible political theory and that the promotion of responsible citizenship is an urgent aim of public policy.

And yet a striking feature of the current debate is the timidity with which authors apply their theories of citizenship to questions of public policy. As we have seen, there are some suggestions about the sorts of institutions or policies that would promote or enforce the virtues and responsibilities of good citizenship. But these tend to be the same policies which have long been defended on grounds of justice or democracy. The left favored democratizing the welfare state long before they adopted the language of citizenship, just as feminists favored day care and the New Right opposed the welfare state. It is not clear whether adopting the perspective of citizenship really leads to different policy conclusions than the more familiar perspectives of justice and democracy.

We can imagine more radical proposals to promote citizenship. If civility is important, why not pass Good Samaritan laws, as many European countries have done? If political participation is important, why not require mandatory voting, as in Australia or Belgium? If public-spiritedness is important, why not require a period of mandatory national service, as in most European countries? If public schools help teach responsible citizenship, because they require children of different races and religions to sit together and learn to respect each other, why not prohibit private schools?

These are the kinds of policies which are concerned specifically with promoting citizenship, rather than justice or democracy. Yet few authors even contemplate such proposals. Instead, most citizenship theorists either leave the question of how to promote citizenship unanswered (Glendon 1991, p. 138) or focus on "modest" or "gentle and relatively unobtrusive ways" to promote civic virtues (Macedo 1990, pp. 234, 253). While citizenship theorists bemoan the excessive focus

20. For other accounts of the "unobtrusive" promotion of citizenship, see Habermas (1992, pp. 6–7), Hill (1993), and Rawls (1993, pp. 216–26).
given to rights, they seem reluctant to propose any policies that could be seen as restricting those rights.

There may be good reasons for this timidity, but it sits uneasily with the claim that we face a crisis of citizenship and that we urgently need a theory of citizenship. As a result, much recent work on citizenship virtues seems quite hollow. In the absence of some account of legitimate and illegitimate ways to promote or enforce good citizenship, many works on citizenship reduce to a platitude: namely, society would be better if the people in it were nicer and more thoughtful.21

Indeed, it is not clear how urgent the need to promote good citizenship is. The literature on citizenship is full of dire predictions about the decline of virtue, but as Galston admits, “cultural pessimism is a pervasive theme of human history, and in nearly every generation” (Galston 1991, p. 237).22 If there are increasing crime and decreasing voting rates, it is equally true that we are more tolerant, more respectful of others’ rights, and more committed to democracy and constitutionalism than were previous generations (Macedo 1990, pp. 6–7). So it remains unclear how we should be promoting good citizenship and how urgent it is to do so.

IV. CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITY, AND DIFFERENCE

Citizenship is not just a certain status, defined by a set of rights and responsibilities. It is also an identity, an expression of one’s membership in a political community. Marshall saw citizenship as a shared identity that would integrate previously excluded groups within British society and provide a source of national unity. He was particularly concerned to integrate the working classes, whose lack of education and economic resources excluded them from the “common culture” which should have been a “common possession and heritage” (Marshall 1965, pp. 101–2).23

21. For example, Mounic criticizes liberalism for reducing citizenship “to a mere legal status, setting out the rights that the individual holds against the state” (1992a, p. 227) and seeks to “reestablish the lost connection between ethics and politics,” by understanding citizenship as a form of “political identity that is created through the identification with the res publica” (p. 230). Yet she offers no suggestions about how to promote or compel this public-spirited participation, and insists (against civic republicans) that citizens must be free to choose not to give priority to their political activities. Her critique of liberalism, therefore, seems to reduce to the claim that the liberal conception of citizenship-as-legal-status is not an adequate conception of good citizenship, which liberals would readily accept. Many critiques of liberal citizenship amount to the same unenlightening claim.

22. Indeed, we can find similar worries about political apathy in 1950s political sociologists, and even in Tocqueville.

23. See the discussion of citizenship’s “integrative function” in Barbalet (1988, p. 93).
It has become clear, however, that many groups—blacks, women, Aboriginal peoples, ethnic and religious minorities, gays and lesbians—still feel excluded from the 'common culture', despite possessing the common rights of citizenship. Members of these groups feel excluded not only because of their socioeconomic status but also because of their sociocultural identity—their 'difference'.

An increasing number of theorists, whom we will call 'cultural pluralists', argue that citizenship must take account of these differences. Cultural pluralists believe that the common rights of citizenship, originally defined by and for white men, cannot accommodate the special needs of minority groups. These groups can only be integrated into the common culture if we adopt what Iris Marion Young calls a conception of "differentiated citizenship" (Young 1989, p. 258).

On this view, members of certain groups would be incorporated into the political community not only as individuals but also through the group, and their rights would depend, in part, on their group membership. For example, some immigrant groups are demanding special rights or exemptions to accommodate their religious practices; historically disadvantaged groups, such as women or blacks, are demanding special representation in the political process; and many national minorities (Québécois, Kurds, Catalans) are seeking greater powers of self-government within the larger country, if not outright secession.

These demands for "differentiated citizenship" pose a serious challenge to the prevailing conception of citizenship. Many people regard the idea of group-differentiated citizenship as a contradiction in terms. On the orthodox view, citizenship is, by definition, a matter of treating people as individuals with equal rights under the law. This is what distinguishes democratic citizenship from feudal and other premodern views that determined people's political status by their religious, ethnic, or class membership. Hence, "the organization of society on the basis of rights or claims that derive from group membership is sharply opposed to the concept of society based on citizenship" (Porter 1987, p. 128). The idea of differentiated citizenship, therefore, is a radical development in citizenship theory.

One of the most influential theorists of cultural pluralism is Iris Marion Young. According to Young, the attempt to create a universal conception of citizenship which transcends group differences is fundamentally unjust because it oppresses historically excluded groups: "In a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that as citizens persons should leave behind their particular affiliations and experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce the privilege; for the perspective and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified public, marginalizing or
silencing those of other groups" (Young 1989, p. 257). Young gives two reasons why genuine equality requires affirming rather than ignoring group differences. First, culturally excluded groups are at a disadvantage in the political process, and "the solution lies at least in part in providing institutionalized means for the explicit recognition and representation of oppressed groups" (Young 1989, p. 259). These procedural measures would include public funds for advocacy groups, guaranteed representation in political bodies, and veto rights over specific policies that affect a group directly (Young 1989, pp. 261–62; 1990, pp. 183–91).

Second, culturally excluded groups often have distinctive needs which can only be met through group-differentiated policies. These include language rights for Hispanics, land rights for Aboriginal groups, and reproductive rights for women (Young 1990, pp. 175–83). Other policies which have been advocated by cultural pluralists include group libel laws for women or Muslims, publicly funded schools for certain religious minorities, and exemptions from laws that interfere with religious worship, such as Sunday closing, animal-slaughtering legislation for Jews and Muslims, or motorcycle helmet laws for Sikhs (Parekh 1990, p. 705; 1991, pp. 197–204; Modood 1992).

Much has been written regarding the justification for these rights and how they relate to broader theories of justice and democracy. Young herself defends them as a response to "oppression," of which she outlines five forms: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and "random violence and harassment motivated by group hatred or fear" (Young 1989, p. 261). It would take us too far afield to consider these justifications or the various objections to them. Instead, we will focus on the impact of these rights on citizenship identity.

Critics of differentiated citizenship worry that if groups are encouraged by the very terms of citizenship to turn inward and focus on their 'difference' (whether racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, and so on), then "the hope of a larger fraternity of all Americans will have to be abandoned" (Glazer 1983, p. 227). Citizenship will cease to be

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24. See also Pateman's discussion of how citizenship is currently "constructed from men's attributes, capacities and activities," so that citizenship can only be extended to women "as lesser men" (1988, pp. 252–53; cf. James 1992, pp. 52–55; Pateman 1992).

25. Critics have objected that differentiated citizenship (a) violates equality: granting rights to some people but not others on the basis of their group membership sets up a hierarchy in which some citizens are 'more equal' than others; (b) violates liberal neutrality: the role of the state in matters of culture should be limited to maintaining a fair cultural marketplace; and (c) is arbitrary: there is no principled way to determine which groups are entitled to differential status. For a discussion of these objections, see Glazer (1983), Taylor (1991; 1992a, pp. 51–61), Hindess (1993), Kymlicka (1989, 1991), Phillips (1992), and Van Dyke (1985).
"a device to cultivate a sense of community and a common sense of purpose" (Heater 1990, p. 295; Kristeva 1993, p. 7; Cairns 1995). Nothing will bind the various groups in society together and prevent the spread of mutual mistrust or conflict (Kukathas 1993, p. 156).

Critics also worry that differentiated citizenship would create a "politics of grievance." If, as Young implies, only oppressed groups are entitled to differentiated citizenship, this may encourage group leaders to devote their political energy to establishing a perception of disadvantage—rather than working to overcome it—in order to secure their claim to group rights.

These are serious concerns. In evaluating them, however, we need to distinguish three different kinds of groups and three different kinds of group rights, which both Young and her critics tend to run together: (a) special representation rights (for disadvantaged groups); (b) multicultural rights (for immigrant and religious groups); and (c) self-government rights (for national minorities). Each of these has very different implications for citizenship identity.

Special representation rights.—For many of the groups on Young’s list, such as the poor, elderly, African-Americans, and gays, the demand for group rights takes the form of special representation within the political process of the larger society. Since Young views these rights as a response to conditions of oppression, they are most plausibly seen as a temporary measure on the way to a society where the need for special representation no longer exists. Society should seek to remove the oppression, thereby eliminating the need for these rights.

Self-government rights.—In some of Young’s examples, such as the reservation system of the American Indians, the demand for group rights is not seen as a temporary measure, and it is misleading to say that group rights are a response to a form of oppression that we hope someday to eliminate. Aboriginal peoples and other national minorities like the Québécois or Scots claim permanent and inherent rights, grounded in a principle of self-determination. These groups are ‘cultures’, ‘peoples’, or ‘nations’, in the sense of being historical communities, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given homeland or territory, sharing a distinct language and history. These nations find themselves within the boundaries of a larger political community, but claim the right to govern themselves in certain key matters, in order to ensure the full and free development of their culture and the best interests of their people. What these national minorities want is not primarily better representation in the central government but, rather, the transfer of power and legislative jurisdictions from the central government to their own communities.

Multicultural rights.—The case of Hispanics and other immigrant groups in the United States is different again. Their demands include public support of bilingual education and ethnic studies in schools and
exemptions from laws that disadvantage them, given their religious practices. These measures are intended to help immigrants express their cultural particularity and pride without its hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant society. Like self-government rights, these rights need not be temporary, because the cultural differences they promote are not something we hope to eliminate. But unlike self-government rights, multicultural rights are intended to promote integration into the larger society, not self-government.

Obviously, these three kinds of rights can overlap, in the sense that some groups can claim more than one kind of group right.

If differentiated citizenship is defined as the adoption of one or more of these group-differentiated rights, then virtually every modern democracy recognizes some form of it. Citizenship today "is a much more differentiated and far less homogeneous concept than has been presupposed by political theorists" (Parekh 1990, p. 702). Nevertheless, most cultural pluralists demand a degree of differentiation not present in almost any developed democracy.

Would adopting one or more of these group rights undermine the integrative function of citizenship? A closer look at the distinction between the three kinds of rights suggests that such fears are often misplaced. The fact is that, generally speaking, the demand for both representation rights and multicultural rights is a demand for inclusion. Groups that feel excluded want to be included in the larger society, and the recognition and accommodation of their 'difference' is intended to facilitate this.

The right to special representation is just a new twist on an old idea. It has always been recognized that a majoritarian democracy can systematically ignore the voices of minorities. In cases where minorities are regionally concentrated, democratic systems have responded by intentionally drawing the boundaries of federal units, or of individual constituencies, to create seats where the minority is in a majority (Beitz 1989, chap. 7). Cultural pluralists simply extend this logic to nonterritorial minorities, who may equally be in need of representation (e.g., women, the disabled, or gays and lesbians).

There are enormous practical obstacles to such a proposal. For example, how do we decide which groups are entitled to such representation,25 and how do we ensure that their 'representatives' are in fact

26. According to Young, "Once we are clear that the principle of group representation refers only to oppressed social groups, then the fear of an unworkable proliferation of group representation should dissipate" (1990, p. 187). However, her list of "oppressed groups" would seem to include 80 percent of the population—she says that "in the United States today, at least the following groups are oppressed in one or more of these ways: women, blacks, Native Americans, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-
accountable to the group? But the basic impulse underlying representation rights is integration, not separation.

Similarly, most multicultural demands are evidence that members of minority groups want to get into the mainstream of society. Consider the case of Canadian Sikhs who wanted to join the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) but, because of their religious requirement to wear a turban, could not do so unless they were exempted from the usual dress code regarding headgear. The fact that these men wanted to be a part of the RCMP, one of Canada’s “national symbols,” is ample evidence of their desire to participate in the larger community. The special right they were requesting could only be seen as promoting, not discouraging, their integration.

Some people fear that multicultural rights impede the process of integration for immigrants by creating a confusing halfway house between their old nation and citizenship in the new one. But these worries seem empirically unfounded. Experience in countries with extensive multicultural programs, such as Canada and Australia, suggest that first- and second-generation immigrants who remain proud of their heritage are also among the most patriotic citizens of their new country (Kruhlak 1992). Moreover, their strong affiliation with speaking Americans, Asian Americans, gay men, lesbians, working-class people, poor people, old people, and mentally and physically disabled people” (1989, p. 261). In short, everyone but healthy, relatively well-off, relatively young, heterosexual white males. Even then, it is hard to see how this criterion would avoid an ‘unworkable proliferation’, since each of these groups has subgroups that might claim their own rights. In the case of Britain, e.g., “the all-embracing concept of ‘black’ people rapidly dissolved into a distinction between the Asian and Afro-Caribbean communities, and then subsequently into finer distinctions between a wide variety of ethnic groups. What in this context then counts as ‘adequate’ ethnic representation?’ (Phillips 1992, p. 89). Nevertheless, many political parties and trade unions have allowed for special group representation without entering an escalating spiral of demands and resentment (Young 1989, pp. 187–89).

27. “There are few mechanisms for establishing what each group wants. . . . Accountability is always the other side of representation, and, in the absence of procedures for establishing what any group wants or thinks, we cannot usefully talk of their political representation” (Phillips 1992, pp. 86–88). In the absence of accountability, it might be more appropriate to talk of consultation than representation.

28. This is in contrast to many Aboriginal communities in Canada who, as part of their self-government, have been trying to remove the RCMP from their reserves and replace it with a Native police force. Of course, some demands for multicultural rights also take the form of withdrawal from the larger society, although this is more likely to be true of religious sects (e.g., the Amish) than of ethnic communities per se.

29. Moreover, a proliferation of such demands is unlikely, since they usually involve clear and specific cases of unintended conflict between majority rules and minority religious practices. And since proof of oppression is neither necessary nor sufficient to claim these rights, there is little risk that they will promote a politics of grievance.
their new country seems to be based in large part on its willingness not just to tolerate but to welcome cultural difference.\textsuperscript{30}

Self-government rights, however, do raise deep problems for traditional notions of citizenship identity. While both representation and multicultural rights take the larger political community for granted and seek greater inclusion in it, demands for self-government reflect a desire to weaken the bonds with the larger community and, indeed, question its very nature, authority, and permanence. If democracy is the rule of the people, group self-determination raises the question of who 'the people' really are. National minorities claim that they are distinct peoples, with inherent rights of self-determination which were not relinquished by their (sometimes involuntary) federation with other nations within a larger country. Indeed, the retaining of certain powers is often explicitly spelled out in the treaties or constitutional agreements which specified the terms of federation.

Self-government rights, therefore, are the most complete case of differentiated citizenship, since they divide the people into separate 'peoples', each with its own historic rights, territories, and powers of self-government, and each, therefore, with its own political community.

It seems unlikely that differentiated citizenship can serve an integrative function in this context. If citizenship is membership in a political community, then in creating overlapping political communities, self-government rights necessarily give rise to a sort of dual citizenship and to potential conflicts about which community citizens identify with most deeply (Vernon 1988). Moreover, there seems to be no natural stopping point to the demands for increasing self-government. If limited autonomy is granted, this may simply fuel the ambitions of nationalist leaders who will be satisfied with nothing short of their own undifferentiated nation-state. Democratic multination states are, it would seem, inherently unstable for this reason.

It might seem tempting, therefore, to ignore the demands of national minorities, keep any reference to particular groups out of the constitution, and insist that citizenship is a common identity shared by all individuals without regard to group membership. This

\textsuperscript{30} Of course, liberals cannot accept a group's demand to practice its religious or cultural customs if these violate the basic rights of the members of these groups (e.g., clitoridectomy, restrictions on exit). It is important to distinguish what we can call "internal" and "external" group rights. Internal rights are rights of a group against its own members, used to force individuals within the group to obey traditional customs or authority. External rights are rights of the group against the larger society, used to provide support for the group against economic or political pressure from outside for cultural assimilation. In western democracies, group-differentiated rights are almost always external rights, since internal rights are clearly inconsistent with liberal democratic norms. See Kukathas (1992) and the reply in Kymlicka (1992).
is often described as the American strategy for dealing with cultural pluralism. But with a few exceptions—such as the (mostly outlying or isolated) American Indian, Inuit, Puerto Rican, and native Hawaiian populations—the United States is not a multination state. It faced the problem of assimilating voluntary immigrants, not of incorporating historically self-governing communities whose homeland has become part of the larger community. And where it was applied to national minorities—for example, American Indians—the ‘common citizenship’ strategy has often been a spectacular failure, as even its supporters admit (Walzer 1982, p. 27; cf. Kymlicka 1991). Hence, many of these groups are now accorded self-government rights within the United States.

Indeed, there are very few democratic multination states that follow the strict ‘common citizenship’ strategy. This is not surprising, because refusing demands for self-government rights may simply aggravate alienation among these groups and increase the desire for secession (Taylor 1992a, p. 64). 

Hence, demands for self-government raise a problem for proponents of both common citizenship and differentiated citizenship. Yet remarkably little attention has been paid, by either defenders or critics, to this form of differentiated citizenship (or to the most common arrangement for instantiating self-government rights, namely, federalism).

What, then, is the source of unity in a multination country? Rawls claims that the source of union in modern societies is a shared conception of justice: “Although a well-ordered society is divided and pluralistic ... public agreement on questions of political and social justice supports ties of civic friendship and secures the bonds of association” (Rawls 1980, p. 540). But the fact that two national groups share the same principles of justice does not necessarily give them any strong reason to join (or remain) together, rather than remaining (or splitting into) two separate countries. The fact that people in Norway and Sweden share the same principles of justice is no reason for them to regret the secession of Norway in 1905. Similarly, the fact that the anglophones and francophones in Canada share the same principles of justice is not a strong reason to remain together, since the Québécois rightly assume that their own national state could respect the same principles. A shared conception of justice throughout a political community does not necessarily generate a shared identity, let alone a

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31. In any event, the state cannot avoid giving public recognition to particular group identities. After all, governments must decide which language(s) will serve as the official language of the schools, courts, and legislatures.

32. For a survey of philosophical work on federalism, see Norman (1993b).
shared citizenship identity that will supersede rival identities based on ethnicity (Nickel 1990; Norman 1993a).33

It seems clear, then, that this is one place where we really do need a theory of citizenship, not just a theory of democracy or justice. How can we construct a common identity in a country where people not only belong to separate political communities but also belong in different ways—that is, some are incorporated as individuals and others through membership in a group? Taylor calls this “deep diversity” and insists that it is “the only formula” on which a multination state can remain united (Taylor 1991). However, he admits that it is an open question what holds such a country together.34

Indeed, the great variance in historical, cultural, and political situations in multination states suggests that any generalized answer to this question will likely be overstated. It might be a mistake to suppose that one could develop a general theory about the role of either a common citizenship identity or a differentiated citizenship identity in promoting or hindering national unity (Taylor 1992b, pp. 65–66). Here, as with the other issues we have examined in this survey, it remains unclear what we can expect from a ‘theory of citizenship’.

33. If governments wish to use citizenship identity to promote national unity, therefore, they will have to identify citizenship, not only with acceptance of principles of justice but also with an emotional-affective sense of identity, based perhaps on a manipulation of shared symbols or historical myths. For a discussion of this strategy, see Norman (1993a).

34. European philosophers are confronting increasingly these dilemmas as they seek to understand the nature of the European Community and the form of citizenship it requires. Habermas and his followers argue that European unity cannot be based on the shared traditions, cultures, and languages that characterized successful nation-states. Instead, European citizenship must be founded on a ‘postnational’ constitutional patriotism based on shared principles of justice and democracy (Habermas 1992; Berten 1992; Ferry 1992). Others, however, argue that such a basis for unity is too ‘thin’. As Taylor notes, even the model experiments in constitutional patriotism, France and the United States, have always also required many of the trappings of nation-states, including founding myths, national symbols, and ideals of historical and quasi-ethnic membership (Taylor 1992b, p. 61; cf. Lenoble 1992; Smith 1993). According to Taylor, it is not for philosophers to define a priori the form of citizenship that is legitimate or admissible. Rather, we should seek forms of identity which appear significant to the people themselves (Taylor 1992b, p. 65; Berten 1992, p. 64).
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