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CHAPTER I

THE ELIMINATION OF METAPHYSICS

The traditional disputes of philosophers are, for the most part, as unwarranted as they are unfruitful. The surest way to end them is to establish beyond question what should be the purpose and method of a philosophical enquiry. And this is by no means so difficult a task as the history of philosophy would lead one to suppose. For if there are any questions which science leaves it to philosophy to answer, a straightforward process of elimination must lead to their discovery.

We may begin by criticising the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science and common sense. Later on, when we come to define metaphysics and account for its existence, we shall find that it is possible to be a metaphysician without believing in a transcendent reality; for we shall see that many metaphysical utterances are due to the commission of logical errors, rather than to a conscious desire on the part of their authors to go beyond the limits of experience. But it is convenient for us to take the case of those who believe that it is possible to have knowledge of a transcendent reality as a starting-point for our discussion. The arguments which we use to refute them will subsequently be found to apply to the whole of metaphysics.

One way of attacking a metaphysician who claimed to have knowledge of a reality which transcended the phenomenal world would be to enquire from what premises his propositions were deduced. Must he not begin, as other men do, with the evidence of his senses? And if so, what valid process of reasoning can possibly lead him to the conception of a transcendent reality? Surely from empirical premises nothing whatsoever concerning the properties, or even the existence, of anything super-empirical can legitimately be inferred. But this objection would be met by a denial on the part of the metaphysician that his assertions were ultimately based on the evidence of his senses. He would say that he was endowed with a faculty of intellectual intuition which
enabled him to know facts that could not be known through sense-experience. And even if it could be shown that he was relying on empirical premises, and that his venture into a non-empirical world was therefore logically unjustified, it would not follow that the assertions which he made concerning this non-empirical world could not be true. For the fact that a conclusion does not follow from its putative premise is not sufficient to show that it is false. Consequently one cannot overthrow a system of transcendent metaphysics merely by criticising the way in which it comes into being. What is required is rather a criticism of the nature of the actual statements which comprise it. And this is the line of argument which we shall, in fact, pursue. For we shall maintain that no statement which refers to a "reality" transcending the limits of all possible sense-experience can possibly have any literal significance; from which it must follow that the labours of those who have striven to describe such a reality have all been devoted to the production of nonsense.

It may be suggested that this is a proposition which has already been proved by Kant. But although Kant also condemned transcendent metaphysics, he did so on different grounds. For he said that the human understanding was so constituted that it lost itself in contradictions when it ventured out beyond the limits of possible experience and attempted to deal with things in themselves. And thus he made the impossibility of a transcendent metaphysic not, as we do, a matter of logic, but a matter of fact. He asserted, not that our minds could not conceivably have had the power of penetrating beyond the phenomenal world, but merely that they were in fact devoid of it. And this leads the critic to ask how, if it is possible to know only what lies within the bounds of sense-experience, the author can be justified in asserting that real things do exist beyond, and how he can tell what are the boundaries beyond which the human understanding may not venture, unless he succeeds in passing them himself. As Wittgenstein says, "in order to draw a limit to thinking, we should have to think both sides of this limit," a truth to which Bradley gives a special twist in maintaining that the man who is ready to prove that metaphysics is impossible is a brother metaphysician with a rival theory of his own.\footnote{1 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Preface.} \footnote{2 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 2nd ed., p. 1.}

Whatever force these objections may have against the Kantian doctrine, they have none whatsoever against the thesis that I am about to set forth. It cannot here be said that the author is himself overstepping the barrier he maintains to be impassable. For the fruitlessness of attempting to transcend the limits of possible sense-experience will be deduced, not from a psychological hypothesis concerning the actual constitution of the human mind, but from the rule which determines the literal significance of language. Our charge against the metaphysician is not that he attempts to employ the understanding in a field where it cannot profitably venture, but that he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant. Nor are we ourselves obliged to talk nonsense in order to show that all sentences of a certain type are necessarily devoid of literal significance. We need only formulate the criterion which enables us to test whether a sentence expresses a genuine proposition about a matter of fact, and then point out that the sentences under consideration fail to satisfy it. And this we shall now proceed to do. We shall first of all formulate the criterion in somewhat vague terms, and then give the explanations which are necessary to render it precise.

The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express—that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such a character that the assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is consistent with any assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of his future experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition. The sentence expressing it may be emotionally significant to him; but it is not literally significant. And with regard to questions the procedure is the same. We enquire in every case what observations would lead us to answer the question, one way or the other; and, if none can be discovered, we must conclude that the sentence under consideration does not, as far as we are concerned, express a genuine question, however strongly its grammatical appearance may suggest that it does.
As the adoption of this procedure is an essential factor in the argument of this book, it needs to be examined in detail.

In the first place, it is necessary to draw a distinction between practical verifiability and verifiability in principle. Plainly we all understand, in many cases believe, propositions which we have not in fact taken steps to verify. Many of these are propositions which we could verify if we took enough trouble. But there remain a number of significant propositions, concerning matters of fact, which we could not verify even if we chose; simply because we lack the practical means of placing ourselves in the situation where the relevant observations could be made. A simple and familiar example of such a proposition is the proposition that there are mountains on the farther side of the moon. No rocket has yet been invented which would enable me to go and look at the farther side of the moon, so that I am unable to decide the matter by actual observation. But I do know what observations would decide it for me, if, as is theoretically conceivable, I were once in a position to make them. And therefore I say that the proposition is verifiable in principle, if not in practice, and is accordingly significant. On the other hand, such a metaphysical pseudo-proposition as "the Absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress," is not even in principle verifiable. For one cannot conceive of an observation which would enable one to determine whether the Absolute did, or did not, enter into evolution and progress. Of course it is possible that the author of such a remark is using English words in a way in which they are not commonly used by English-speaking people, and that he does, in fact, intend to assert something which could be empirically verified. But until he makes us understand how the proposition that he wishes to express would be verified, he fails to communicate anything to us. And if he admits, as I think the author of the remark in question would have admitted, that his words were not intended to express either a tautology or a proposition which was capable, at least in principle, of being verified, then it follows that he has made an utterance which has no literal significance even for himself.

A further distinction which we must make is the distinction between the "strong" and the "weak" sense of the term "verifiable." A proposition is said to be verifiable, in the strong sense of the term, if, and only if, its truth could be conclusively established in experience. But it is verifiable, in the weak sense, if it is possible for experience to render it probable. In which sense are we using the term when we say that a putative proposition is genuine only if it is verifiable?

It seems to me that if we adopt conclusive verifiability as our criterion of significance, as some positivists have proposed, our argument will prove too much. Consider, for example, the case of general propositions of law—such propositions, namely, as "arsenic is poisonous"; "all men are mortal"; "a body tends to expand when it is heated." It is of the very nature of these propositions that their truth cannot be established with certainty by any finite series of observations. But if it is recognized that such general propositions of law are designed to cover an infinite number of cases, then it must be admitted that they cannot, even in principle, be verified conclusively. And then, if we adopt conclusive verifiability as our criterion of significance, we are logically obliged to treat these general propositions of law in the same fashion as we treat the statements of the metaphysician.

In face of this difficulty, some positivists have adopted the heretical course of saying that these general propositions are indeed pieces of nonsense, albeit an essentially important type of nonsense. But here the introduction of the term "important" is simply an attempt to hedge. It serves only to mark the authors' recognition that their view is somewhat too paradoxical, without in any way removing the paradox. Besides, the difficulty is not confined to the case of general propositions of law, though it is there revealed most plainly. It is hardly less obvious in the case of propositions about the remote past. For it must surely be admitted that, however strong the evidence in favour of historical statements may be, their truth can never become more than highly probable. And to maintain that they also constituted an important, or unimportant, type of nonsense would be unpleasing, to say the very least. Indeed, it will be our contention...
that no proposition, other than a tautology, can possibly be anything more than a probable hypothesis. And if this is correct, the principle that a sentence can be factually significant only if it expresses what is conclusively verifiable is self-contradicting as a criterion of significance. For it leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to make a significant statement of fact at all.

Nor can we accept the suggestion that a sentence should be allowed to be factually significant if, and only if, it expresses something which is definitely confutable by experience. Those who adopt this course assume that, although no finite series of observations is ever sufficient to establish the truth of a hypothesis beyond all possibility of doubt, there are crucial cases in which a single observation, or series of observations, can definitely confute it. But, as we shall show later on, this assumption is false. A hypothesis cannot be conclusively confuted any more than it can be conclusively verified. For when we take the occurrence of certain observations as proof that a given hypothesis is false, we presuppose the existence of certain conditions. And though, in any given case, it may be extremely improbable that this assumption is false, it is not logically impossible. We shall see that there need be no self-contradiction in holding that some of the relevant circumstances are other than we have taken them to be, and consequently that the hypothesis has not really broken down. And if it is not the case that any hypothesis can be definitively confuted, we cannot hold that the genuineness of a proposition depends on the possibility of its definite confutation.

Accordingly, we fall back on the weaker sense of verification. We say that the question that must be asked about any putative statement of fact is not, Would any observations make its truth or falsehood logically certain? but simply, Would any observations be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood? And it is only if a negative answer is given to this second question that we conclude that the statement under consideration is nonsensical.

To make our position clearer, we may formulate it in another way. Let us call a proposition which records an actual or possible observation an experiential proposition. Then we may say that it is the mark of a genuine factual proposition, not that it should be equivalent to an experiential proposition, or any finite number of experiential propositions, but simply that some experiential propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises without being deducible from these other premises alone.¹

This criterion seems liberal enough. In contrast to the principle of conclusive verifiability, it clearly does not deny significance to general propositions or to propositions about the past. Let us see what kinds of assertion it rules out.

A good example of the kind of utterance that is condemned by our criterion as being not even false but nonsensical would be the assertion that the world of sense-experience was altogether unreal. It must, of course, be admitted that our senses do sometimes deceive us. We may, as the result of having certain sensations, expect certain other sensations to be obtainable which are, in fact, not obtainable. But, in all such cases, it is further sense-experience that informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience. We say that the senses sometimes deceive us, just because the expectations to which our sense-experiences give rise do not always accord with what we subsequently experience. That is, we rely on our senses to substantiate or confute the judgments which are based on our sensations. And therefore the fact that our perceptual judgements are sometimes found to be erroneous has not the slightest tendency to show that the world of sense-experience is unreal. And, indeed, it is plain that no conceivable observation, or series of observations, could have any tendency to show that the world revealed to us by sense-experience was unreal. Consequently, anyone who condemns the sensible world as a world of mere appearance, as opposed to reality, is saying something which, according to our criterion of significance, is literally nonsensical.

An example of a controversy which the application of our criterion obliges us to condemn as fictitious is provided by those who dispute concerning the number of substances that there are in the world. For it is admitted both by monists, who maintain that reality is one substance, and by pluralists, who maintain that reality is many, that it is impossible to imagine any empirical situation which would be relevant to the solution of their dispute. But if we are told that no possible observation could give any

¹ This has been proposed by Karl Popper in his Logik der Forschung.

³ This is an over-simplified statement, which is not literally correct. I give what I believe to be the correct formulation in the Introduction, p. 13.
probability either to the assertion that reality was one substance or to the assertion that it was many, then we must conclude that neither assertion is significant. We shall see later on that there are genuine logical and empirical questions involved in the dispute between monists and pluralists. But the metaphysical question concerning "substance" is ruled out by our criterion as spurious.

A similar treatment must be accorded to the controversy between realists and idealists, in its metaphysical aspect. A simple illustration, which I have made use of in a similar argument elsewhere, will help to demonstrate this. Let us suppose that a picture is discovered and the suggestion made that it was painted by Goya. There is a definite procedure for dealing with such a question. The experts examine the picture to see in what way it resembles the accredited works of Goya, and to see if it bears any marks which are characteristic of a forgery; they look up contemporary records for evidence of the existence of such a picture, and so on. In the end, they may still disagree, but each one knows what empirical evidence would go to confirm or discredit his opinion. Suppose, now, that these men have studied philosophy, and some of them proceed to maintain that this picture is a set of ideas in the perceiver's mind, or in God's mind, others that it is objectively real. What possible experience could any of them have which would be relevant to the solution of this dispute one way or the other? In the ordinary sense of the term "real," in which it is opposed to "illusory," the reality of the picture is not in doubt. The disputants have satisfied themselves that the picture is real, in this sense, by obtaining a correlated series of sensations of sight and sensations of touch. Is there any similar process by which they could discover whether the picture was real, in the sense in which the term "real" is opposed to "ideal"? Clearly there is none. But, if that is so, the problem is fictitious according to our criterion. This does not mean that the realist-idealist controversy may be dismissed without further ado. For it can legitimately be regarded as a dispute concerning the analysis of existential propositions, and so as involving a logical problem which, as we shall see, can be definitively solved. What we have just shown is that the question at issue between idealists and

realists becomes fictitious when, as is often the case, it is given a metaphysical interpretation.

There is no need for us to give further examples of the operation of our criterion of significance. For our object is merely to show that philosophy, as a genuine branch of knowledge, must be distinguished from metaphysics. We are not now concerned with the historical question how much of what has traditionally passed for philosophy is actually metaphysical. We shall, however, point out later on that the majority of the "great philosophers" of the past were not essentially metaphysicians, and thus reassure those who would otherwise be prevented from adopting our criterion by considerations of picy.

As to the validity of the verification principle, in the form in which we have stated it, a demonstration will be given in the course of this book. For it will be shown that all propositions which have factual content are empirical hypotheses; and that the function of an empirical hypothesis is to provide a rule for the anticipation of experience. And this means that every empirical hypothesis must be relevant to some actual, or possible, experience, so that a statement which is not relevant to any experience is not an empirical hypothesis, and accordingly has no factual content. But this is precisely what the principle of verifiability asserts.

It should be mentioned here that the fact that the utterances of the metaphysician are nonsensical does not follow simply from the fact that they are devoid of factual content. It follows from that fact, together with the fact that they are not a priori propositions. And in assuming that they are not a priori propositions, we are once again anticipating the conclusions of a later chapter in this book. For it will be shown there that a priori propositions, which have always been attractive to philosophers on account of their certainty, owe this certainty to the fact that they are tautologies. We may accordingly define a metaphysical sentence as a sentence which purports to express a genuine proposition, but does, in fact, express neither a tautology nor an empirical hypothesis. And as tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions, we are justified in concluding that all metaphysical assertions are nonsensical. Our next task is to show how they come to be made.

1 Vide Chapter V. 2 Chapter IV.
The use of the term “substance,” to which we have already referred, provides us with a good example of the way in which metaphysics mostly comes to be written. It happens to be the case that we cannot, in our language, refer to the sensible properties of a thing without introducing a word or phrase which appears to stand for the thing itself as opposed to anything which may be said about it. And, as a result of this, those who are infected by the primitive superstition that to every name a single real entity must correspond assume that it is necessary to distinguish logically between the thing itself and any, or all, of its sensible properties. And so they employ the term “substance” to refer to the thing itself. But from the fact that we happen to employ a single word to refer to a thing, and make that word the grammatical subject of the sentences in which we refer to the sensible appearances of the thing, it does not follow that the thing itself is a “simple entity,” or that it cannot be defined in terms of the totality of its appearances. It is true that in talking of “its” appearances we appear to distinguish the thing from the appearances, but that is simply an accident of linguistic usage. Logical analysis shows that what makes these “appearances” the “appearances of” the same thing is not their relationship to an entity other than themselves, but their relationship to one another. The metaphysician fails to see this because he is misled by a superficial grammatical feature of his language.

A simpler and clearer instance of the way in which a consideration of grammar leads to metaphysics is the case of the metaphysical concept of Being. The origin of our temptation to raise questions about Being, which is not conceivability experience would enable us to answer, lies in the fact that, in our language, sentences which express existential propositions and sentences which express attributive propositions may be of the same grammatical form. For instance, the sentences “Martyrs exist” and “Martyrs suffer” both consist of a noun followed by an intransitive verb, and the fact that they have grammatically the same appearance leads one to assume that they are of the same logical type. It is seen that in the proposition “Martyrs suffer,” the members of a certain species are credited with a certain attribute, and it is sometimes assumed that the same thing is true of such a proposition as “Martyrs exist.” If this were actually the case, it would, indeed, be as legitimate to speculate about the Being of martyrs as it is to speculate about their suffering. But, as Kant pointed out, existence is not an attribute. For, when we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we coherently assert that it exists: so that if existence were itself an attribute, it would follow that all positive existential propositions were tautologies, and all negative existential propositions self-contradictory; and this is not the case. So that those who raise questions about Being which are based on the assumption that existence is an attribute are guilty of following grammar beyond the boundaries of sense.

A similar mistake has been made in connection with such propositions as “Unicorns are fictitious.” Here again the fact that there is a superficial grammatical resemblance between the English sentences “Dogs are faithful” and “Unicorns are fictitious,” and between the corresponding sentences in other languages, creates the assumption that they are of the same logical type. Dogs must exist in order to have the property of being faithful, and so it is held that unless unicorns in some way existed they could not have the property of being fictitious. But, as it is plainly self-contradictory to say that fictitious objects exist, the device is adopted of saying that they are real in some non-empirical sense—that they have a mode of real being which is different from the mode of being of existent things. But since there is no way of testing whether an object is real in this sense, as there is for testing whether it is real in the ordinary sense, the assertion that fictitious objects have a special non-empirical mode of real being is devoid of all literal significance. It comes to be made as a result of the assumption that being fictitious is an attribute. And this is a fallacy of the same order as the fallacy of supposing that existence is an attribute, and it can be exposed in the same way.

In general, the postulation of real non-existent entities results from the superstition, just now referred to, that, to every word or phrase that can be the grammatical subject of a sentence, there must somewhere be a real entity corresponding. For as there is no place in the empirical world for many of these “entities,” a special non-empirical world is invoked to house them. To this error must be attributed, not only the utterances of a Heidegger,

2 This argument is well stated by John Wisdom, Interpretation and Analysis, pp. 62, 63.
who bases his metaphysics on the assumption that "Nothing" is a name which is used to denote something peculiarly mysterious, but also the prevalence of such problems as those concerning the reality of propositions and universals whose senselessness, though less obvious, is no less complete. These few examples afford a sufficient indication of the way in which most metaphysical assertions come to be formulated. They show how easy it is to write sentences which are literally nonsensical without seeing that they are nonsensical. And thus we see that the view that a number of the traditional "problems of philosophy" are metaphysical, and consequently fictitious, does not involve any incredible assumptions about the psychology of philosophers.

Among those who recognise that if philosophy is to be accounted a genuine branch of knowledge it must be defined in such a way as to distinguish it from metaphysics, it is fashionable to speak of the metaphysician as a kind of misplaced poet. As his statements have no literal meaning, they are not subject to any criteria of truth or falsehood: but they may still serve to express, or arouse, emotion, and thus be subject to ethical or aesthetic standards. And it is suggested that they may have considerable value, as means of moral inspiration, or even as works of art. In this way, an attempt is made to compensate the metaphysician for his estrangement from philosophy.  

I am afraid that this compensation is hardly in accordance with his deserts. The view that the metaphysician is to be reckoned among the poets appears to rest on the assumption that both talk nonsense. But this assumption is false. In the vast majority of cases the sentences which are produced by poets do have literal meaning. The difference between the man who uses language scientifically and the man who uses it emotively is not that the one produces sentences which are incapable of arousing emotion, and the other sentences which have no sense, but that the one is primarily concerned with the expression of true propositions, the other with the creation of a work of art. Thus, if a work of science contains true and important propositions, its value as a work of science will hardly be diminished by the fact that they are inelegantly expressed. And similarly, a work of art is not necessarily the worse for the fact that all the propositions comprising it are literally false. But to say that many literary works are largely composed of falsehoods, is not to say that they are composed of pseudo-propositions. It is, in fact, very rare for a literary artist to produce sentences which have no literal meaning. And where this does occur, the sentences are carefully chosen for their rhythm and balance. If the author writes nonsense, it is because he considers it most suitable for bringing about the effects for which his writing is designed.

The metaphysician, on the other hand, does not intend to write nonsense. He lapses into it through being deceived by grammar, or through committing errors of reasoning, such as that which leads to the view that the sensible world is unreal. But it is not the mark of a poet simply to make mistakes of this sort. There are some, indeed, who would see in the fact that the metaphysician's utterances are senseless a reason against the view that they have aesthetic value. And, without going so far as this, we may safely say that it does not constitute a reason for it.

It is true, however, that although the greater part of metaphysics is merely the embodiment of humdrum errors, there remain a number of metaphysical passages which are the work of genuine mystical feeling; and they may more plausibly be held to have moral or aesthetic value. But, as far as we are concerned, the distinction between the kind of metaphysics that is produced by a philosopher who has been duped by grammar, and the kind that is produced by a mystic who is trying to express the inexpressible, is of no great importance; what is important to us is to realise that even the utterances of the metaphysician who is attempting to expound a vision are literally senseless; so that henceforth we may pursue our philosophical researches with as little regard for them as for the more inglorious kind of metaphysics which comes from a failure to understand the workings of our language.

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CHAPTER II

THE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

Among the superstitions from which we are freed by the abandonment of metaphysics is the view that it is the business of the philosopher to construct a deductive system. In rejecting this view we are not, of course, suggesting that the philosopher can dispense with deductive reasoning. We are simply contesting his right to posit certain first principles, and then offer them with their consequences as a complete picture of reality. To discredit this procedure, one has only to show that there can be no first principles of the kind it requires.

As it is the function of these first principles to provide a certain basis for our knowledge, it is clear that they are not to be found among the so-called laws of nature. For we shall see that the "laws of nature," if they are not mere definitions, are simply hypotheses which may be confused by experience. And, indeed, it has never been the practice of the system-builders in philosophy to choose inductive generalizations for their premises. Rigtly regarding such generalizations as being merely probable, they subordinate them to principles which they believe to be logically certain.

This is illustrated most clearly in the system of Descartes. It is commonly said that Descartes attempted to derive all human knowledge from premises whose truth was intuitively certain: but this interpretation puts an undue stress on the element of psychology in his system. I think he realized well enough that a mere appeal to intuition was insufficient for his purpose, since men are not all equally credulous, and that what he was really trying to do was to base all our knowledge on propositions which it would be self-contradictory to deny. He thought he had found such a proposition in "cogito," which must not here be understood in its ordinary sense of "I think," but rather as meaning "there is a thought now." In fact he was wrong, because "non cogito" would be self-contradictory only if it negated itself; and this no significant proposition can do. But even if it were true that such a proposition as "there is a thought now" was logically certain, it still would not serve Descartes' purpose. For if "cogito" is taken in this sense, his initial principle, "cogito ergo sum," is false. "I exist" does not follow from "there is a thought now." The fact that a thought occurs at a given moment does not entail that any other thought has occurred at any other moment, still less that there has occurred a series of thoughts sufficient to constitute a single self. As Hume conclusively showed, no one event intrinsically points to any other. We infer the existence of events which we are not actually observing, with the help of general principles. But these principles must be obtained inductively. By mere deduction from what is immediately given we cannot advance a single step beyond. And, consequently, any attempt to base a deductive system on propositions which describe what is immediately given is bound to be a failure.

The only other course open to one who wished to deduce all our knowledge from "first principles," without indulging in metaphysics, would be to take for his premises a set of a priori truths. But, as we have already mentioned, and shall later show, an a priori truth is a tautology. And from a set of tautologies, taken by themselves, only further tautologies can be validly deduced. But it would be absurd to put forward a system of tautologies as constituting the whole truth about the universe. And thus we may conclude that it is not possible to deduce all our knowledge from "first principles"; so that those who hold that it is the function of philosophy to carry out such a deduction are denying its claim to be a genuine branch of knowledge.

The belief that it is the business of the philosopher to search for first principles is bound up with the familiar conception of philosophy as the study of reality as a whole. And this conception is one which it is difficult to criticize, because it is so vague. If it is taken to imply, as it sometimes is, that the philosopher somehow projects himself outside the world, and takes a bird's-eye view of it, then it is plainly a metaphysical conception. And it is also metaphysical to assert, as some do, that "reality as a whole" is somehow generically different from the reality which is investigated piecemeal by the special sciences. But if the assertion that philosophy studies reality as a whole is understood to imply merely that the philosopher is equally concerned with the
content of every science, then we may accept it, not indeed as an adequate definition of philosophy, but as a truth about it. For we shall find, when we come to discuss the relationship of philosophy to science, that it is not, in principle, related to any one science more closely than to any other.

In saying that philosophy is concerned with each of the sciences, in a manner which we shall indicate,¹ we mean also to rule out the supposition that philosophy can be ranged alongside the existing sciences, as a special department of speculative knowledge. Those who make this supposition cherish the belief that there are some things in the world which are possible objects of speculative knowledge and yet lie beyond the scope of empirical science. But this belief is a delusion. There is no field of experience which cannot, in principle, be brought under some form of scientific law, and no type of speculative knowledge about the world which it is, in principle, beyond the power of science to give. We have already gone some way to substantiate this proposition by demolishing metaphysics; and we shall justify it to the full in the course of this book.

With this we complete the overthrow of speculative philosophy. We are now in a position to see that the function of philosophy is wholly critical. In what exactly does its critical activity consist?

One way of answering this question is to say that it is the philosopher's business to test the validity of our scientific hypotheses and everyday assumptions. But this view, though very widely held, is mistaken. If a man chooses to doubt the truth of all the propositions he ordinarily believes, it is not in the power of philosophy to reassure him. The most that philosophy can do, apart from seeing whether his beliefs are self-consistent, is to show what are the criteria which are used to determine the truth or falseness of any given proposition; and then, when the sceptic realises that certain observations would verify his propositions, he may also realize that he could make those observations, and so consider his original beliefs to be justified. But in such a case one cannot say that it is philosophy which justifies his beliefs. Philosophy merely shows him that experience can justify them. We may look to the philosopher to show us what we accept as constituting sufficient evidence for the truth of any given empirical proposition. But whether the evidence is forthcoming or not is in every case a purely empirical question.

If anyone thinks that we are here taking too much for granted, let him refer to the chapter on "Truth and Probability," in which we discuss how the validity of synthetic propositions is determined. He will see there that the only sort of justification that is necessary or possible for self-consistent empirical propositions is empirical verification. And this applies just as much to the laws of science as to the maxims of common sense. Indeed there is no difference in kind between them. The superiority of the scientific hypothesis consists merely in its being more abstract, more precise, and more fruitful. And although scientific objects such as atoms and electrons seem to be fictitious in a way that chairs and tables are not, here, too, the distinction is only a distinction of degree. For both these kinds of objects are known only by their sensible manifestations and are definable in terms of them.

It is time, therefore, to abandon the superstition that natural science cannot be regarded as logically respectable until philosophers have solved the problem of induction. The problem of induction is, roughly speaking, the problem of finding a way to prove that certain empirical generalizations which are derived from past experience will hold good also in the future. There are only two ways of approaching this problem on the assumption that it is a genuine problem, and it is easy to see that neither of them can lead to its solution. One may attempt to deduce the proposition which one is required to prove either from a purely formal principle or from an empirical principle. In the former case one commits the error of supposing that from a tautology it is possible to deduce a proposition about a matter of fact; in the latter case one simply assumes what one is setting out to prove. For example, it is often said that we can justify induction by invoking the uniformity of nature, or by postulating a "principle of limited independent variety."¹ But, in fact, the principle of the uniformity of nature merely states, in a misleading fashion, the assumption that past experience is a reliable guide to the future; while the principle of limited independent variety presupposes it. And it is plain that any other empirical principle which was put forward as a justification of induction would beg the question in the same way. For the only grounds which one

¹ Vide Chapter III and Chapter VIII.

¹ cf. J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, Part III.
could have for believing such a principle would be inductive grounds.

Thus it appears that there is no possible way of solving the problem of induction, as it is ordinarily conceived. And this means that it is a fictitious problem, since all genuine problems are at least theoretically capable of being solved; and the credit of natural science is not impaired by the fact that some philosophers continue to be puzzled by it. Actually, we shall see that the only test to which a form of scientific procedure which satisfies the necessary condition of self-consistency is subject, is the test of its success in practice. We are entitled to have faith in our procedure just so long as it does the work which it is designed to do—that is, enables us to predict future experience, and so to control our environment. Of course, the fact that a certain form of procedure has always been successful in practice affords no logical guarantee that it will continue to be so. But then it is a mistake to demand a guarantee where it is logically impossible to obtain one. This does not mean that it is irrational to expect future experience to conform to the past. For when we come to define "rationality" we shall find that for us "being rational" entails being guided in a particular fashion by past experience.

The task of defining rationality is precisely the sort of task that it is the business of philosophy to undertake. But in achieving this it does not justify scientific procedure. What justifies scientific procedure, to the extent to which it is capable of being justified, is the success of the predictions to which it gives rise; and this can be determined only in actual experience. By itself, the analysis of a synthetic principle tells us nothing whatsoever about its truth.

Unhappily, this fact is generally disregarded by philosophers who concern themselves with the so-called theory of knowledge. Thus it is common for writers on the subject of perception to assume that, unless one can give a satisfactory analysis of perceptual situations, one is not entitled to believe in the existence of material things. But this is a complete mistake. What gives one the right to believe in the existence of a certain material thing is simply the fact that one has certain sensations; for, whether one realises it or not, to say that the thing exists is equivalent to saying that such sensations are obtainable. It is the philosopher's business to give a correct definition of material things in terms of sensations. But his success or failure in this task has no bearing whatsoever on the validity of our perceptual judgements. That depends wholly on actual sense-experience.

It follows that the philosopher has no right to despise the beliefs of common sense. If he does so, he merely displays his ignorance of the true purpose of his enquiries. What he is entitled to despise is the unreflecting analysis of those beliefs, which takes the grammatical structure of the sentence as a trustworthy guide to its meaning. Thus, many of the mistakes made in connection with the problem of perception can be accounted for by the fact, already referred to in connection with the metaphysical notion of "substance," that it happens to be impossible in an ordinary European language to mention a thing without appearing to distinguish it generically from its qualities and states. But from the fact that the common-sense analysis of a proposition is mistaken by no means follows that the proposition is not true. The philosopher may be able to show us that the propositions we believe are far more complex than we suppose; but it does not follow from this that we have no right to believe them.

It should now be sufficiently clear that if the philosopher is to uphold his claim to make a special contribution to the stock of our knowledge, he must not attempt to formulate speculative truths, or to look for first principles, or to make a priori judgements about the validity of our empirical beliefs. He must, in fact, confine himself to works of clarification and analysis of a sort which we shall presently describe.

In saying that the activity of philosophising is essentially analytic, we are not, of course, maintaining that all those who are commonly called philosophers have actually been engaged in carrying out analyses. On the contrary, we have been at pains to show that a great deal of what is commonly called philosophy is metaphysical in character. What we have been in search of, in enquiring into the function of philosophy, is a definition of philosophy which should accord to some extent with the practice of those who are commonly called philosophers, and at the same time be consistent with the common assumption that philosophy is a special branch of knowledge. It is because metaphysics fails to satisfy this second condition that we distinguish it from philosophy, in spite of the fact that it is commonly referred to as philosophy. And our justification for making this distinction is
that it is necessitated by our original postulate that philosophy is a special branch of knowledge, and our demonstration that metaphysics is not.

Although this procedure is logically unassailable, it will perhaps be attacked on the ground that it is inexpedient. It will be said that the "history of philosophy" is, almost entirely, a history of metaphysics; and, consequently, that although there is no actual fallacy involved in our using the word "philosophy" in the sense in which philosophy is incompatible with metaphysics, it is dangerously misleading. For all our care in defining the term will not prevent people from confusing the activities which we call philosophical with the metaphysical activities of those whom they have been taught to regard as philosophers. And therefore it would surely be advisable for us to abandon the term "philosophy" altogether, as a name for a distinctive branch of knowledge, and invent some new description for the activity which we were minded to call the activity of philosophizing.

Our answer to this is that it is not the case that the "history of philosophy" is almost entirely a history of metaphysics. That it contains some metaphysics is undeniable. But I think it can be shown that the majority of those who are commonly supposed to have been great philosophers were primarily not metaphysicians but analysts. For example, I do not see how anyone who follows the account which we shall give of the nature of philosophical analysis and then turns to Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding can fail to conclude that it is essentially an analytic work. Locke is generally regarded as being one who, like G. E. Moore at the present time, puts forward a philosophy of common sense. But he does not, any more than Moore, attempt to give an a priori justification of our common-sense beliefs. Rather does he appear to have seen that it was not his business as a philosopher to affirm or deny the validity of any empirical propositions, but only to analyse them. For he is content, in his own words, "to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge"; and so devotes himself to the purely analytic tasks of defining knowledge, and classifying propositions, and displaying the nature of material things. And the small portion of his work which is not philosophical, in our sense, is not given over to metaphysics, but to psychology.

Nor is it fair to regard Berkeley as a metaphysician. For he did not, in fact, deny the reality of material things, as we are still too commonly told. What he denied was the adequacy of Locke's analysis of the notion of a material thing. He maintained that to say of various "ideas of sensation" that they belonged to a single material thing was not, as Locke thought, to say that they were related to a single unobservable underlying "somewhat," but rather that they stood in certain relations to one another. And in this he was right. Admittedly he made the mistake of supposing that what was immediately given in sensation was necessarily mental; and the use, by him and by Locke, of the word "idea" to denote an element in that which is sensibly given is objectionable, because it suggests this false view. Accordingly we replace the word "idea" in this usage by the neutral word "sense-content," which we shall use to refer to the immediate data not merely of "outer" but also of "introspective" sensation, and say that what Berkeley discovered was that material things must be definable in terms of sense-contents. We shall see, when we come finally to settle the conflict between idealism and realism, that his actual conception of the relationship between material things and sense-contents was not altogether accurate. It led him to some notoriously paradoxical conclusions, which a slight emendation will enable us to avoid. But the fact that he failed to give a completely correct account of the way in which material things are constituted out of sense-contents does not invalidate his contention that they are so constituted. On the contrary, we know that it must be possible to define material things in terms of sense-contents, because it is only by the occurrence of certain sense-contents that the existence of any material thing can ever be in the least degree verified. And thus we see that we have not to enquire whether a phenomenalist "theory of perception" or some other sort of theory is correct, but only what form of phenomenalist theory is correct. For the fact that all causal and representative theories of perception treat material things as if they were unobservable entities entitles us, as Berkeley saw, to rule them out a priori. The unfortunate thing is that, in spite of this, he found it necessary to postulate God as an unobservable cause of our "ideas"; and he must be criticised also for failing to

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see that the argument which he uses to dispose of Locke's analysis of a material thing is fatal to his own conception of the nature of the self, a point which was effectively seized upon by Hume.

Of Hume we may say not merely that he was not in practice a metaphysician, but that he explicitly rejected metaphysics. We find the strongest evidence of this in the passage with which he concludes his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. "If," he says, "we take in our hand any volume; of divinity, or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames. For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." What is this but a rhetorical version of our own thesis that a sentence which does not express either a formally true proposition or an empirical hypothesis is devoid of literal significance? It is true that Hume does not, so far as I know, actually put forward any view concerning the nature of philosophical propositions themselves, but those of his works which are commonly accounted philosophical are, apart from certain passages which deal with questions of psychology, works of analysis. If this is not universally conceded, it is because his treatment of causation, which is the main feature of his philosophical work, is often misinterpreted. He has been accused of denying causation, whereas in fact he was concerned only with defining it. So far is he from asserting that no causal propositions are true that he is himself at pains to give rules for judging of the existence of causes and effects.\(^1\) He realised well enough that the question whether a given causal proposition was true or false was not one that could be settled *a priori*, and accordingly confined himself to discussing the analytic question, What is it that we are asserting when we assert that one event is causally connected with another? And in answering this question he showed, I think conclusively, first: that the relation of cause and effect was not logical in character, since any proposition asserting a causal connection could be denied without self-contradiction, secondly that causal laws were not analytically derived from experience, since they were not deductible from any finite number of experiential propositions, and, thirdly, that it was a mistake to analyse propositions asserting causal connections in terms of a relation of

necessitation which held between particular events, since it was impossible to conceive of any observations which would have the slightest tendency to establish the existence of such a relation. He thus laid the way open for the view, which we adopt, that every assertion of a particular causal connection involves the assertion of a causal law, and that every general proposition of the form "C causes E" is equivalent to a proposition of the form "whenever C, then E," where the symbol "whenever" must be taken to refer, not to a finite number of actual instances of C, but to the infinite number of possible instances. He himself defines a cause as "an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second," or, alternatively, as "an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other,"\(^1\) but neither of these definitions is acceptable as it stands. For, even if it is true that we should not, according to our standards of rationality, have good reason to believe that an event C was the cause of an event E unless we had observed a constant conjunction of events like C with events like E, still there is no self-contradiction involved in asserting the proposition "C is the cause of E" and at the same time denying that any events like C or like E ever have been observed; and this would be self-contradictory if the first of the definitions quoted was correct. Nor is it conceivable, as the second definition implies, that there should be causal laws which have never yet been thought of. But although we are obliged, for these reasons, to reject Hume's actual definitions of a cause, our view of the nature of causation remains substantially the same as his. And we agree with him that there can be no other justification for inductive reasoning than its success in practice, while insisting more strongly than he did that no better justification is required. For it is his failure to make this second point clear that has given his views the air of paradox which has caused them to be so much undervalued and misunderstood.

When we consider, also, that Hobbes and Bentham were chiefly occupied in giving definitions, and that the best part of John Stuart Mill's work consists in a development of the analyses carried out by Hume, we may fairly claim that in holding that the activity of philosophising is essentially analytic we are

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1 *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 7.*
adopting a standpoint which has always been implicit in English empiricism. Not that the practice of philosophical analysis has been confined to members of this school. But it is with them that we have the closest historical affinity.

If I refrain from discussing these questions in detail, and make no attempt to furnish a complete list of all the "great philosophers" whose work is predominantly analytic—a list which would certainly include Plato and Aristotle and Kant—it is because the point to which this discussion is relevant is one of minor importance in our enquiry. We have been maintaining that much of "traditional philosophy" is genuinely philosophical, by our standards, in order to defend ourselves against the charge that our retention of the word "philosophy" is misleading. But even if it were the case that none of those who are commonly called philosophers had ever been engaged in what we call the activity of philosophising, it would not follow that our definition of philosophy was erroneous, given our initial postulates. We may admit that our retention of the word "philosophy" is causally dependent on our belief in the historical propositions set forth above. But the validity of these historical propositions has no logical bearing on the validity of our definition of philosophy, nor on the validity of the distinction between philosophy, in our sense, and metaphysics.

It is advisable to stress the point that philosophy, as we understand it, is wholly independent of metaphysics, inasmuch as the analytic method is commonly supposed by its critics to have a metaphysical basis. Being misled by the associations of the word "analysis," they assume that philosophical analysis is an activity of dissection; that it consists in "breaking up" objects into their constituent parts, until the whole universe is ultimately exhibited as an aggregate of "bare particulars," united by external relations. If this were really so, the most effective way of attacking the method would be to show that its basic presupposition was nonsensical. For to say that the universe was an aggregate of bare particulars would be as senseless as to say that it was Fire or Water or Experience. It is plain that no possible observation would enable one to verify such an assertion. But, so far as I know, this line of criticism is in fact never adopted. The critics content themselves with pointing out that few, if any, of the complex objects in the world are simply the sum of their parts.

They have a structure, an organic unity, which distinguishes them, as genuine wholes, from mere aggregates. But the analyst, so it is said, is obliged by his atomistic metaphysics to regard an object consisting of parts a, b, c, and d in a distinctive configuration as being simply a + b + c + d, and thus gives an entirely false account of its nature.

If we follow the Gestalt psychologists, who of all men talk most constantly about genuine wholes, in defining such a whole as one in which the properties of every part depend to some extent on its position in the whole, then we may accept it as an empirical fact that there exist genuine, or organic, wholes. And if the analytic method involved a denial of this fact, it would indeed be a faulty method. But, actually, the validity of the analytic method is not dependent on any empirical, much less any metaphysical, presupposition about the nature of things. For the philosopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them.

In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character—that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects; they express definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions. Accordingly, we may say that philosophy is a department of logic. For we shall see that the characteristic mark of a purely logical enquiry is that it is concerned with the formal consequences of our definitions and not with questions of empirical fact.

It follows that philosophy does not in any way compete with science. The difference in type between philosophical and scientific propositions is such that they cannot conceivably contradict one another. And this makes it clear that the possibility of philosophical analysis is independent of any empirical assumptions. That it is independent of any metaphysical assumptions should be even more obvious still. For it is absurd to suppose that the provision of definitions, and the study of their formal consequences, involves the nonsensical assertion that the world is composed of bare particulars, or any other metaphysical dogma.

What has contributed as much as anything to the prevalent misunderstanding of the nature of philosophical analysis is the fact that propositions and questions which are really linguistic
the word “synonymous” is here used in such a way that two symbols belonging to the same language can be said to be synonymous if, and only if, the simple substitution of one symbol for the other, in any sentence in which either can significantly occur, always yields a new sentence which is equivalent to the old. And we say that two sentences of the same language are equivalent if, and only if, every sentence which is entailed by any given group of sentences in conjunction with one of them is entailed by the same group in conjunction with the other. And, in this usage of the word “entail,” a sentence s is said to entail a sentence t when the proposition expressed by t is deducible from the proposition expressed by s; while a proposition p is said to be deducible from, or to follow from, a proposition q when the denial of p contradicts the assertion of q.

The provision of these criteria enables us to see that the vast majority of the definitions which are given in ordinary discourse are explicit definitions. In particular, it is worth remarking that the process of defining *per genus et differentiam*, to which Aristotelian logicians devote so much attention, always yields definitions which are explicit in the foregoing sense. Thus, when we define an oculist as an eye-doctor, what we are asserting is that, in the English language, the two symbols “oculist” and “eye-doctor” are synonymous. And, generally speaking, all the questions that are discussed by logicians in connection with this mode of definition are concerned with the possible ways of finding synonyms in a given language for any given term. We shall not enter into these questions ourselves, because they are irrelevant to our present purpose, which is to expound the method of philosophy. For the philosopher, as we have already said, is primarily concerned with the provision, not of explicit definitions, but of definitions in use.¹

¹ We define a symbol in use, not by saying that it is synonymous with some other symbol, but by showing how the sentences in which it significantly occurs can be translated into equivalent sentences, which contain neither the *definendum* itself, nor any of its synonyms. A good illustration of this process is provided by Bertrand Russell’s so-called theory of definite descriptions, which is not a theory at all in the ordinary sense, but an indication of, the way in which all phrases of the form “the so-and-so” arc to be defined.¹ It proclaims that every sentence which contains a symbolic expression of this form can be translated into a sentence which does not contain any such expression, but does contain a sub-sentence asserting that one, and only one, object possesses a certain property, or else that no one object possesses a certain property. Thus, the sentence “The round square cannot exist!” is equivalent to “No one thing can be both square and round”; and the sentence “The author of Waverley was Scotch” is equivalent to “One person, and one person only, wrote Waverley, and that person was Scotch.”² The first of these examples provides us with a typical illustration of the way in which any definite descriptive phrase which occurs as the subject of a negative existential sentence can be eliminated; and the second, with a typical illustration of the way in which any definite descriptive phrase which occurs anywhere in any other type of sentence can be eliminated. Together, therefore, they show us how to express what is expressed by any sentence which contains a definite descriptive phrase without employing any such phrase. And thus they furnish us with a definition of these phrases in use.

The effect of this definition of descriptive phrases, as of all good definitions, is to increase our understanding of certain sentences. And this is a benefit which the author of such a definition confers not only on others, but also on himself. It might be objected that he must already understand the sentences in order to be able to define the symbols which occur in them. But this initial understanding need not amount to anything more than an ability to tell, in practice, what sort of situation verify the propositions they express. Such an understanding of sentences containing definite descriptive phrases may be possessed even by those who believe that there are existent entities, such as the round square, or the present King of France. But the fact that they do maintain this shows that their understanding of these sentences is imperfect. For their lapse into metaphysics is the outcome of the naive assumption that definite descriptive phrases are demonstrative symbols. And in the light of the clearer understanding which is afforded by Russell’s definition, we see that this assumption is false. Nor could this end have been achieved by an explicit

¹ Vide *Principia Mathematica*, Introduction, Chapter iii, and *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, Chapter xvi.

² This is not quite accurate, vide Introduction, pp. 22–4.
definition of any descriptive phrase. What was required was a translation of sentences containing such phrases which would reveal what may be called their logical complexity. In general, we may say that it is the purpose of a philosophical definition to dispel those confusions which arise from our imperfect understanding of certain types of sentence in our language, where the need cannot be met by the provision of a synonym for any symbol, either because there is no synonym, or else because the available synonyms are unclear in the same fashion as the symbol to which the confusion is due.

A complete philosophical elucidation of any language would consist, first, in enumerating the types of sentence that were significant in that language, and then in displaying the relations of equivalence that held between sentences of various types. And here it may be explained that two sentences are said to be of the same type when they can be correlated in such a way that to each symbol in one sentence there corresponds a symbol of the same type in the other; and that two symbols are said to be of the same type when it is always possible to substitute one for the other without changing a significant sentence into a piece of nonsense. Such a system of definitions in use would reveal what may be called the structure of the language in question. And thus we may regard any particular philosophical "theory," such as Russell's "theory of definite descriptions," as a revelation of part of the structure of a given language. In Russell's case, the language is the everyday English language; and any other language, such as French or German, which has the same structure as English. And, in this context, it is not necessary to draw a distinction between the spoken and the written language. As far as the validity of a philosophical definition is concerned, it does not matter whether we regard the symbol defined as being constituted by visible marks or by sounds.

A factor which complicates the structure of a language such as English is the prevalence of ambiguous symbols. A symbol is said to be ambiguous when it is constituted by signs which are identical in their sensible form, not only with one another, but also with signs which are elements of some other symbol. For what makes two signs elements of the same symbol is not merely an identity of form, but also an identity of usage. Thus, if we were guided merely by the form of the sign, we should assume that the "is" which occurs in the sentence "He is the author of that book" was the same symbol as the "is" which occurs in the sentence "A cat is a mammal." But, when we come to translate the sentences, we find that the first is equivalent to "He, and no one else, wrote that book," and the second to "The class of mammals contains the class of cats." And this shows that, in this instance, each "is" is an ambiguous symbol which must not be confused with the other, nor with the ambiguous symbols of existence, and class-membership, and identity, and entailment, which are also constituted by signs of the form "is."

To say that a symbol is constituted by signs which are identical with one another in their sensible form, and in their significance, and that a sign is a sense-content, or a series of sense-contents, which is used to convey literal meaning, is not to say that a symbol is a collection, or system, of sense-contents. For when we speak of certain objects, b, c, d. . . as being elements of an object e, and of e as being constituted by b, c, d. . . we are not saying that they form part of e, in the sense in which my arm is a part of my body, or a particular set of books on my shelf is a part of my collection of books. What we are saying is that all the sentences in which the symbol e occurs can be translated into sentences which do not contain e itself, or any symbol which is synonymous with e, but do contain symbols b, c, d. . . . In such a case we say that e is a logical construction out of b, c, d. . . . And, in general, we may explain the nature of logical constructions by saying that the introduction of symbols which denote logical constructions is a device which enables us to state complicated propositions about the elements of these constructions in a relatively simple form.

What one must not say is that logical constructions are fictitious objects. For while it is true that the English State, for example, is a logical construction out of individual people, and that the table at which I am writing is a logical construction out of sense-contents, it is not true that either the English State or this table is fictitious, in the sense in which Hamlet or a mirage is fictitious. Indeed, the assertion that tables are logical constructions out of sense-contents is not a factual assertion at all, in the sense in which the assertion that tables were fictitious objects would be a factual assertion, albeit a false one. It is, as our explanation of
the notion of a logical construction should have made clear, a
linguistic assertion, to the effect that the symbol "table" is defin-
able in terms of certain symbols which stand for sense-contents.
not explicitly, but in use. And this, as we have seen, is tantamount
to saying that sentences which contain the symbol "table," or the
corresponding symbol in any language which has the same struc-
ture as English, can all be translated into sentences of the same
language which do not contain that symbol, nor any of its
synonyms, but do contain certain symbols which stand for sense-
contents; a fact which may be loosely expressed by saying that to
say anything about a table is always to say something about sense-
contents. This does not, of course, imply that to say something
about a table is ever to say the same thing about the relevant
sense-contents. For example, the sentence, "I am now sitting in
front of a table," can, in principle, be translated into a sentence
which does not mention tables, but only sense-contents. But this
does not mean that we can simply substitute a sense-content
symbol for the symbol "table" in the original sentence. If we do
this, our new sentence, so far from being equivalent to the old,
will be a mere piece of nonsense. To obtain a sentence which is
equivalent to the sentence about the table, but refers to sense-
contents instead, the whole of the original sentence has to be
altered. And this, indeed, is implied by the fact that to say that
the symbols which stand for sense-contents, but only that it can be so
defined in use; For, as we have seen, the function of a definition
in use is not to provide us with a synonym for any symbol, but to
enable us to translate sentences of a certain type.

The problem of giving an actual rule for translating sentences
about a material thing into sentences about sense-contents, which
may be called the problem of the "reduction" of material things
to sense-contents, is the main philosophical part of the traditional
problem of perception. It is true that writers on perception who
set out to describe "the nature of a material thing" believe them-

The solution which we shall now give of this "problem of per-
ception" will serve as a further illustration of the method of philo-
osophical analysis. To simplify the question, we introduce the
following definitions. We say that two sense-contents directly
resemble one another when there is either no difference, or only
an infinitesimal difference, of quality between them; and that
they resemble one another indirectly when they are linked by
a series of direct resemblances, but are not themselves directly
resemblant, a relationship whose possibility depends on the fact
that the relative product of infinitesimal differences in quality
is an appreciable difference in quantity. And we say that two
visual, or tactual, sense-contents are directly continuous when
they belong to successive members of a series of actual, or possible,
sense-fields, and there is no difference, or only an infinitesimal
difference, between them, with respect to the position of each in

1 The relative product of two relations R and S is the relation which holds
between x and z when there is an intermediate term y such that x has the
relation R to y and y has the relation S to z. Principia Mathematica, Intro-
duction, Chapter I.
its own sense-field; and that they are indirectly continuous when they are related by an actual, or possible, series of such direct continuities. And here it should be explained that to say of a sense-experience, or a sense-field which is a part of a sense-experience, or a sense-content which is a part of a sense-field, that it is possible, as opposed to actual, is to say, not that it ever has occurred or will occur in fact, but that it would occur if certain specifiable conditions were fulfilled. So when it is said that a material thing is constituted by both actual and possible sense-contents, all that is being asserted is that the sentences referring to sense-contents, which are the translations of the sentences referring to any material thing, are both categorical and hypothetical. And thus the notion of a possible sense-content, or sense-experience, is as unobjectionable as the familiar notion of a hypothetical statement.

Relying on these preliminary definitions, one may assert with regard to any two of one's visual sense-contents, or with regard to any two of one's tactual sense-contents, that they are elements of the same material thing if, and only if, they are related to one another by a relation of direct, or indirect, resemblance in certain respects, and by a relation of direct, or indirect, continuity. And as each of these relations is asymmetrical—that is to say, a relation which cannot hold between any terms A and B without also holding between B and A—and also transitive—that is, a relation which cannot hold between a term A and another term B, and between B and another term C, without holding between A and C—it follows that the groups of visual and tactual sense-contents which are constituted by means of these relations cannot have any members in common. And this means that no visual, or tactual, sense-content can be an element of more than one material thing.

The next step in the analysis of the notion of a material thing is to show how these separate groups of visual and tactual sense-contents are correlated. And this may be effected by saying that any two of one's visual and tactual groups belong to the same material thing when every element of the visual group which is of minimal visual depth forms part of the same sense-experience as an element of the tactual group which is of minimal tactual depth. We cannot here define visual or tactual depth otherwise than ostensibly. The depth of a visual or tactual sense-content is as much a sensible property of it as its length or breadth.1 But we may describe it by saying that one visual or tactual sense-content has a greater depth than another when it is farther from the observer's body, provided that we make it clear that this is not intended to be a definition. For it would clearly vitiate any "reduction" of material things to sense-contents if the defining sentences contained references to human bodies, which are themselves material things. We, however, are obliged to mention material things when we wish to describe certain sense-contents, because the poverty of our language is such that we have no other verbal means of explaining what their properties are.

As for the sense-contents of taste, or sound, or smell, which are assigned to particular material things, they may be classified by reference to their association with tactual sense-contents. Thus, we assign sense-contents of taste to the same material things as the simultaneously occurring sense-contents of touch which are experienced by the palate, or the tongue. And in assigning an auditory or olfactory sense-content to a material thing, we remark that it is a member of a possible series of temporarily continuous sounds, or smells, of uniform quality but gradually increasing intensity; the series, namely, which one would ordinarily be said to experience in the course of moving towards the place from which the sound, or the smell, came; and we assign it to the same material thing as the tactual sense-content which is experienced at the same time as the sound, or the smell, of maximum intensity in the series.

What is next required of us, who are attempting to analyse the notion of a material thing, is the provision of a rule for translating sentences which refer to the "real" qualities of material things. Our answer is that to say of a certain quality that it is the real quality of a given material thing is to say that it characterizes those elements of the thing which are the most conveniently measured of all the elements which possess qualities of the kind in question. Thus, when I look at a coin and assert that it is really round in shape, I am not asserting that the shape of the sense-content, which is the element of the coin that I am actually observing, is round, still less that the shape of all the visual, or tactual, elements of the coin is round; what I am asserting is that roundness of shape characterizes those elements of the coin

1 See H. H. Price, Perception, p. 218.
which are experienced from the point of view from which measurements of shape are most conveniently carried out. And similarly I assert that the real colour of the paper on which I am writing is white, even though it may not always appear to be so, because white is a colour which is experienced in the conditions in which the paper which is experienced in the conditions in which the greatest discrimination of colours is possible. And, finally, we define relations of quality, or position, between material things in terms of the relations of quality, or position, which obtain between such "privileged" elements.

This definition, or, rather, this outline of a definition, of symbols which stand for material things is intended to have the same sort of effect as the definition of descriptive phrases which we gave as our original example of the process of philosophical analysis. It serves to increase our understanding of the sentences in which we refer to material things. In this case also, there is, of course, a sense in which we already understand such sentences. Those who use the English language have no difficulty, in practice, in identifying the situations which determine the truth or falsehood of such simple statements as "This is a table," or "Penny is round." But they may very well be unaware of the hidden logical complexity of such statements which our analysis of the notion of a material thing has brought to light. And, as a result, they may be led to adopt some metaphysical belief, such as the belief in the existence of material substances or invisible substrata, which is a source of confusion in all their speculative thought. And the utility of the philosophical definition which dispels such confusions is not to be measured by the apparent triviality of the sentences which it translates.

It is sometimes said that the purpose of such philosophical definitions is to reveal the meaning of certain symbols, or combinations of symbols. The objection to this way of speaking is that it does not give an unequivocal description of the philosopher's practice, because it employs, in "meaning," a highly ambiguous symbol. It is for this reason that we defined the relation of equivalence between sentences, without referring to "meaning." And, indeed, I doubt whether all the sentences which are equivalent, according to our definition, would ordinarily be said to have the same meaning. For I think that although a complex sign of the form "the sentences s and t have the same meaning" is sometimes used, or taken, to express what we express by saying "the sentences s and t are equivalent," this is not the way in which such a sign is most commonly used or interpreted. I think that if we are to use the sign "meaning" in the way in which it is most commonly used, we must not say that two sentences have the same meaning for anyone, unless the occurrence of one always has the same effect on his thoughts and actions as the occurrence of the other. And, clearly, it is possible for two sentences to be equivalent, by our criterion, without having the same effect on anyone who employs the language. For instance, "p is a law of nature" is equivalent to "p is a general hypothesis which can always be relied on"; but the associations of the symbol "law" are such that the former sentence tends to produce a very different psychological effect from its equivalent. It gives rise to a belief in the orderliness of nature, and even in the existence of a power "behind" that orderliness, which is not evoked by the equivalent sentence, and has, indeed, no rational warrant. Thus there are many people for whom these sentences do, in this common sense of "meaning," have different meanings. And this, I suspect, accounts for the widespread reluctance to admit that the laws of nature are merely hypotheses, just as the failure of some philosophers to recognise that material things are reducible to sense-contents is very largely due to the fact that no sentence which refers to sense-contents ever has the same psychological effect on them as a sentence which refers to a material thing. But, as we have seen, this is not a valid ground for denying that any two such sentences are equivalent.

Accordingly, one should avoid saying that philosophy is concerned with the meaning of symbols, because the ambiguity of "meaning" leads the unscrupulous critic to judge the result of a philosophical enquiry by a criterion which is not applicable to it, but only to an empirical enquiry concerning the psychological effect which the occurrence of certain symbols has on a certain group of people. Such empirical enquiries are, indeed, an important element in sociology and in the scientific study of a language; but they are quite distinct from the logical enquiries which constitute philosophy.

It is misleading, also, to say, as some do, that philosophy tells us how certain symbols are actually used. For this suggests that the propositions of philosophy are factual propositions concerning
the behaviour of a certain group of people; and this is not the case. The philosopher who asserts that, in the English language, the sentence "The author of Waverley was Scotch" is equivalent to "One person, and one person only, wrote Waverley, and that person was Scotch" is not asserting that all, or most, English-speaking people use these sentences interchangeably. What he is asserting is that, in virtue of certain rules of entailment, namely those which are characteristic of "correct" English, every sentence which is entailed by "The author of Waverley was Scotch." In conjunction with any given group of sentences, is entailed also by that group, in conjunction with "One person, and one person only, wrote Waverley, and that person was Scotch." That English-speaking people should employ the verbal conventions that they do is, indeed, an empirical fact. But the deduction of relations of equivalence from the rules of entailment which characterise the English, or any other, language is a purely logical activity; and it is in this logical activity, and not in any empirical study of the linguistic habits of any group of people, that philosophical analysis consists.

Thus, in specifying the language to which he intends his definitions to apply, the philosopher is simply describing the conventions from which his definitions are deduced; and the validity of the definitions depends solely on their compatibility with these conventions. In most cases, indeed, the definitions are obtained from conventions which do, in fact, correspond to the conventions which are actually observed by some group of people. And it is a necessary condition of the utility of the definitions, as a means of clarification, that this should be so. But it is a mistake to suppose that the existence of such a correspondence is ever part of what the definitions actually assert.

It is to be remarked that the process of analysing a language is facilitated if it is possible to use for the classification of its forms.

1 There is a ground for saying that the philosopher is always concerned with an artificial language. For the conventions which we follow in our actual usage of words are not altogether systematic and precise.

2 Thus if I wish to refute a philosophical opponent I do not argue about people's linguistic habits. I try to prove that his definitions involve a contradiction. Suppose, for example, that he is maintaining that "A is a free agent" is equivalent to "A's actions are uncaused." Then I refute him by getting him to admit that "A is a free agent" is entailed by "A is morally responsible for his actions" whereas "A's actions are uncaused" entails "A is not morally responsible for his actions."

but an artificial system of symbols whose structure is known. The best-known example of such a symbolism is the so-called system of logical which was employed by Russell and Whitehead in their Principia Mathematica. But it is not necessary that the language in which analysis is carried out should be different from the language analysed. If it were, we should be obliged to suppose, as Russell once suggested, "that every language has a structure concerning which, in the language, nothing can be said, but that there may be another language dealing with the structure of the first language, and having itself a new structure, and that to this hierarchy of languages there may be no limit." This was written presumably in the belief that an attempt to refer to the structure of a language in the language itself would lead to the occurrence of logical paradoxes. But Carnap, by actually carrying out such an analysis, has subsequently shown that a language cannot without self-contradiction be used in the analysis of itself.

CHAPTER IV

THE A PRIORI

The view of philosophy which we have adopted may, I think, fairly be described as a form of empiricism. For it is characteristic of an empirist to eschew metaphysics, on the ground that every factual proposition must refer to sense-experience. And even if the conception of philosophizing as an activity of analysis is not to be discovered in the traditional theories of empiricism, we have seen that it is implicit in their practice. At the same time, it must be made clear that, in calling ourselves empiricists, we are not avowing a belief in any of the psychological doctrines which are commonly associated with empiricism.

For even if these doctrines were valid, their validity would be independent of the validity of any philosophical thesis. It could

1 Introduction to L. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, p. 22.

2 Concerning logical paradoxes, see Russell and Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, Introduction, Chapter ii; F. F. Ramsey, Foundations of Mathematics, pp. 1-63; and Lewis and Langford, Symbolic Logic, Chapter xii.

3 Viere Logische Syntax der Sprache, Parts I and II.
be established only by observation, and not by the purely logical considerations upon which our empiricism rests.

Having admitted that we are empiricists, we must now deal with the objection that is commonly brought against all forms of empiricism; the objection, namely, that it is impossible on empiristic principles to account for our knowledge of necessary truths. For, as Hume conclusively showed, no general proposition whose validity is subject to the test of actual experience can ever be logically certain. No matter how often it is verified in practice, there still remains the possibility that it will be contradicted on some future occasion. The fact that a law has been substantiated in n - 1 cases affords no logical guarantee that it will be substantiated in the nth case also, no matter how large we take n to be. And this means that no general proposition referring to a matter of fact can ever be shown to be necessarily and universally true. It can at best be a probable hypothesis. And this, we shall find, applies not only to general propositions, but to all propositions which have a factual content. They can none of them ever become logically certain. This conclusion, which we shall elaborate later on, is one which must be accepted by every consistent empiricist. It is often thought to involve him in complete scepticism; but this is not the case. For the fact that the validity of a proposition cannot be logically guaranteed in no way entails that it is irrational for us to believe it. On the contrary, what is irrational is to look for a guarantee where none can be forthcoming; to demand certainty where probability is all that is obtainable. We have already remarked upon this, in referring to the work of Hume. And we shall make the point clearer when we come to treat of probability, in explaining the use which we make of empirical propositions. We shall discover that there is nothing perverse or paradoxical about the view that all the "truths" of science and common sense are hypotheses; and consequently that the fact that it involves this view constitutes no objection to the empiricist thesis.

Where the empiricist does encounter difficulty is in connection with the truths of formal logic and mathematics. For whereas a scientific generalisation is readily admitted to be fallible, the truths of mathematics and logic appear to everyone to be necessary and certain. But if empiricism is correct no proposition which has a factual content can be necessary or certain. Accordingly the empiricist must deal with the truths of logic and mathematics in one of the two following ways: he must say either that they are not necessary truths, in which case he must account for the universal conviction that they are; or he must say that they have no factual content, and then he must explain how a proposition which is empty of all factual content can be true and useful and surprising.

If neither of those courses proves satisfactory, we shall be obliged to give way to rationalism. We shall be obliged to admit that there are some truths about the world which we can know independently of experience; that there are some properties which we can ascribe to all objects, even though we cannot conceivably observe that all objects have them. And we shall have to accept it as a mysterious inexplicable fact that our thought has this power to reveal to us authoritatively the nature of objects which we have never observed. Or else we must accept the Kantian explanation which, apart from the epistemological difficulties which we have already touched on, only pushes the mystery a stage further back.

It is clear that any such concession to rationalism would upset the main argument of this book. For the admission that there were some facts about the world which could be known independently of experience would be incompatible with our fundamental contention that a sentence says nothing unless it is empirically verifiable. And thus the whole force of our attack on metaphysics would be destroyed. It is vital, therefore, for us to be able to show that one or other of the empiricist accounts of the propositions of logic and mathematics is correct. If we are successful in this, we shall have destroyed the foundations of rationalism. For the fundamental tenet of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge, and is moreover a more trustworthy source of knowledge than experience; indeed some rationalists have gone so far as to say that thought is the only source of knowledge. And the ground for this view is simply that the only necessary truths about the world which are known to us are known through thought and not through experience. So that if we can show either that the truths in question are not necessary or that they are not "truths about the world," we shall be taking away the support on which rationalism rests. We shall be making good the empiricist contention that there are no "truths of reason" which refer to matters of fact.
The course of maintaining that the truths of logic and mathematics are not necessary or certain was adopted by Mill. He maintained that these propositions were inductive generalizations based on an extremely large number of instances. The fact that the number of supporting instances was so very large accounted, in his view, for our believing these generalizations to be necessarily and universally true. The evidence in their favour was so strong that it seemed incredible to us that a contrary instance should ever arise. Nevertheless it was in principle possible for such generalizations to be confuted. They were highly probable, but, being inductive generalizations, they were not certain. The difference between them and the hypotheses of natural science was a difference in degree and not in kind. Experience gave us a very good reason to suppose that a “truth” of mathematics or logic was true universally; but we were not possessed of a guarantee. For these “truths” were only empirical hypotheses. For these “truths” were only empirical hypotheses.

Experience gave us a very good reason to suppose that a “truth” of mathematics or logic was true universally; but we were not possessed of a guarantee. For these “truths” were only empirical hypotheses.

I do not think that this solution of the empiricist’s difficulty with regard to the propositions of logic and mathematics is acceptable. In discussing it, it is necessary to make a distinction which is perhaps already enshrined in Kant’s famous dictum that, although there can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. When we say that the truths of logic are known independently of experience, we are not of course saying that they are innate, in the sense that we are born knowing them. It is obvious that mathematics and logic have to be learned in the same way as chemistry and history have to be learned. Nor are we denying, for example, that the principle of the syllogism was formulated not before but after the validity of syllogistic reasoning had been observed in a number of particular cases. What we are discussing, however, when we say that logical and mathematical truths are known independently of experience, is not a historical question concerning the way in which these truths were originally discovered, nor a psychological question concerning the way in which each of us comes to learn them, but an epistemological question. The contention of Mill’s which we reject is that the propositions of logic and mathematics have the same status as empirical hypotheses; that their validity is determined in the same way. We maintain that they are independent of experience in the sense that they do not owe their validity to empirical verification. We may come to discover them through an inductive process; but once we have apprehended them we see that they are necessarily true, that they hold good for every conceivable instance. And this serves to distinguish them from empirical generalizations. For we know that a proposition whose validity depends upon experience cannot be seen to be necessarily and universally true.

In rejecting Mill’s theory, we are obliged to be somewhat dogmatic. We can do no more than state the issue clearly and then trust that his contention will be seen to be discrepant with the relevant logical facts. The following considerations may serve to show that of the two ways of dealing with logic and mathematics which are open to the empiricist, the one which Mill adopted is not the one which is correct.

The best way to substantiate our assertion that the truths of formal logic and pure mathematics are necessarily true is to examine cases in which they might seem to be confused. It might easily happen, for example, that when I came to count what I had taken to be five pairs of objects, I found that they amounted only to nine. And if I wished to mislead people I might say that on this occasion twice five was not ten. But in that case I should not be using the complex sign “2 × 5 = 10” in the way in which it is ordinarily used. I should be taking it not as the expression of a purely mathematical proposition, but as the expression of an empirical generalization, to the effect that whenever I counted what appeared to me to be five pairs of objects I discovered that they were ten in number. This generalization may very well be false. But if it proved false in a given case, one would not say that the mathematical proposition “2 × 5 = 10” had been confuted. One would say that I was wrong in supposing that there were five pairs of objects to start with, or that one of the objects had been taken away while I was counting, or that two of them had coalesced, or that I had counted wrongly. One would adopt as an explanation whatever empirical hypothesis fitted in best with the accredited facts. The one explanation which would in no
circumstances be adopted is that ten is not always the product of two and five.

To take another example: if what appears to be a Euclidean triangle is found by measurement not to have angles totalling 180 degrees, we do not say that we have met with an instance which invalidates the mathematical proposition that the sum of the three angles of a Euclidean triangle is 180 degrees. We say that we have measured wrongly, or, more probably, that the triangle we have been measuring is not Euclidean. And this is our procedure in every case in which a mathematical truth might appear to be confused. We always preserve its validity by adopting some other explanation of the occurrence.

The same thing applies to the principles of formal logic. We may take an example relating to the so-called law of excluded middle, which states that a proposition must be either true or false, or, in other words, that it is impossible that a proposition and its contradictory should neither of them be true. One might suppose that a proposition of the form “x has stopped doing y” would in certain cases constitute an exception to this law. For instance, if my friend has never yet written to me, it seems fair to say that it is neither true nor false that he has stopped writing to me. But in fact one would refuse to accept such an instance as an invalidation of the law of excluded middle. One would point out that the proposition “My friend has stopped writing to me” is not a simple proposition, but the conjunction of the two propositions “My friend wrote to me in the past” and “My friend does not write to me now”; and, furthermore, that the proposition “My friend has not stopped writing to me” is not, as it appears to be, contradictory to “My friend has stopped writing to me,” but only contrary to it. For it means “My friend wrote to me in the past, and he still writes to me.” When, therefore, we say that such a proposition as “My friend has stopped writing to me” is sometimes neither true nor false, we are speaking inaccurately. For we seem to be saying that neither it nor its contradictory is true. Whereas what we mean, or anyhow should mean, is that neither it nor its apparent contradictory is true. And its apparent contradictory is really only its contrary. Thus we preserve the law of excluded middle by showing that the negating of a sentence does not always yield the contradictory of the proposition originally expressed.

There is no need to give further examples. Whatever instance we care to take, we shall always find that the situations in which a logical or mathematical principle might appear to be confused are accounted for in such a way as to leave the principle unassailed. And this indicates that Mill was wrong in supposing that a situation could arise which would overthrow a mathematical truth. The principles of logic and mathematics are true universally simply because we never allow them to be anything else. And the reason for this is that we cannot abandon them without contradicting ourselves, without sinning against the rules which govern the use of language, and so making our utterances self-contradictory. In other words, the truths of logic and mathematics are analytic propositions or tautologies. In saying this we are making what will be held to be an extremely controversial statement, and we must now proceed to make its implications clear.

The most familiar definition of an analytic proposition, or judgement, as he called it, is that given by Kant. He said that an analytic judgement was one in which the predicate B belonged to the subject A as something which was covertly contained in the concept of A. He contrasted analytic with synthetic judgements, in which the predicate B lay outside the subject A, although it did stand in connection with it. Analytic judgements, he explains, “add nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely break it up into those constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it, although confusedly.” Synthetic judgements, on the other hand, “add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any wise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it.” Kant gives “all bodies are extended” as an example of an analytic judgement, on the ground that the required predicate can be extracted from the concept of “body,” “in accordance with the principle of contradiction”; as an example of a synthetic judgement, he gives “all bodies are heavy.” He refers also to “7 + 5 = 12” as a synthetic judgement, on the ground that the concept of twelve is by no means already thought in merely thinking the union of seven and five. And he appears to regard this as tantamount to saying that the judgement does not rest on the principle of contradiction alone. He holds, also, that through analytic judgements our knowledge is not extended as it is

1 Critique of Pure Reason, and ed., Introduction, sections iv and v.
through synthetic judgements. For in analytic judgements “the concept which I already have is merely set forth and made intelligible to me.”

I think that this is a fair summary of Kant’s account of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, but I do not think that it succeeds in making the distinction clear. For even if we pass over the difficulties which arise out of the use of the vague term “concept,” and the unwarranted assumption that every judgement, as well as every German or English sentence, can be said to have a subject and a predicate, there remains still this crucial defect. Kant does not give one straightforward criterion for distinguishing between analytic and synthetic propositions; he gives two distinct criteria, which are by no means equivalent. Thus his ground for holding that the proposition “7+5=12” is synthetic is, as we have seen, that the subjective intension of “+” does not comprise the subjective intension of “12”; whereas his ground for holding that “all bodies are extended” is that it is analytic proposition is that it rests on the principle of contradiction alone. That is, he employs a psychological criterion in the first of these examples, and a logical criterion in the second, and this the equivalence for granted. But, in fact, a proposition which is synthetic according to the former criterion may very well be analytic according to the latter. For, as we have already pointed out, it is possible for symbols to be synonymous without having the same intensional meaning for anyone; and accordingly from the fact that one can think of the sum of seven and five without necessarily thinking of twelve, it by no means follows that the proposition “7+5=12” can be denied without self-contradiction. From the rest of his argument, it is clear that it is this logical proposition, and not any psychological proposition, that Kant is really anxious to establish. His use of the psychological criterion leads him to think that he has established it, when he has not.

I think that we can preserve the logical import of Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, while avoiding the confusion which mar his actual account of it, if we say that a proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains, and synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts of experience. Thus, the proposition “There are ants which have established a system of slavery” is a synthetic proposition. For we cannot tell whether it is true or false merely by considering the definitions of the symbols which constitute it. We have to resort to actual observation of the behaviour of ants. On the other hand, the proposition “Either some ants are parasitic or none are” is a synthetic proposition. For one need not resort to observation to discover that there either are or are not ants which are parasitic. If one knows what is the function of the words “either,” “or,” and “not,” then one can see that any proposition of the form “Either p is true or p is not true” is valid, independently of experience. Accordingly, all such propositions are analytic.

It is to be noticed that the proposition “Either some ants are parasitic or none are” provides no information whatsoever about the behaviour of ants, or, indeed, about any matter of fact. And this applies to all analytic propositions. They none of them provide any information about any matter of fact. In other words, they are entirely devoid of factual content. And it is for this reason that no experience can confute them.

When we say that analytic propositions are devoid of factual content, and consequently that they say nothing, we are not suggesting that they are senseless in the way that metaphysical utterances are senseless. For, although they give us no information about any empirical situation, they do enlighten us by illustrating the way in which we use certain symbols. Thus if I say, “Nothing can be coloured in different ways at the same time with respect to the same part of itself,” I am not saying anything about the properties of any actual thing; but I am not saying nonsense. I am expressing a natural proposition, which records our determination to call a colour expande which differs in quality from a neighbouring colour expande a different part of a given thing. In other words, I am simply calling attention to the implications of a certain linguistic usage. Similarly, in saying that if all Bretons are Frenchmen, and all Frenchmen Europeans, then all Bretons are Europeans, I am not describing any matter of fact. Rather I am showing that in the statement that all Bretons are Frenchmen, and all Frenchmen Europeans, the further statement that all Bretons are Europeans is implicitly contained. And I am thereby indicating the convention which governs our usage of the words “if” and “all.”
it was actually concerned with was the formal relationship of classes, as is shown by the fact that all its principles of inference are subsumed in the Boolean class-calculus, which is subsumed in its turn in the propositional calculus of Russell and Whitehead. Their system, expounded in *Principia Mathematica*, makes it clear that formal logic is not concerned with the properties of men's minds, much less with the properties of material objects, but simply with the possibility of combining propositions by means of logical particles into analytic propositions, and with studying the formal relationship of these analytic propositions, in virtue of which one is deducible from another. Their procedure is to exhibit the propositions of formal logic as a deductive system, based on five primitive propositions, subsequently reduced in number to one. Hereby the distinction between logical truths and principles of inference, which was maintained in the Aristotelian logic, very properly disappears. Every principle of inference is put forward as a logical truth and every logical truth can serve as a principle of inference. The three Aristotelian "laws of thought," the law of identity, the law of excluded middle, and the law of non-contradiction, are incorporated in the system, but they are not considered more important than the other analytic propositions. They are not reckoned among the premises of the system. And the system of Russell and Whitehead itself is probably only one among many possible logics, each of which is composed of tautologies as interesting to the logician as the arbitrarily selected Aristotelian "laws of thought." *2*

A point which is not sufficiently brought out by Russell, if indeed it is recognised by him at all, is that every logical proposition is valid in its own right. Its validity does not depend on its being incorporated in a system, and deduced from certain propositions which are taken as self-evident. The construction of systems of logic is useful as a means of discovering and certifying analytic propositions, but it is not in principle essential even for this purpose. For it is possible to conceive of a symbolism in which every analytic proposition could be seen to be analytic in virtue of its form alone.

The fact that the validity of an analytic proposition in no way

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*2* Vide Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic*, Chapter vii, for an elaboration of this point.
depends on its being deducible from other analytic propositions is our justification for disregarding the question whether the propositions of mathematics are reducible to propositions of formal logic, in the way that Russell supposed. For even if it is the case that the definition of a cardinal number as a class of classes similar to a given class is circular, and it is not possible to reduce mathematical notions to purely logical notions, it will still remain true that the propositions of mathematics are analytic propositions. They will form a special class of analytic propositions, containing special terms, but they will be none the less analytic for that. For the criterion of an analytic proposition is that its validity should follow simply from the definitions of the terms contained in it, and this condition is fulfilled by the propositions of pure mathematics.

The mathematical propositions which one might most pardonably suppose to be synthetic are the propositions of geometry. For it is natural for us to think, as Kant thought, that geometry is the study of the properties of physical space, and consequently that its propositions have factual content. And if we believe this, and also recognise that the truths of geometry are necessary and certain, then we may be inclined to accept Kant’s hypothesis that space is the form of intuition of our outer sense, a form imposed by us on the matter of sensation, as the only possible explanation of our a priori knowledge of these synthetic propositions. But while the view that pure geometry is concerned with physical space was plausible enough in Kant’s day, when the geometry of Euclid was the only geometry known, the subsequent invention of non-Euclidean geometries has shown it to be mistaken. We see now that the axioms of a geometry are simply definitions, and that the theorems of a geometry are simply, the logical consequences of these definitions. A geometry is not in itself about physical space; in itself it cannot be said to be “about” anything. But we can use a geometry to reason about physical space. That is, to say, once we have given the axioms a physical interpretation, we can proceed to apply the theorems to the objects which satisfy the axioms. Whether a geometry can be applied to the actual physical world or not, is an empirical question which falls outside the scope of the geometry itself. There is no sense, therefore, in asking which of the various geometries known to us are false and which are true. In so far as they are all free from contradiction, they are all true. What one can ask is which of them is the most useful on any given occasion, which of them can be applied most easily and most fruitfully to an actual empirical situation. But the proposition which states that a certain application of a geometry is possible is not itself a proposition of that geometry. All that the geometry itself tells us is that if anything can be brought under the definitions, it will also satisfy the theorems. It is therefore a purely logical system, and its propositions are purely analytic propositions.

It might be objected that the use made of diagrams in geometrical treatises shows that geometrical reasoning is not purely abstract and logical, but depends on our intuition of the properties of figures. In fact, however, the use of diagrams is not essential to completely rigorous geometry. The diagrams are introduced as an aid to our reason. They provide us with a particular application of the geometry, and so assist us to perceive the more general truth that the axioms of the geometry involve certain consequences. But the fact that most of us need the help of an example to make us aware of those consequences does not show that the relation between them and the axioms is not a purely logical relation. It shows merely that our intellects are unequal to the task of carrying out very abstract processes of reasoning without the assistance of intuition. In other words, it has no bearing on the nature of geometrical propositions, but is simply an empirical fact about ourselves. Moreover, the appeal to intuition, though generally of psychological value, is also a source of danger to the geometry. He is tempted to make assumptions which are accidentally true of the particular figure he is taking as an illustration, but do not follow from his axioms. It has, indeed, been shown that Euclid himself was guilty of this, and consequently that the presence of the figure is essential to some of his proofs. This shows that his system is not, as he presents it, completely rigorous, although of course it can be made so. It does not show that the presence of the figure is essential to a truly rigorous geometrical proof. To suppose that it did would be to take as a necessary feature of all geometries what is really only an incidental defect in one particular geometrical system.

1 Vide Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Chapter ii.
2 cf. H. Poincaré, La Science et l'Hypothèse, Part II, Chapter iii.
We conclude, then, that the propositions of pure geometry are analytic. And this leads us to reject Kant's hypothesis that geometry deals with the form of intuition of our outer sense. For the ground for this hypothesis was that it alone explained how the propositions of geometry could be both true a priori and synthetic: and we have seen that they are not synthetic. Similarly, our view that the propositions of arithmetic are not synthetic but analytic leads us to reject the Kantian hypothesis that arithmetic is concerned with the pure intuition of time, the form of our inner sense. And thus we are able to dismiss Kant's transcendental aesthetic without having to bring forward the epistemological difficulties which it is commonly said to involve. For the only argument which can be brought in favour of Kant's theory is that it alone explains certain "facts." And now we have found that the "facts" which it purports to explain are not facts at all. For while it is true that we have a priori knowledge of necessary propositions, it is not true, as Kant supposed, that any of these necessary propositions are synthetic. They are without exception analytic propositions, or, in other words, tautologies.

We have already explained how it is that these analytic propositions are necessary and certain. We saw that the reason why they cannot be confused in experience is that they do not make any assertion about the empirical world. They simply record our determination to use words in a certain fashion. We cannot deny them without infringing the conventions which are presupposed by our very denial, and so falling into self-contradiction. And this is the sole ground of their necessity. As Wittgenstein puts it, our justification for holding that the world could not conceivably disobey the laws of logic is simply that we could not say of an unlogical world how it would look. And just as the validity of an analytic proposition is independent of the nature of the external world; so is it independent of the nature of our minds. It is perfectly conceivable that we should have employed different linguistic conventions from those which we actually do employ. But whatever these conventions might be, the tautologies in which we recorded them would always be necessary. For any denial of them would be self-attaining.

1 This hypothesis is not mentioned in the Critique of Pure Reason, but was maintained by Kant at an earlier date.
2 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 309.

We see, then, that there is nothing mysterious about the apodictic certainty of logic and mathematics. Our knowledge that no observation can ever confute the proposition "7+5=12" depends simply on the fact that the symbolic expression "7+5" is synonymous with "12," just as our knowledge that every oculist is an eye-doctor depends on the fact that the symbol "eye-doctor" is synonymous with "oculist." And the same explanation holds good for every other a priori truth.

What is mysterious at first sight is that these tautologies should on occasion be so surprising, that there should be in mathematics and logic the possibility of invention and discovery. As Poincaré says: "If all the assertions which mathematics puts forward can be derived from one another by formal logic, mathematics cannot amount to anything more than an immense tautology. Logical inference can teach us nothing essentially new, and if everything is to proceed from the principle of identity, everything must be reducible to it. But can we really allow that these theorems which fill so many books serve no other purpose than to say in a round-about fashion 'A = A'?" Poincaré finds this incredible. His own theory is that the sense of invention and discovery in mathematics belongs to it in virtue of mathematical induction, the principle that what is true for the number 1, and true for n+1 when it is true for n, is true for all numbers. And he claims that this is a synthetic a priori principle. It is, in fact, a priori, but it is not synthetic. It is a defining principle of the natural numbers, serving to distinguish them from such numbers as the infinite cardinal numbers, to which it cannot be applied. Moreover, we must remember that discoveries can be made, not only in arithmetic, but also in geometry and formal logic, where no use is made of mathematical induction. So that even if Poincaré were right about mathematical induction, he would not have provided a satisfactory explanation of the paradox that a mere body of tautologies can be so interesting and so surprising.

The true explanation is very simple. The power of logic and mathematics to surprise us depends, like their usefulness, on the limitations of our reason. A being whose intellect was infinitely

1 La Science et l'Hypothèse, Part I, Chapter i.
2 This was wrongly stated in previous editions as "true for n when it is true for n+1."
3 cf. B. Russell's Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Chapter iii, p. 27.
powerful would take no interest in logic and mathematics. For he would be able to see at a glance everything that his definitions implied, and, accordingly, could never learn anything from logical inference which he was not fully conscious of already. But our intellects are not of this order. It is only a minute proportion of the consequences of our definitions that we are able to detect at a glance. Even so simple a tautology as “91 times 79 equals 7189” is beyond the scope of our immediate apprehension. To assure ourselves that “7189” is synonymous with “91 times 79” we have to resort to calculation, which is simply a process of tautological transformation—that is, a process by which we change the form of expressions without altering their significance. The multiplication tables are rules for carrying out this process in arithmetic, just as the laws of logic are rules for the tautological transformation of sentences expressed in logical symbolism or in ordinary language. As the process of calculation is carried out more or less mechanically, it is easy for us to make a slip and so unwittingly contradict ourselves. And this accounts for the existence of logical and mathematical “falsehoods,” which otherwise might appear paradoxical. Clearly the risk of error in logical reasoning is proportionate to the length and the complexity of the process of calculation. And in the same way, the more complex an analytic proposition is, the more chance it has of interesting and surprising us.

It is easy to see that the danger of error in logical reasoning can be minimized by the introduction of symbolic devices, which enable us to express highly complex tautologies in a conveniently simple form. And this gives us an opportunity for the exercise of invention in the pursuit of logical enquiries. For a well-chosen definition will call our attention to analytic truths, which would otherwise have escaped us. And the framing of definitions which are useful and fruitful may well be regarded as a creative act.

Having thus shown that there is no inexplicable paradox involved in the view that the truths of logic and mathematics are all of them analytic, we may safely adopt it as the only satisfactory explanation of their a priori necessity. And in adopting it we vindicate the empiricist claim that there can be no a priori knowledge of reality. For we show that the truths of pure reason, the propositions which we know to be valid independently of all experience, are so only in virtue of their lack of factual content. To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology. And tautologies, though they may serve to guide us in our empirical search for knowledge, do not in themselves contain any information about any matter of fact.

CHAPTER V

TRUTH AND PROBABILITY

Having shown how the validity of a priori propositions is determined, we shall now put forward the criterion which is used to determine the validity of empirical propositions. In this way we shall complete our theory of truth. For it is easy to see that the purpose of a “theory of truth” is simply to describe the criteria by which the validity of the various kinds of propositions is determined. And as all propositions are either empirical or a priori, and we have already dealt with the a priori, all that is now required to complete our theory of truth is an indication of the way in which we determine the validity of empirical propositions. And this we shall shortly proceed to give.

But first of all we ought, perhaps, to justify our assumption that the object of a “theory of truth” can only be to show how propositions are validated. For it is commonly supposed that the business of the philosopher who concerns himself with “truth” is to answer the question “What is truth?” and that it is only an answer to this question that can fairly be said to constitute a “theory of truth.” But when we come to consider what this famous question actually entails, we find that it is not a question which gives rise to any genuine problem; and consequently that no theory can be required to deal with it.

We have already remarked that all questions of the form, “What is the nature of a?” are requests for a definition of a symbol in use, and that to ask for a definition of a symbol x in use is to ask how the sentences in which x occurs are to be translated into
equivalent sentences, which do not contain $x$ or any of its synonyms. Applying this to the case of “truth” we find that to ask, “What is truth?” is to ask for such a translation of the sentence “(the proposition) $p$ is true.”

It may be objected here that we are ignoring the fact that it is not merely propositions that can be said to be true or false, but also statements and assertions and judgements and assumptions and opinions and beliefs. The answer to this is that to say that a belief, or a statement, or a judgement, is true is always an elliptical way of ascribing truth to a proposition, which is believed, or stated, or judged. Thus, if I say that the Marxist’s belief that capitalism leads to war is true, what I am saying is that the proposition, believed by Marxists, that capitalism leads to war is true; and the illustration holds good when the word “opinion” or “assumption,” or any of the others in the list, is substituted for the word “belief.” And, further, it must be made clear that we are not hereby committing ourselves to the metaphysical doctrine that propositions are real entities. Regarding classes as a species of logical constructions, we may define a proposition as a class of sentences which have the same intensional significance for anyone who understands them. Thus, the sentences “I am ill,” “Ich bin krank,” “Je suis malade,” are all elements of the proposition “I am ill.” And what we have previously said about logical constructions should make it clear that we are not asserting that a proposition is a collection of sentences, but rather that to speak about a given proposition is a way of speaking about certain sentences, just as to speak about sentences, in this usage, is a way of speaking about particular signs.

Reverting to the analysis of truth, we find that in all sentences of the form “$p$ is true,” the phrase “is true” is logically superfluous. When, for example, one says that the proposition “Queen Anne is dead” is true, all that one is saying is that Queen Anne is dead. And similarly, when one says that the proposition “Oxford is the capital of England” is false, all that one is saying is that Oxford is not the capital of England. Thus, to say that a proposition is true is just to assert it, and to say that it is false is just to assert its contradictory. And this indicates that the terms “true” and “false” connote nothing, but function in the sentence simply as marks of assertion and denial. And in that case there can be no sense in asking us to analyse the concept of “truth.”

This point seems almost too obvious to mention, yet the preoccupation of philosophers with the “problem of truth” shows that they have overlooked it. Their excuse is that references to truth generally occur in sentences whose grammatical forms suggest that the word “true” does stand for a genuine quality or relation. And a superficial consideration of these sentences might lead one to suppose that there was something more in the question “What is truth?” than a demand for the analysis of the sentence “$p$ is true.” But when one comes to analyse the sentences in question, one always finds that they contain sub-sentences of the form “$p$ is true” or “$p$ is false,” and that when they are translated in such a way as to make these sub-sentences explicit, they contain no other mention of truth. Thus, to take two typical examples, the sentence “A proposition is not made true by being believed” is equivalent to “for no value of $p$ or $x$, is $x$ believes $p$.” And the sentence “Truth is sometimes stranger than fiction” is equivalent to “There are values of $p$ and $q$ such that $p$ is true and $q$ is false and $p$ is more surprising than $q$.” And the same result would be yielded by any other example one cared to take. In every case the analysis of the sentence would confirm our assumption that the question “What is truth?” is reducible to the question “What is the analysis of the sentence “$p$ is true”?” And it is plain that this question raises no genuine problem, since we have shown that to say that $p$ is true is simply a way of asserting $p$.

We conclude, then, that there is no problem of truth as it is ordinarily conceived. The traditional conception of truth as a “real quality” or a “real relation” is due, like most philosophical mistakes, to a failure to analyse sentences correctly. There are sentences, such as the two we have just analysed, in which the word “truth” seems to stand for something real; and this leads the speculative philosopher to enquire what this “something” is. Naturally he fails to obtain a satisfactory answer, since his question is illegitimate. For our analysis has shown that the word “truth” does not stand for anything, in the way which such a question requires.

1 For a criticism of this doctrine, see G. Ryle, “Are there propositions?” Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1929-30.

It follows that if all theories of truth were theories about the "real quality" or the "real relation," which the word "truth" is naively supposed to stand for, they would be all nonsense. But in fact they are for the most part theories of an entirely different sort. Whatever question their authors may think that they are discussing, what they are really discussing most of the time is the question "What makes a proposition true or false?" And this is a loose way of expressing the question "With regard to any proposition $p$, what are the conditions in which $p$ (is true) and what are the conditions in which not-$p$?" In other words, it is a way of asking how propositions are validated. And this is the question which we were considering when we embarked on our digression about the analysis of truth.

In saying that we propose to show "how propositions are validated," we do not of course mean to suggest that all propositions are validated in the same way. On the contrary we lay stress on the fact that the criterion by which we determine the validity of an a priori or analytic proposition is not sufficient to determine the validity of an empirical or synthetic proposition. For it is characteristic of empirical propositions that their validity is not purely formal. To say that a geometrical proposition, or a system of geometrical propositions, is false is to say that it is self-contradictory. But an empirical proposition, or a system of empirical propositions, may be free from contradiction, and still be false. It is said to be false, not because it is formally defective, but because it fails to satisfy some material criterion. And it is our business to discover what this criterion is.

We have been assuming so far that empirical propositions, though they differ from a priori propositions in their method of validation, do not differ in this respect among themselves. Having found that all a priori propositions are validated in the same way, we have taken it for granted that this holds good of empirical propositions also. But this assumption would be challenged by a great many philosophers who agree with us in most other respects.\footnote{\textit{E.g.}, M. Schlick, "Über das Fundament der Erscheinungen," \textit{Erkenntnis}, Band IV, Heft II; \textit{and "Facts and Propositions," Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 5; and B. von Kahr, "Empiricism and Physicalism," Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 6.}} They would say that among empirical propositions, there was a special class of propositions whose validity consisted in the fact that they directly recorded an immediate experience.

They maintain that these propositions, which we may call ("ostensive") propositions, are not mere hypotheses but are absolutely certain. For they are supposed to be purely demonstrative in character, and so incapable of being refuted by any subsequent experience. And they are, on this view, the only empirical propositions which are certain. The rest are hypotheses which derive what validity they have from their relationship to the ostensive propositions. For their probability is held to be determined by the number and variety of the ostensive propositions which can be deduced from them.

That no synthetic proposition which is not purely ostensive can be logically indubitable, may be granted without further ado. What we cannot admit is that any synthetic proposition can be purely ostensive.\footnote{\textit{See also} Rudolf Carnap, "Über Protokollikus," \textit{Erkenntnis}, Band III; Otto Neurath, "Protokollikus," \textit{Erkenntnis}, Band III; \textit{and "Radikaler Physicalismus und 'Wirkliche Welt,'" Erkenntnis, Band IV, Heft V; and Carl Hempel, "On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," \textit{Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 4.} } The notion of an ostensive proposition appears to involve a contradiction in terms. It implies that there could be a sentence which consisted of purely demonstrative symbols and was at the same time intelligible. And this is not even a logical possibility. A sentence which consisted of demonstrative symbols would not express a genuine proposition. It would be a mere ejaculation, in no way characterizing that to which it was supposed to refer.\footnote{This question is reviewed in the Introduction, pp. 10-11.}

The fact is that one cannot in language point to an object without describing it. If a sentence is to express a proposition, it cannot merely name a situation; it must say something about it. And in describing a situation, one is not merely "registering" a sense-content; one is classifying it in some way or other, and this means going beyond what is immediately given. But a proposition would be ostensive only if it recorded what was immediately experienced, without referring in any way beyond. And as this is not possible, it follows that no genuine synthetic proposition can be ostensive, and consequently that none can be absolutely certain.

Accordingly we hold not merely that no ostensive propositions ever are expressed, but that it is inconceivable that any ostensive proposition ever should be expressed. That no ostensive propositions ever are expressed might be admitted even by those who
believe in them. They might allow that in actual practice one
never limits oneself to describing the qualities of an immediately
presented sense-content, but always treats it as if it were a
material thing. And it is obvious that the propositions in which
we formulate our ordinary judgements about material things are
not ostensive, referring as they do to an infinite series of actual
sense-contents. But it is in principle possible to
formulate propositions which simply describe the qualities of
sense-contents without expressing perceptual judgements. And it
is claimed that these artificial propositions would be genuinely
ostensive. It should be clear from what we have already said that
this claim is unjustified. If any doubt on this point still
remains, we may remove it with the help of an example.

Let us suppose that I assert the proposition “This is white,”
and my words are taken to refer, not, as they normally would, to
some material thing, but to a sense-content. Then what I am
saying about this sense-content is that it is an element in the class
of sense-contents which constitutes “white” for me; or in other
words that it is similar in colour to certain other sense-contents,
namely those which I should call, or actually have called, white.
And I think I am saying also that it corresponds in some fashion
to the sense-contents which go to constitute “white” for other
people: so that if I discovered that I had an abnormal colour-
sense, I should admit that the sense-content in question was not
white. But even if we exclude all reference to other people, it is
still possible to think of a situation which would lead me to
suppose that my classification of a sense-content was mistaken.
I might, for example, have discovered that whenever I sensed
a sense-content of a certain quality, I made some distinctive
overt bodily movement; and I might on one occasion be pre-

dented with a sense-content which I asserted to be of that quality,
and then fail to make the bodily reaction which I had come to
associate with it. In such a case I should probably abandon the
hypothesis that sense-contents of that quality always called out
in me the bodily reaction in question. But I should not, logically,
be obliged to abandon it. If I found it more convenient, I could
save this hypothesis by assuming that I really did make the
reaction, although I did not notice it, or, alternatively, that the
sense-content did not have the quality I asserted it to have.
The fact that this course is a possible one, that it involves no
logical contradiction, proves that a proposition which describes
the quality of a presented sense-content may as legitimately be
doubted as any other empirical proposition. And this shows
that such a proposition is not ostensive, for we have seen that an
ostensive proposition could not legitimately be doubted. But
propositions describing the actual qualities of presented sense-
contents are the only examples of ostensive propositions which
those who believe in ostensive propositions have ever ventured
to give. And if these propositions are not ostensive, it is certain
that none are.

In denying the possibility of ostensive propositions, we are not
of course denying that there really is a “given” element in each
of our sense-experiences. Nor are we suggesting that our sensa-
tions are themselves doubtful. Indeed such a suggestion would be
nonsensical. A sensation is not the sort of thing which can be
doubtful or not doubtful. A sensation simply occurs. What are
doubtful are the propositions which refer to our sensations, in-
cluding the propositions which describe the qualities of a pre-
sentated sense-content, or assert that a certain sense-content has
occurred. To identify a proposition of this sort with the sensation
itself would clearly be a gross logical blunder. Yet I fancy that
the doctrine of ostensive propositions is the outcome of such a tacit
identification. It is difficult to account for it in any other way.

However, we shall not waste time speculating about the origins
of this false philosophical doctrine. Such questions may be left to
the historian. Our business is to show that the doctrine is false,
and this we may fairly claim to have done. It should now be clear
that there are no absolutely certain empirical propositions. It is
only tautologies that are certain. Empirical propositions are one

1 Of course those who believe in “ostensive” propositions do not maintain
that such a proposition as “This is white” is valid in virtue of its form alone.
What they assert is that I am entitled to regard the proposition “This is white”
as objectively certain when I am actually experiencing a white sense-content.
But can it really be the case that they mean to assert no more than the trivial
tautology that when I am seeing something white, then I am seeing something
white? See following footnote.

2 It has subsequently occurred to me that the doctrine of ostensive propo-
sitions may be due to the confusion of the proposition “It is certain that
r implies p”—e.g. “It is certain that if I am in pain, then I am in pain”—
which is a tautology, with the proposition “r implies that (p is certain)”
e.g. “If I am in pain, then the proposition ‘I am in pain’ is certain,” which is,
in general, false. Vide my article on “The Criterion of Truth,” Analysis,
Vol. III, Nos. 1 and 2.
and all hypotheses, which may be confirmed or discredited in actual sense-experience. And the propositions in which we record the observations that verify these hypotheses are themselves hypotheses which are subject to the test of further sense-experience. Thus there are no final propositions. When we set about verifying a hypothesis we may make an observation which satisfies us at the time. But the very next moment we may doubt whether the observation really did take place, and require a fresh process of verification in order to be reassured. And, logically, there is no reason why this procedure should not continue indefinitely, each act of verification supplying us with a new hypothesis, which in turn leads to a further series of acts of verification. In practice we assume that certain types of observation are trustworthy, and admit the hypothesis that they have occurred without bothering to embark on a process of verification. But we do this, not from obedience to any logical necessity, but from a purely pragmatic motive, the nature of which will shortly be explained.

When one speaks of hypotheses being verified in experience, it is important to bear in mind that it is never just a single hypothesis which an observation confirms or discredits, but always a system of hypotheses. Suppose that we have devised an experiment to test the validity of a scientific "law." The law states that in certain conditions a certain type of observation will always be forthcoming. It may happen in this particular instance that we make the observation as our law predicts. Then it is not only the law itself that is substantiated, but also the hypotheses which assert the existence of the requisite conditions. For it is only by assuming the existence of these conditions that we can hold that our observation is relevant to the law. Alternatively, we may fail to make the expected observation. And in that case we may conclude that the law is invalidated by our experiment. But we are not obliged to adopt this conclusion. If we wish to preserve our law, we may do so by abandoning one or more of the other relevant hypotheses. We may say that the conditions were really not what they seemed to be, and construct a theory to explain how we came to be mistaken about them; or we may say that some factor which we had dismissed as irrelevant was really relevant, and support this view with supplementary hypotheses. We may even assume that the experiment was really not unfavourable, and that our negative observation was hallucinatory.

And in that case we must bring the hypotheses which record the conditions that are deemed necessary for the occurrence of a hallucination into line with the hypotheses which describe the conditions in which this observation is supposed to have taken place. Otherwise we shall be maintaining incompatible hypotheses. And this is the one thing that we may not do. But, so long as we take suitable steps to keep our system of hypotheses free from self-contradiction, we may adopt any explanation of our observations that we choose. In practice our choice of an explanation is guided by certain considerations, which we shall presently describe. And these considerations have the effect of limiting our freedom in the matter of preserving and rejecting hypotheses. But logically our freedom is unlimited. Any procedure which is self-consistent will satisfy the requirements of logic.

It appears, then, that the "facts of experience" can never compel us to abandon a hypothesis. A man can always sustain his convictions in the face of apparently hostile evidence if he is prepared to make the necessary ad hoc assumptions. But although any particular instance in which a cherished hypothesis appears to be refuted can always be explained away, there must still remain the possibility that the hypothesis will ultimately be abandoned. Otherwise it is not a genuine hypothesis. For a proposition whose validity we are resolved to maintain in the face of any experience is not a hypothesis at all, but a definition. In other words, it is not a synthetic but an analytic proposition.

That some of our most hallowed "laws of nature" are merely disguised definitions is, I think, incontestable, but this is not a question that we can go into here. It is sufficient for us to point out that there is a danger of mistaking such definitions for genuine hypotheses, a danger which is increased by the fact that the same form of words may at one time, or for one set of people, express a synthetic proposition, and at another time, or for another set of people, express a tautology. For our definitions of things are not immutable. And if experience leads us to entertain a very strong belief that everything of the kind A has the property of being a B, we tend to make the possession of this property a defining characteristic of the kind. Ultimately we may refuse to call anything A unless it is also a B. And in that case the sentence

1 For an elaboration of this view, see H. Poincaré, La Science et l'Hypothèse.
“All A’s are B’s,” which originally expressed a synthetic generalization, would come to express a plain tautology.

One good reason for drawing attention to this possibility is that the neglect of it by philosophers is responsible for much of the confusion that infects their treatment of general propositions. Consider the stock example, “All men are mortal.” We are told that this is not a doubtful hypothesis, as Hume maintained, but an instance of a necessary connection. And if we ask what it is that is here necessarily connected, the only answer that appears possible to us is that it is the concept of “man” and the concept of “being mortal.” But the only meaning which we attach to the statement that two concepts are necessarily connected is that the sense of one concept is contained in that of the other. Thus to say that “All men are mortal” is an instance of a necessary connection is to say that the concept of being mortal is contained in the concept of man, and this amounts to saying that “All men are mortal” is a tautology. Now the philosopher may use the word “man” in such a way that he would refuse to call anything a man unless it were mortal. And in that case the sentence “All men are mortal” will, as far as he is concerned, express a tautology. But this does not mean that the proposition which we ordinarily express by that sentence is a tautology. Even for our philosopher, it remains a genuine empirical hypothesis. Only he cannot now express it in the form: “All men are mortal.” Instead, he must say that everything which has the other defining properties of a man also has the property of being mortal, or something to that effect. Thus we may create tautologies by a suitable adjustment of our definitions: but we cannot solve empirical problems merely by juggling with the meanings of words.

Of course, when a philosopher says that the proposition “All men are mortal” is an instance of a necessary connection, he does not intend to say that it is a tautology. It is left to us to point out that this is all he can be saying, if his words are to bear their ordinary sense and at the same time express a significant proposition. But I think that he finds it possible to hold that this general proposition is both synthetic and necessary, only because he identifies it tacitly with the tautology which might, given suitable conventions, be expressed by the same form of words. And the same applies to all other general propositions of law. We may turn the sentences which now express them into expressions of definitions. And then these sentences will express necessary propositions. But these will be different propositions from the original generalizations. They, as Hume saw, can never be necessary. However, we firmly believe them, it is always conceivable that a future experience will lead us to abandon them.

This brings us once more to the question, What are the considerations that determine in any given situation which of the relevant hypotheses shall be preserved and which shall be abandoned? It is sometimes suggested that we are guided solely by the principle of economy, or, in other words, by our desire to make the least possible alteration in our previously accepted system of hypotheses. But though we undoubtedly have this desire, and are influenced by it to some extent, it is not the sole, or even the dominant, factor in our procedure. If our concern was simply to keep our existing system of hypotheses intact, we should not feel obliged to take any notice of an unfavourable observation. We should not feel the need to account for it in any way whatsoever—not even by introducing the hypothesis that we had just had a hallucination. We should simply ignore it. But, in fact, we do not disregard inconvenient observations. Their occurrence always causes us to make some alteration in our system of hypotheses in spite of our desire to keep it intact. Why is this so? If we can answer this question, and show why we find it necessary to alter our systems of hypotheses at all, we shall be in a better position to decide what are the principles according to which such alterations are actually carried out.

What we must do to solve this problem is to ask ourselves, What is the purpose of formulating hypotheses? Why do we construct these systems in the first place? The answer is that they are designed to enable us to anticipate the course of our sensations. The function of a system of hypotheses is to warn us beforehand what will be our experience in a certain field—to enable us to make accurate predictions. The hypotheses may therefore be described as rules which govern our expectation of future experience. There is no need to say why we require such rules. It is plain that on our ability to make successful predictions depends the satisfaction of even our simplest desires, including the desire to survive.

Now the essential feature of our procedure with regard to the formulation of these rules is the use of past experience as a guide to the future. We have already remarked upon this, when
discussing the so-called problem of induction, and we have seen that there is no sense in asking for a theoretical justification of this policy. The philosopher must be content to record the facts of scientific procedure. If he seeks to justify it, beyond showing that it is self-consistent, he will find himself involved in spurious problems. This is a point which we stressed earlier on, and we shall not trouble to argue it over again.

We remark, then, as a fact that our forecasts of future experience are in some way determined by what we have experienced in the past. And this fact explains why science, which is essentially predictive, is also to some extent a description of our experience.1

But it is noticeable that we tend to ignore those features of our experience which cannot be made the basis of fruitful generalizations. And, furthermore, that which we do describe, we describe with some latitude. As Poincaré puts it: “One does not limit oneself to generalizing experience, one corrects it; and the physicist who consented to abstain from these corrections and really be satisfied with bare experience would be obliged to promulgate the most extraordinary laws.”2

But even if we do not follow past experience slavishly in making our predictions, we are guided by it to a very large extent. And this explains why we do not simply disregard the conclusion of an unfavourable experiment. We assume that a system of hypotheses which has broken down once is likely to break down again. We could, of course, assume that it had not broken down at all, but we believe that this assumption would not pay us so well as the recognition that the system had really failed us, and therefore required some alteration if it was not to fail us again. We alter our system because we think that by altering it we shall make it a more efficient instrument for the anticipation of experience. And this belief is derived from our guiding principle that, broadly speaking, the future course of our sensations will be in accordance with the past.

This desire of ours to have an efficient set of rules for our predictions, which causes us to take notice of unfavourable observations, is also the factor which primarily determines how we adjust our system to cover the new data. It is true that we are infected with a spirit of conservatism and would rather make small alterations than large ones. It is disagreeable and troublesome for us to admit that our existing system is radically defective. And it is true that, other things being equal, we prefer simple to complex hypotheses, again from the desire to save ourselves trouble. But if experience leads us to suppose that radical changes are necessary, then we are prepared to make them, even though they do complicate our system, as the recent history of physics shows. When an observation runs counter to our most confident expectations, the easiest course is to ignore it, or at any rate to explain it away. If we do not do this, it is because we think that, if we leave our system as it is, we shall suffer further disappointments. We think it will increase the efficiency of our system as an instrument of prediction if we make it compatible with the hypothesis that the unexpected observation occurred. Whether we are right in thinking this is a question which cannot be settled by argument. We can only wait and see if our new system is successful in practice. If it is not, we alter it once again.

We have now obtained the information we required in order to answer our original question, “What is the criterion by which we test the validity of an empirical proposition?” The answer is that we test the validity of an empirical hypothesis by seeing whether it actually fulfills the function which it is designed to fulfill. And we have seen that the function of an empirical hypothesis is to enable us to anticipate experience. Accordingly, if an observation to which a given proposition is relevant conforms to our expectations, the truth of that proposition is confirmed. One cannot say that the proposition has been proved absolutely valid, because it is still possible that a future observation will discredit it; but one can say that its probability has been increased. If the observation is contrary to our expectations, then the status of the proposition is jeopardized. We may preserve it by adopting or abandoning other hypotheses; or we may consider it to have been confuted. But even if it is rejected in consequence of an unfavourable observation, one cannot say that it has been invalidated absolutely. For it is still possible that future observations will lead us to reinstate it. One can say only that its probability has been diminished.

It is necessary now to make clear what is meant in this context by the term “probability.” In referring to the probability of a
proposition, we are not, as is sometimes supposed, referring to an intrinsic property of it, or even to an unanalyzable logical relation which holds between it and other propositions. Roughly speaking, all that we mean by saying that an observation increases the probability of a proposition is that it increases our confidence in the proposition, as measured by our willingness to rely on it in practice as a forecast of our sensations, and to retain it in preference to other hypotheses in face of an unfavourable experience. And, similarly, to say of an observation that it diminishes the probability of a proposition is to say that it decreases our willingness to include the proposition in the system of accepted hypotheses which serve us as guides to the future.¹

As it stands, this account of the notion of probability is somewhat over-simplified. For it assumes that we deal with all hypotheses in a uniform self-consistent fashion, and this is unfortunately not the case. In practice, we do not always relate belief to observation in the way which is generally recognized to be the most reliable. Although we acknowledge that certain standards of evidence ought always to be observed in the formation of our beliefs, we do not always observe them. In other words, we are not always rational. For to be rational is simply to employ a self-consistent accredited procedure in the formation of all one's beliefs. The fact that the procedure, by reference to which we now determine whether a belief is rational, may subsequently forfeit our confidence, does not in any way detract from the rationality of adopting it now. For we define a rational belief as one which is arrived at by the methods which we now consider reliable. There is no absolute standard of rationality, just as there is no method of constructing hypotheses which is guaranteed to be reliable. We trust the methods of contemporary science because they have been successful in practice. If in the future we were to adopt different methods, then beliefs which are now rational might become irrational from the standpoint of these new methods. But the fact that this is possible has no bearing on the fact that these beliefs are rational now.

This definition of rationality enables us to amend our account of what is meant by the term "probability," in the usage with which we are now concerned. To say that an observation increases

¹ This definition is not, of course, intended to apply to the mathematical usage of the term "probability."
we have just described. For my own part, I do not find anything excessively paradoxical in the view that propositions about the past are rules for the prediction of those “historical” experiences which are commonly said to verify them,¹ and I do not see how else “our knowledge of the past” is to be analysed. And I suspect, moreover, that those who object to our pragmatic treatment of history are really basing their objections on a tacit, or explicit, assumption that the past is somehow “objectively there” to be corresponded to—that it is “real” in the metaphysical sense of the term. And from what we have remarked concerning the metaphysical issue of idealism and realism, it is clear that such an assumption is not a genuine hypothesis.²

CHAPTER VI

CRITIQUE OF ETHICS AND THEOLOGY

There is still one objection to be met before we can claim to have justified our view that all synthetic propositions are empirical hypotheses. This objection is based on the common supposition that our speculative knowledge is of two distinct kinds—that which relates to questions of empirical fact, and that which relates to questions of value. It will be said that “statements of value” are genuine synthetic propositions, but that they cannot with any show of justice be represented as hypotheses, which are used to predict the course of our sensations; and, accordingly, that the existence of ethics and aesthetics as branches of speculative knowledge presents an insuperable objection to our radical empiricist thesis.

In face of this objection, it is our business to give an account of “judgements of value” which is both satisfactory in itself and consistent with our general empiricist principles. We shall set ourselves to show that in so far as statements of value are

¹ The implications of this statement may be misleading, vide Introduction, p. 15.
² The case for a pragmatic treatment of history, in our sense, is well put by C. L. Lewis in Mind and the World Order, pp. 150–3.