CHAPTER VIII

Epilogue

To relegate Luther to a shadowy greatness at the turbulent conclusion of the Age of Faith does not help us see what his life really stands for. To put it in his own words:

"I did not learn my theology all at once, but I had to search deeper for it, where my temptations took me." 1 "Vivendo, immo moriendo et damnando fit theologus, non intelligendo, legendo, aut speculando": 2 A theologian is born by living, nay dying and being damned, not by thinking, reading, or speculating.

Not to understand this message under the pretense of not wanting to make the great man too human—although he represented himself as human with relish and gusto—only means to protect ourselves from taking our chances with the temptations of our day, as he did with his. Historical analysis should help us to study further our own immediate tasks, instead of hiding them in a leader's greatness.

I will not conclude with a long list of what we must do. In too many books the word "must" increases in frequency in inverse relation to the number of pages left to point out how what must be done might be done. I will try, instead, to restate a few assumptions of this book in order to make them more amenable to joint study.

When Luther challenged the rock bottom of his own prayer, he could not know that he would find the fundament for a new theology. Nor did Freud know that he would find the principles of a new psychology when he took radical chances with himself in a new kind of introspective analysis. I have applied to Luther, the
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first Protestant at the end of the age of absolute faith, insights developed by Freud, the first psychoanalyst at the end of the era of absolute reason, and I have mentioned seemingly incidental parallels between the two men. A few weightier connections must be stated in conclusion.

Both men endeavored to increase the margin of man's inner freedom by introspective means applied to the very center of his conflicts; and this to the end of increased individuality, sanity, and service to men. Luther, at the beginning of ruthless mercantilism in Church and commerce, counterpoised praying man to the philosophy and practice of meritorious works. Subsequently, his justification by faith was absorbed into the patterns of mercantilism, and eventually turned into a justification of commercialism by faith. Freud, at the beginning of unrestricted industrialization, offered another method of introspection, psychoanalysis. With it, he obviously warned against the mechanical socialization of man into effective but neurotic robots. It is equally obvious that his work is about to be used in furtherance of that which he warned against: the glorification of "adjustment." Thus both Doctor Luther and Doctor Freud, called great by their respective ages, have been and are apt to be resisted not only by their enemies, but also by friends who subscribe to their ideas but lack what Kierkegaard called a certain strenuousness of mental and moral effort.

Luther, as we saw, instituted a technique of prayer which eminently served to clarify the delineation of what we, to the best of our knowledge, really mean. Freud added a technique (totally inapplicable to people who do not really mean anything at all) which can make us understand what it means when we insist we mean what we, according to our dreams and symptoms, cannot mean deep down. As to prayer, Luther advocated an appeal to God that He grant you, even as you pray, the good intention with which you started the prayer: *ut etiam intentionem quam praestupseris ipse tibi dat.* Centuries later Freud postulated an analogous rigor for genuine introspection, namely, the demand that one take an especially honest look at one's honesty.

Luther tried to free individual conscience from totalitarian dogma; he meant to give man credal wholeness, and, alas, inadvertently helped to increase and to refine authoritarianism. Freud tried to free the individual's insight from authoritarian conscience; his wholeness is that of the individual ego, but the question is whether collective man will create a world worth being whole for.

Luther accepted man's distance from God as existential and absolute, and refused any traffic with the profundity of a God of deals, Freud suggests that we steadfastly study our unconscious deals with morality and reality before we haughtily claim free will, or righteousness good intentions in dealings with our fellowmen.

Luther limited our knowledge of God to our individual experience of temptation and our identification in prayer with the passion of God's son. In this, all men are free and equal. Freud made it clear that the structure of inner *Konflikt*, made conscious by psychoanalysis and recognized as universal for any and all, is all we can know of ourselves—yet it is a knowledge inescapable and indispensable. The devoutly sceptical Freud proclaimed that man's uppermost duty (no matter what his introspective reason would make him see, or his fate suffer) was *das Leben auszuhalten*: to stand life, to hold out.

In this book I have described how Luther, once a sorely frightened child, recovered through the study of Christ's Passion the central meaning of the Nativity; and I have indicated in what way Freud's method of introspection brought human conflict under a potentially more secure control by revealing the boundness of man in the loves and rages of his childhood. Thus both Luther and Freud came to acknowledge that "the child is in the midst." Both men perfected introspective techniques permitting isolated man to recognize his individual paternity. They also reasserted the other pole of existence, man's involvement in generations: for only in facing the helplessness and the hope newly born in every child does mature man (and this does include woman) recognize the irreparable responsibility of being alive and about.

Let us consider, then, what we may call the metabolism of generations.

Each human life begins at a given evolutionary stage and level of tradition, bringing to its environment a capital of patterns and energies; these are used to grow on, and to grow into the social
process with, and also as contributions to this process. Each new being is received into a style of life prepared by tradition and held together by tradition, and at the same time disintegrating because of the very nature of tradition. We say that tradition "molds" the individual, "channels" his drives. But the social process does not mold a new being merely to housebreak him; it molds generations in order to be remolded, to be reinvigorated, by them. Therefore, society can never afford merely to suppress drives or to guide their sublimation. It must also support the primary function of every individual ego, which is to transform instinctual energy into patterns of action, into character, into style—in short, into an identity with a core of integrity which is to be derived from and also contributed to the tradition. There is an optimum ego synthesis to which the individual aspires; and there is an optimum societal metabolism for which societies and cultures strive. In describing the interdependence of individual aspiration and of societal striving, we describe something indispensable to human life.

In an earlier book, I indicated a program of studies which might account for the dovetailing of the stages of individual life and of basic human institutions. The present book circumscribes for only one of these stages—the identity crisis—it's intrinsic relation to the process of ideological rejuvenation in a period of history when organized religion dominated ideologies.

In discussing the identity crisis, we have, at least implicitly, presented some of the attributes of any psychosocial crisis. At a given age, a human being, by dint of his physical, intellectual and emotional growth, becomes ready and eager to face a new life task, that is, a set of choices and tests which are in some traditional way prescribed and prepared for him by his society's structure. A new life task presents a crisis whose outcome can be a successful graduation, or alternatively, an impairment of the life cycle which will aggravate future crises. Each crisis prepares the next, as one step leads to another; and each crisis also lays one more cornerstone for the adult personality. I will enumerate all these crises (more thoroughly treated elsewhere) to remind us, in summary, of certain issues in Luther's life, and also to suggest a developmental root for the basic human values of faith, will, conscience, and reason—all necessary in rudimentary form for the identity which crowns childhood.

The first crisis is the one of early infancy. How this crisis is met decides whether a man's innermost mood will be determined more by basic trust or by basic mistrust. The outcome of this crisis—apart from accidents of heredity, gestation, and birth—depends largely on the quality of maternal care, that is, on the consistency and mutuality which guide the mother's ministrations and give a certain predictability and helpfulness to the baby's original cosmos of urgent and bewildering body feelings. The ratio and relation of basic trust to basic mistrust established during early infancy determines much of the individual's capacity for simple faith, and consequently also determines his future contribution to his society's store of faith—which, in turn, will feed into a future mother's ability to trust the world in which she teaches trust to newcomers. In this first stage we can assume that a historical process is already at work; history writing should therefore chart the influence of historical events on growing generations to be able to judge the quality of their future contribution to history. As for little Martin, I have drawn conclusions about that earliest time when his mother could still claim the baby, and when he was still all hers, inferring that she must have provided him with a font of basic trust on which he was able to draw in his fight for a primary faith present before all will, conscience, and reason, a faith which is "the soul's virginity."

The first crisis corresponds roughly to what Freud has described as orality; the second corresponds to anality. An awareness of these correspondences is essential for a true understanding of the dynamics involved.

The second crisis, that of infancy, develops the infantile sources of what later becomes a human being's will, in its variations of willpower and willfulness. The resolution of this crisis will determine whether an individual is apt to be dominated by a sense of autonomy, or by a sense of shame and doubt. The social limitations imposed on intensified willfulness inevitably create doubt about the justice governing the relations of grown and growing people. The way this doubt is met by the grown-ups determines much of a man's future ability to combine an unimpaired will with ready self-discipline, rebellion with responsibility.

The interpretation is plausible that Martin was driven early out of the trust stage, out from "under his mother's skirts," by a jealous, ambitious father who tried to make him precociously in-
dependent from women, and sober and reliable in his work. Hans
succeeded, but not without storing in the boy violent doubts of
the father’s justification and sincerity; a lifelong shame over the
persisting gap between his own precocious conscience and his
actual inner state; and a deep nostalgia for a situation of infantile
trust. His theological solution—spiritual return to a faith which is
there before all doubt, combined with a political submission to
those who by necessity must wield the sword of secular law—seems
to fit perfectly his personal need for compromise. While this
analysis does not explain either the ideological power or the
theological consistency of his solution, it does illustrate that on-
togenetic experience is an indispensable link and transformer be-
tween one stage of history and the next. This link is a psychological
one, and the energy transformed and the process of transformation
are both charted by the psychanalytic method.

Freud formulated these matters in dynamic terms. Few men be-
fore him gave more genuine expression to those experiences which
are on the borderline between the psychological and the theological
than Luther, who gleaned from these experiences a religious gain
formulated in theological terms. Luther described states of badness
which in many forms pervade human existence from childhood.
For instance, his description of shame, an emotion first experienced
when the infant stands naked in space and feels belittled: “He is
put to sin and shame before God . . . this shame is now a thousand
times greater, that a man must blush in the presence of God. For
this means that there is no corner or hole in the whole of creation
into which a man might creep, not even in hell, but he must let
himself be exposed to the gaze of the whole creation, and stand in
the open with all his shame, as a bad conscience feels when it is
really struck . . .” Or his description of doubt, an emotion first
experienced when the child feels singled out by demands whose
rational he does not comprehend: “When he is tormented in
Anfechtung it seems to him that he is alone: God is angry only
with him, and irreconcilably angry against him: then he alone is a
sinner and all the others are in the right, and they work against him
at God’s orders. There is nothing left for him but this unspeakable
sighing through which, without knowing it, he is supported by the
Spirit and cries‘Why does God pick on me alone?’”

Luther was a man who would not settle for an easy appeasement
of these feelings on any level, from childhood through youth to his
manhood, or in any segment of life. His often impulsive and intuitive
formulations transparently display the infantile struggle at the
bottom of the lifelong emotional issue.

His basic contribution was a living reformulation of faith. This
marks him as a theologian of the first order; it also indicates his
struggle with the ontogenetically earliest and most basic problems
of life. He saw as his life’s work a new delineation of faith and
will, of religion and the law: for it is clear that organized religiosity,
in circumstances where faith in a world order is monopolized by
religion, is the institution which tries to give dogmatic permanence
to a reaffirmation of that basic trust—and a renewed victory over
that basic mistrust—with which each human being emerges from
early infancy. In this way organized religion cements the faith
which will support future generations. Established law tries to
formulate obligations and privileges, restraints and freedoms, in such
a way that man can submit to law and order with a minimum of
doubt and with little loss of face, and as an autonomous agent of
order can teach the rudiments of discipline to his young. The
relation of faith and law, of course, is an eternal human problem,
whether it appears in questions of church and state, mysticism and
daily morality, or existential loneliness and political commitment.

The third crisis, that of initiative versus guilt, is part of what
Freud described as the central complex of the family, namely, the
Oedipus complex. It involves a lasting unconscious association of
sensual freedom with the body of the mother and the administra-
tions received from her hand; a lasting association of cruel pro-
hibition with the interference of the dangerous father; and the
consequences of these associations for love and hate in reality and
in phantasy. (I will not discuss here the cultural relativity of Freud’s
observations nor the dated origin of his term; but I assume that those
who do wish to quibble about all this will feel the obligation to
advance systematic propositions about family, childhood, and society
which come closer to the core, rather than go back to the periphery,
of the riddle which Freud was the first to penetrate.) We have
reviewed the strong indications of an especially heavy interference
by Hans Luder with Martin’s attachment to his mother, who, it is
suggested, secretly provided for him what Goethe openly ac-
knowledged as his mother’s gift—“Die Frohnatur, die Lust zu

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fabulieren"; gaiety and the pleasure of confabulation. We have indicated how this gift, which later emerged in Luther’s poetry, became guilt-laden and was broken to harness by an education designed to make a precocious student of the boy. We have also traced its relationship to Luther’s lifelong burden of excessive guilt. Here is one of Luther’s descriptions of that guilt: “And this is the worst of all these ills, that the conscience cannot run away from itself, but it is always present to itself and knows all the terrors of the creature which such things bring even in this present life, because the ungodly man is like a raging sea. The third and greatest of all these horrors and the worst of all ills is to have a judge.” 8 He also said, “For this is the nature of a guilty conscience, to fly and to be terrified, even when all is safe and prosperous, to convert all into peril and death.” 8

The stage of initiative, associated with Freud’s phallic stage of psycho-sexuality, ties man’s budding will to fantasy, play, games, and early work, and thus to the mutual delineation of unlimited imagination and aspiration and limiting, threatening conscience. As far as society is concerned, this is vitally related to the occupational and technological ideals perceived by the child; for the child can manage the fact that there is no return to the mother as a mother and no competition with the father as a father only to the degree to which a future career outside of the narrower family can at least be envisaged in ideal future occupations: these he learns to imitate in play, and to anticipate in school. We can surmise that for little Martin the father’s own occupation was early precluded from anticipatory fantasy, and that a life of scholarly duty was obediently and sadly envisaged instead. This precocious severity of obedience later made it impossible for young Martin to anticipate any career but that of unlimited study for its own sake, as we have seen in following his path of obedience—in disobedience.

In the fourth stage, the child becomes able and eager to learn systematically, and to collaborate with others. The resolution of this stage decides much of the ratio between a sense of industry or work completion, and a sense of tool-inferiority, and prepares a man for the essential ingredients of the ethos as well as the rationale of his technology. He wants to know the reason for things, and is provided, at least, with rationalizations. He learns to use whatever simplest techniques and tools will prepare him most generally for

the tasks of his culture. In Martin’s case, the tool was literacy, Latin literacy, and we saw how he was molded by it—and how later he remolded, with the help of printing, his nation’s literary habits. With a vengeance he could claim to have taught German even to his enemies.

But he achieved this only after a protracted identity crisis which is the main subject of this book. Whoever is hard put to feel identical with one set of people and ideas must that much more violently repudiate another set; and whenever an identity, once established, meets further crises, the danger of irrational repudiation of otherness and temporarily even of one’s own identity increases.

I have already briefly mentioned the three crises which follow the crisis of identity; they concern problems of intimacy, generativity, and integrity. The crisis of intimacy in a monk is naturally distorted in its heterosexual core. What identity diffusion is to identity—its alternative and danger—intimacy is to intimacy. In a monk this too is subject to particular rules, since a monk seeks intentional and organized isolation, and submits all intimacy to prayer and confession.

Luther’s intimacy crisis seems to have been fully experienced and resolved only on the Wartburg; that is, after his lectures had established him as a lecturer, and his speech at Worms as an orator of universal stamp. On the Wartburg he wrote De Volis Monasticis, obviously determined to take care of his sexual needs as soon as a dignified solution could be found. But the intimacy crisis is by no means only a sexual, or for that matter, a heterosexual, one: Luther, once free, wrote to men friends about his emotional life, including his sexuality, with a frankness clearly denoting a need to share intimacies with them. The most famous example, perhaps, is a letter written at a time when the tragicomedy of these priests’ belated marriages to runaway nuns was in full swing. Luther had made a match between Spalatin and an ex-nun, a relative of Steupitz. In the letter, he wished Spalatin luck for the wedding night, and promised to think of him during a parallel performance to be arranged in his own marital bed.

Also on the Wartburg, Luther developed, with his translation of the Bible, a supreme ability to reach into the homes of his nation; as a preacher and a table talker he demonstrated his ability and his need to be intimate for the rest of his life. One could write a book
about Luther on this theme alone; and perhaps in such a book all but the most wrathful utterances would be found to be communications exquisitely tuned to the recipient.

Owing to his prolonged identity crisis, and also to delayed sexual intimacy, intimacy and generativity were fused in Luther's life. We have given an account of the time when his generativity reached its crisis, namely, when within a short period he became both a father, and a leader of a wide following which began to disperse his teachings in any number of avaricious, rebellious, and mystical directions. Luther then tasted fully the danger of this stage, which paradoxically is felt by creative people more deeply than by others, namely, a sense of stagnation, experienced by him in manic-depressive form. As he recovered, he proceeded with the building of the edifice of his theology; yet he responded to the needs of his parishioners and students, including his princes, to the very end. Only his occasional outbursts expressed that fury of repudiation which was mental hygiene to him, but which set a lasting bad example to his people.

3

We now come to the last, the integrity crisis which again leads man to the portals of nothingness, or at any rate to the station of having been. I have described it thus:

Only he who in some way has taken care of things and people and has adapted himself to the triumphs and disappointments adherent to being, by necessity, the originator of others and the generator of things and ideas—only he may gradually grow the fruit of these seven stages. I know no better word for it than ego integrity. Lacking a clear definition, I shall point to a few constituents of this state of mind. It is the ego's secured assurance of its propriety for order and meaning. It is a post-narcissistic love of the human ego—not of the self—as an experience which conveys some world order and some spiritual sense, no matter how dearly paid for. It is the acceptance of one's one and only life cycle as something that had to be and that, by necessity, permitted of no substitutions: it thus means a new, a different, love of one's parents. It is a contriveship with the ordering ways of distant times and different pursuits, as expressed in the simple products and sayings of such times and pursuits. Although aware of the relativity of all the various life styles which have given meaning to human striving, the possessor of integrity is ready to defend the dignity of his own life style against all physical and economic threats. For he

knows that an individual life is the accidental coincidence of but one life cycle with but one segment of history; and that for him all human integrity stands or falls with the one style of integrity of which he partakes. The style of integrity developed by his culture or civilization thus becomes the "patrimony of his soul," the seal of his moral paternity of himself (*... pero el honor/Es patrimonio del alma*: Calderón). Before this final solution, death loses its sting.

This integrity crisis, last in the lives of ordinary men, is a lifelong and chronic crisis in a homo religious. He is always older, or in early years suddenly becomes older, than his playmates or even his parents and teachers, and focuses in a precocious way on what it takes others a lifetime to gain a mere inklings of: the questions of how to escape corruption in living and how in death to give meaning to life. Because he experiences a breakthrough to the last problems so early in his life maybe such a man had better become a martyr and seal his message with an early death; or else become a hermit in a solitude which anticipates the Beyond. We know little of Jesus of Nazareth as a young man, but we certainly cannot even begin to imagine him as middle-aged.

This short cut between the youthful crisis of identity and the mature one of integrity makes the religiousist's problem of individual identity the same as the problem of existential identity. To some extent this problem is only an exaggeration of an abortive trait not uncommon in late adolescence. One may say that the religious leader becomes a professional in dealing with the kind of scruples which prove transitory in many all-too-serious postadolescents who later grow out of it, go to pieces over it, or find an intellectual or artistic medium which can stand between them and nothingness.

The late adolescent crisis, in addition to anticipating the more mature crises, can at the same time hark back to the very earliest crisis of life—trust or mistrust toward existence as such. This concentration in the cataclysm of the adolescent identity crisis of both first and last crises in the human life may well explain why religiously and artistically creative men often seem to be suffering from a barely compensated psychosis, and yet later prove superhumanly gifted in conveying a total meaning for man's life; while malignant disturbances in late adolescence often display precocious wisdom and usurped integrity. The chosen young man extends the problem of his identity to the borders of existence in the known universe;
other human beings bend all their efforts to adopt and fulfill the
departmentalized identities which they find prepared in their commu-
nities. He can permit himself to face as permanent the trust
problem which drives others in whom it remains or becomes
dominant into denial, despair, and psychosis. He acts as if mankind
were starting all over with his own beginning as an individual,
conscious of his singularity as well as his humanity; others hide
in the folds of whatever tradition they are part of because of
membership, occupation, or special interests. To him, history ends
as well as starts with him; others must look to their memories, to
legends, or to books to find models for the present and the future
in what their predecessors have said and done. No wonder that he is
something of an old man (a philosophus, and a sad one) when his
age-mates are young, or that he remains something of a child when
they age with finality. The name Lao-sze, I understand, means just
that.

The danger of a reformer of the first order, however, lies in the
nature of his influence on the masses. In our own day we have
seen this in the life and influence of Gandhi. He, too, believed in
the power of prayer; when he fasted and prayed, the masses and
even the English held their breath. Because prayer gave them the
power to say what would be heard by the lowest and the highest,
both Gandhi and Luther believed that they could count on the
restraining as well as the arousing power of the Word. In such hope
great religiousists are supported—one could say they are seduced—
by the fact that all people, because of their common undercurrent
of existential anxiety, at cyclic intervals and during crises feel an
intense need for a rejuvenation of trust which will give new mean-
ing to their limited and perverted exercise of will, conscience,
reason, and identity. But the best of them will fall asleep at
Gethsemane; and the worst will accept the new faith only as a
sanction for anarchic destructiveness or political guilt. If faith can
move mountains, let it move obstacles out of their way. But maybe
the masses also sense that he who aspires to spiritual power, even
though he speaks of renunciation, has an account to settle with an
inner authority. He may disavow their rebellion, but he is a rebel.
He may say in the deepest humility, as Luther said, that "his mouth
is Christ’s mouth"; his nerve is still the nerve of a usurper. So for
a while the world may be worse for having had a vision of being

better. From the oldest Zen poem to the most recent psychological
formulation, it is clear that "the conflict between right and wrong
is the sickness of the mind." 9

The great human question is to what extent early child training
must or must not exploit man’s early helplessness and moral
sensitivity to the degree that a deep sense of evil and of guilt be-
come unavoidable; for such a sense in the end can only result in
clandestine commitment to evil in the name of higher values. Re-
ligionists, of course, assume that because a sense of evil dominated
them even as they combated it, it belongs not only to man’s “nature,”
but is God’s plan, even God’s gift to him. The answer to this as-
sumption is that not only do child training systems differ in their
exploitation of basic mistrust, shame, doubt, and guilt—so do re-
ligions. The trouble comes, first, from the mortal fear that instinctual
forces would run wild if they were not dominated by a negative
conscience; and second, from trying to formulate man’s optimum
as negative morality, to be reinforced by rigid institutions. In this
formulation all man’s erstwhile fears of the forces and demons of
nature are reprojected onto his inner forces, and onto the child,
whose dormant energies are alternatively vilified as potentially
criminal, or romanticized as altogether angelic. Because man needs
a disciplined conscience, he thinks he must have a bad one; and
he assumes that he has a good conscience when, at times, he has an
easy one. The answer to all this does not lie in attempts to avoid
or to deny one or the other sense of badness in children altogether;
the denial of the unavoidable can only deepen a sense of secret,
unmanageable evil. The answer lies in man’s capacity to create
order which will give his children a disciplined as well as a tolerant
conscience, and a world within which to act affirmatively.

In this book we are dealing with a Western religious movement
which grew out of and subsequently perpetuated an extreme
emphasis on the interplay of initiative and guilt, and an exclusive
emphasis on the divine Father-Son. Even in this scheme, the mother
remains a counterplayer however shadowy. Father religions have
mother churches.

One may say that man, when looking through a glass darkly,
finds himself in an inner cosmos in which the outlines of three ob-
jects awaken dim nostalgias. One of these is the simple and fervent wish for a hallucinatory sense of unity with a maternal matrix, and a supply of benevolently powerful substances; it is symbolized by the affirmative face of charity, graciously inclined, reassuring the faithful of the unconditional acceptance of those who will return to the bosom. In this symbol the split of autonomy is forever repaired: shame is healed by unconditional approval, doubt by the eternal presence of generous provision.

In the center of the second nostalgia is the paternal voice of guiding conscience, which puts an end to the simple paradise of childhood and provides a sanction for energetic action. It also warns of the inevitability of guilty entanglement, and threatens with the lightning of wrath. To change the threatening sound of this voice, if need be by means of partial surrender and manifold self-castigation, is the second imperative demand which enters religious endeavor. At all cost, the Godhead must be forced to indicate that He Himself mercifully planned crime and punishment in order to assure salvation.

Finally, the glass shows the pure self itself, the unborn core of creation, the—as it were, preparental—center where God is pure nothing: ein letzter Nieth, in the words of Angelus Silesius. God is so designated in many ways in Eastern mysticism. This pure self is the self no longer sick with a conflict between right and wrong, not dependent on providers, and not dependent on guides to reason and reality.

These three images are the main religious objects. Naturally, they often fuss in a variety of ways and are joined by hosts of secondary deities. But must we call it regression if man thus seeks again the earliest encounters of his trustful past in his efforts to reach a hoped-for and eternal future? Or do religions partake of man’s ability, even as he regresses, to recover creatively? At their creative best, religions trace our earliest inner experiences, giving tangible form to vague evils, and reaching back to the earliest individual sources of trust; at the same time, they keep alive the common symbols of integrity distilled by the generations. If this is partial regression, it is a regression which, in retracing firmly established pathways, returns to the present amplified and clarified. Here, of course, much depends on whether or not the son of a given era approaches the glass in good faith: whether he seeks to find again on a higher level a treasure of basic trust safely possessed from the beginning, or tries to find a birthright denied him in the first place, in his childhood. It is clear that each generation (whatever its ideological heaven) owes to the next a safe treasure of basic trust; Luther was psychologically and ideologically right when he said in theological terms that the infant has faith if his community means his baptism. Creative moments, however, and creative periods are rare. The process here described may remain abortive or outlive itself in stagnant institutions—in which case it can and must be associated with neurosis and psychosis, with self-restriction and self-denial, with hypocrisy and stupid moralism.

Freud has convincingly demonstrated the affinity of some religious ways of thought with those of neurosis. But we regress in our dreams, too, and the inner structures of many dreams correspond to neurotic symptoms. Yet dreaming itself is a healthy activity, and a necessary one. And here too, the success of a dream depends on the faith one has, not on that which one seeks: a good conscience provides that proverbially good sleep which knits up the raveled sleeve of care. All the things that make man feel guilty, ashamed, doubtful, and mistrustful during the daytime are woven into a mysterious yet meaningful set of dream images, so arranged as to direct the recuperative powers of sleep toward a constructive waking state. The dreamwork fails and the dream turns into a nightmare when there is an intrusion of a sense of foreign reality into the dreamer’s make-believe, and a subsequent disturbance in returning from that superimposed sense of reality into real reality.

Religions try to use mechanisms analogous to dreamlife, reinforced at times by a collective genius of poetry and artistry, to offer ceremonial dreams of great recuperative value. It is possible, however, that the medieval Church, the past master of ceremonial hallucination, by promoting the reality of hell too efficiently, and by tampering too successfully with man’s sense of reality in this world, eventually created, instead of a belief in the greater reality of a more desirable world, only a sense of nightmare in this one.

I have implied that the original faith which Luther tried to restore goes back to the basic trust of early infancy. In doing so I have not, I believe, diminished the wonder of what Luther calls God’s disguise. If I assume that it is the smiling face and the guiding voice of infantile parent images which religion projects onto the
benevolent sky, I have no apologies to render to an age which thinks of painting the moon red. Peace comes from the inner space.

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The Reformation is continuing in many lands, in the form of manifold revolutions, and in the personalities of protestants of varied vocations.

I wrote this book in Mexico, on a mirador overlooking a fishing village on Lake Chapala. What remains of this village's primeval inner order goes back to pre-Christian times. But at odd times, urgent church bells call the populace to remembrance. The church is now secular property, only lent to the Curia; and the priest's garb is legally now a uniform to be worn only in church or when engaged in such business as bringing the host to the dying. Yet, at night, with defensive affront, the cross on the church tower is the only neon light in town. The vast majority of the priest's customers are women, indulging themselves fervently in the veneration of the diminutive local madonna statue, which, like those in other communities, is a small idol representing little-girlishness and pure motherhood, rather than the tragic parent of the Savior, who, in fact, is little seen. The men for the most part look on, willing to let the women have their religion as part of women's world, but themselves bound on secular activity. The young ones tend toward the not too distant city of Guadalajara, where the churches and cathedrals are increasingly matched in height and quiet splendor by apartment houses and business buildings.

Guadalajara is rapidly turning into a modern city, the industrial life of which is dominated by the products and techniques of the industrial empire in the North; yet, the emphasis is on Mexican names, Mexican management. A postrevolutionary type of businessman is much in evidence: in his appearance and bearing he protests Mexican maleness and managerial initiative. His modern home can only be called puritan; frills and comforts are avoided, the lines are clean and severe, the rooms light and barren.

The repudiation of the old is most violently expressed in some of the paintings of the revolution. In Orozco's house in Guadalajara one can see beside lithographs depicting civil war scenes with a stark simplicity, sketches of vituperative defamation of the class he obviously sprang from: his sketches swear and blaspheme as loudly

as any of the worst pamphlets of Martin Luther. In fact, some of the most treasured murals of the revolution vie with Cranach's woodcuts in their pamphleteering aimed at an as yet illiterate populace. But will revolutions against exploiters settle the issue of exploitation, or must man also learn to raise truly less exploitable men—men who are first of all masters of the human life cycle and of the cycle of generations in man's own lifespan?

On an occasional trip to the capital, I visit ancient Guanajuato where the university, a formidable fortress, has been topped by fantastic ornamental erections in order to overshadow the adjoining cathedral which once dominated education. The cathedral wall bears this announcement about death, judgment, inferno, and eternal glory:

La Muerte que es puerta de la Eternidad
El Juzgado que decide la Etimidad
El Infierno que es la habitación de la desgraciada Eternidad
La Gloria que es la mansión de la feliz Eternidad

The area of nearby Lake Patzcuaro is dominated by an enormous statue erected on a fisherman's island. The statue depicts the revolutionary hero Morelos, an erstwhile monk, his right arm raised in a gesture much like Luther's when he spoke at Worms. In its clean linear stockiness and stubborn puritanism the statue could be somewhere in a Nordic land; and if, in its other hand, it held a mighty book instead of the handle of a stony sword, it could, for all the world, be Luther.