Yael Tamir's "Hands Off Clitoridectomy" would appear to commit its author
to one or more of the following theses:
The first thesis is true, and it is useful to be reminded of it. Tamir does
not, however, produce much evidence to show that lack of self-criticism is a
grave problem for Americans on such issues. We find no shortage of criticism
of the ideal beauty image she describes, or of practices of dieting intended
to produce it; indeed, American feminists would appear to have devoted
considerably more attention to these American problems than to genital
mutilation, to judge from the success of books such as Naomi Wolf's The Beauty
Myth and Susan Bordo's Unbearable Weight. Indeed, I am inclined to think that
the problem lies in exactly the opposite direction: We indulge in moral
narcissism when we flagellate ourselves for our own errors while neglecting to
attend to the needs of those who ask our help from a distance.
The second thesis is surely false. (I do not think Tamir means to defend
it, but some of her rhetoric may be read as implying it.) It is wrong to
insist on cleaning up one's own house before responding to urgent calls from
outside. Should we have said "Hands off Apartheid," on the grounds that racism
persists in the United States? Or, during the Second World War, "Hands off the
rescue of the Jews," on the grounds that in the 1930's and 1940's every nation
that contained Jews was implicated in anti-Semitic practices? It is and should
be difficult to decide how to allocate one's moral effort between local and
distant abuses. To work against both is urgently important, and individuals
will legitimately make different decisions about their priorities. But the
fact that a needy human being happens to live in Togo rather than Idaho does
not make her less my fellow, less deserving of my moral commitment. And to
fail to recognize the plight of a fellow human being because we are busy
moving our own culture to higher moral ground seems the very height of moral
obtuseness and parochialism.
If the third thesis were true, it might support a decision to give priority
to the local in our political action (though not necessarily speech and
writing): If two abuses are morally the same and we have better local
information about one, and are better placed politically to do something about
it, that one seems to be a sensible choice to focus on in our actions here and
now. But is the third thesis true? Surely not. Let us enumerate the
differences.
These differences help explain why Vogue is not illegal, whereas FGM is
illegal in many of the countries where it occurs (including the Sudan, Kenya,
Egypt, Côte D'Ivoire, Burkina Faso), as well as in Western nations such as the
United Kingdom and France. (In the Sudan, the practice is punishable by up to
two years' imprisonment.) Such laws are not well enforced, but their existence
is evidence of a widespread movement against the practice in the countries
implicated. They also explain why Fauziya Kassindja, a woman from Togo about
to be coerced by her relatives into undergoing genital mutilation, was
recently able to win political asylum in the United States. Kassindja's case
is unusual in that she was 19, and her father, a wealthy progressive
businessman, had vetoed the operation until his death, when her aunt took
over; note that even in the case of a 19-year-old there was no question of
consent. The case was also unusual because Kassindja had access to enough
money to get a flight to the United States, something rarely true of women
facing FGM. The immigration Appeals Court ruling quoted from a report prepared
by the immigration service on the practice of FGM: "It remains particularly
true that women have little legal recourse and may face threats to their
freedom, threats or acts of physical violence, or social ostracization for
refusing to undergo this harmful traditional practice, or attempting to
protect their female children."4 We shall not see similar arguments for
political asylum for American women who have been urged to read Vogue, or
women whose mothers tell them to diet-however much it remains appropriate to
criticize the norms of female beauty displayed in Vogue (as some advertisers
have begun to do), the practices of some mothers, and the many covert
pressures that combine to produce eating disorders in our society. Similarly,
whereas the prospect of foot-binding of the traditional Chinese type (in which
the bones of the feet were repeatedly broken and the flesh of the foot became
rotten5) would, in my view, give grounds for political asylum, the presence of
advertisements for high-heeled shoes surely would not. Even the publication of
articles urging women to undergo FGM should be seen as altogether different
from attempts to force a woman to undergo the procedure.
A secondary theme in Tamir's article is an assault on the human value of
sexual functioning; she believes that hedonistic American feminists have
ascribed too much value to pleasure, and she suggests that it is men, above
all, whose interests are being served by this, because female sexual enjoyment
in our society is "seen as a measure of the sexual power and achievements of
men," and because men find women who do not enjoy sex more intimidating than
those who do. I am prepared to agree with Tamir to this extent: The attention
given FGM seems to me somewhat disproportionate, among the many gross abuses
the world practices against women-lack of equality under the law, lack of
equal access to education, sex-selective infanticide and feticide, domestic
violence, marital rape, rape in police custody, and many more. Unlike Tamir, I
believe that the reason for this focus is not a fascination with sex but the
relative tractability of FGM as a practical problem, given the fact that it is
already widely resisted and indeed illegal; how much harder to grapple with
women's legal inequality before Islamic courts, their pervasive hunger, their
illiteracy, their subjection to battery and violence. Surely Tamir is right
that we should not focus on this one abuse while relaxing our determination to
make structural changes that would bring women closer to full equality
worldwide.
I find her denigration of sexual pleasure flawed, however, by the failure
to make a crucial distinction: that between a function and the capacity to
choose that function. Nobody in this debate seems to me to be saying what
Tamir suggests-that celibacy is bad, that Mother Theresa has a starved life,
that orgasms are the be-all and end-all of life. I know of no opponent of FGM
who would not agree with Tamir's statement that women "are not merely sexual
agents, that their ability to lead rich and rewarding lives does not depend
solely on the nature of their sex life." But there is a great difference
between fasting and starving; just so, there is also a great difference
between celibacy and FGM. Celibacy involves the choice not to exercise a
capability to which even Mother Theresa herself, insofar as she is an orthodox
Roman Catholic, ascribes considerable human value. Its active exercise is
thought good for all but a few of those humans, and even for them it is the
choice not to use a capacity one has (as in the case of fasting) that is
deemed morally valuable. (A Catholic should hold that a survivor of FGM cannot
achieve the Christian good of celibacy.) FGM, by contrast, involves forgoing
altogether the very possibility of sexual functioning-and, as I said, well
before one is of an age to make such a choice. We all know that people who are
blind, or unable to walk, can lead rich and meaningful lives; nonetheless, we
would all deplore practices that deliberately disabled people in those
respects, nor would we think that critics of those practices are giving
walking, or seeing, undue importance in human life.
Can even the mothers of these girls make an informed choice as to the value
of female sexual pleasure? They have been immersed in traditional beliefs
about women's impurity; lacking literacy and education, as a large proportion
do, they cannot search out alternative paradigms. As the immigration report
points out, their situation is made more difficult by fear and powerlessness.
Equally important, their own experience of sexual life cannot have contained
orgasmic pleasure, if they themselves encountered FGM as girls; even if they
did not, they are highly likely to have experienced marriage and sexual life
largely as a series of insults to their dignity, given the ubiquity of
domestic violence and marital rape in these nations. Such facts do not show
that women who have had a more fortunate experience of marriage and sexuality
are making a mistake when they hold that the capacity for sexual pleasure
should be preserved for those who may choose to exercise it. There is
certainly something wrong with any social situation in which women are viewed
only or primarily as sex objects; but criticizing such perceptions has nothing
to do with defending FGM.
Nor does Tamir give us any reason to suppose that the importance of women's
sexual pleasure is a mythic construct of the male ego. Many women have
reported enjoying sex a good deal, and there is no reason to think them all
victims of false consciousness. It is probably true that some men find women
who don't enjoy sex more intimidating than those who do; but it would be more
than a little perverse to deny oneself pleasure simply in order to intimidate
men. Moreover, in the case of FGM, the operative male fear is surely that of
women's sexual agency, which is a sign that she is not simply a possession and
might even experience pleasure with someone other than her owner. It would be
highly implausible to suggest that African women can gain power and intimidate
men by undergoing FGM. The attack on FGM is part and parcel of a more general
attempt by women to regain control of their sexual capacities; it is thus a
relative of attacks on rape, marital rape, sexual harassment, and domestic
violence. It is precisely this challenge to traditional male control that many
men find threatening.
Tamir imagines a country called Libidia, where women with unnaturally
enlarged clitorises find they cannot do anything else but have sex, and
therefore seek to remove the clitoris in order to have better lives. In this
way she suggests that sexual pleasure undermines other valuable human
functions-so one might plausibly deem its removal a helpful thing, rather like
a trip to the dentist to get rid of a diseased tooth. She here expresses a
Platonic idea about the relation between continence and intellectual
creativity that may be true for some individuals at some times, but is surely
not a universal datum of human experience. Plato did indeed hold in the Phaedo
that mental life would be much better if bodily appetites could be put to one
side insofar as possible-though even he did not maintain this position with
absolute consistency, nor did he suggest genital mutilation as a remedy.6
Aristotle, on the other hand, held that someone who was insensible to the full
range of bodily pleasures would be "far from being a human being." We do not
need to decide who is right-or indeed for which people each of them is
right-in order to decide sensibly that FGM is not like an appendectomy, and
that it involves the removal of a capability for whose value history and
experience have had a great deal to say. Individuals may then choose whether
and how to exercise it, just as we also choose whether and how to use our
athletic and musical capacities.
Approximately two million girls a year encounter female genital
mutilation-approximately, then, 6,000 per day. Overall, there are in today's
world between 85 and 114 million women who have suffered FGM.7 Many of the
women and men in relevant nations who are struggling against this practice are
impoverished or unequal under the law or illiterate or powerless or in
fear-and often all of these. There is no doubt that they wish outside aid.
There is no doubt that they encounter domestic opposition-as is always the
case when one moves to change a deeply entrenched custom connected with the
structures of power. The presence of this opposition-eager, of course, to
brand their opponents as Westernizers, colonialists, and any other bad thing
that may carry public sentiment-should not intimidate outsiders who have
reasoned the matter out, at the same time listening to the narratives of women
who have been involved in the reality of FGM. In the United Nations, in Human
Rights Watch, and in many organizations throughout the world, the issue has
been debated, and the help of the powerful solicited. Even the not very
progressive INS has been swayed by the data it collected. In short,
international and national officials who have been culpably slow to recognize
gender-specific abuses as human rights violations are beginning to get the
idea that women's rights are human rights, and that freedom from FGM is among
them. Without abandoning a broader concern for the whole list of abuses women
suffer at the hands of unjust customs and individuals, we should continue to
keep FGM on the list of unacceptable practices that violate women's human
rights, and we should be ashamed of ourselves if we do not use whatever
privilege and power has come our way to make it disappear forever.
Double Moral Standards?
Martha Nussbaum
A response to Yael Tamir's "Hands Off
Clitoridectomy," from the October/November 1996 issue of
Boston Review.
usually performed in conditions that in
and of themselves are dangerous and unsanitary, conditions to which no child
should be exposed; dieting is not. Tamir's analogy to the dentist's chair is
highly
implausible.
economic and
political powerlessness, intimidation, and malnutrition.
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rights reserved. Please do not reproduce without permission.
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